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TERRORISM AND PREJUDICE – KNOWN AND UNKNOWN CAUSALITIES

Publishers

The Atlantic Initiative
Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo

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Copies

200



Norwegian Embassy
Sarajevo

Preventing Radicalisation, Violent Extremism and Terrorism Project is supported by the Embassy of the Kingdom of Norway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The views expressed in this publication belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Embassy of the Kingdom of Norway in Bosnia and Herzegovina.



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Sarajevo, 2023

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It is harder to crack prejudice than an atom.

Albert Einstein

INTRODUCTION

Prejudice based on national, ethnic, racial, religious, class or similar differences that divide people into groups pervade human life. For the most part, human history is marked by conflicts between different groups that often resulted in horrible and mass atrocities because of prejudice. As can be seen from recent history that we witnessed, such conflicts continue and it seems that the intensity of ethnic, religious or other conflicts is not decreasing. Only the means and forms of conflict change. Prejudice has always been the driver of various forms of hostility, ranging from discrimination to war crimes. Terrorism is generally considered the peacetime equivalent of a war crime (Horgan, 2005a). This book is an attempt to answer the question to what extent is prejudice the driving force behind involvement in terrorism.¹

Terrorism became the dominant form of violent political struggle of the weak against the strong in the last century, especially since the 1970s. The legal confrontation with phenomenon of terrorism has been going on an entire century. For half a century, terrorism has been intensively studied in a multidisciplinary manner. And yet, even the first step, defining terrorism, did not yield concrete results in terms of a consensual, generally accepted, unique definition. Phenomenological research on terrorism has offered a number of classifications and typologies that have helped the understanding of terrorism. Etiology has offered a series of theories about the causes of terrorism that have been accepted, re-examined, rejected, upgraded, changed, etc. The concept of radicalisation has changed the ways of understanding the individual becoming a terrorist. The question of why someone becomes a terrorist has been transformed into the question of how someone becomes a terrorist. Among the numerous theories about the causes of terrorism, the impact of prejudice against certain groups has not been established or investigated so far. Therefore, it constitutes an unexplored causality. On the other hand, the cause-and-effect connection between terrorism and the growth of prejudice has been repeatedly investigated and empirically proven, in such a way that a terrorist act leads to an increase in prejudice against the actual or perceived ethnic, religious, etc. group of the terrorist.

In general, terrorism research is marked by a lack of empirical data. For years, terrorism researchers and security experts have lamented the lack of primary data to understand terrorism (Braddock, 2019). Despite these complaints, most terrorism researchers have not presented primary data, used the rigorous scientific methods of the social sciences, or the benefits of statistical analysis. Sageman (2008) spoke critically about the scientific challenges of researching terrorism, stating that science is not a set of beliefs but a methodological procedure that tests hypotheses. In this sense, a large number of authors researching terrorism have concentrated on the cases of Osama bin Laden, the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 or the terrorist act in Bali in 2002. Researchers have erred in making generalisations based on individual cases. Other authors have used selective information, selecting facts that support their arguments while ignoring facts that contradict them.

1 All views expressed in this text belong exclusively to the author and do not reflect the views of the organisation in which he is employed.

Sageman (2008, p. 14) wants to open the scientific research on terrorism and suggests that it must specify or generate a set of data, which should be “representative of the terrorist universe.” In the thesis we have proposed, we suggest that prejudice is an important driver on the path of radicalisation towards terrorism. To investigate and empirically prove the hypothesis, we conducted research on the influence of ethnic prejudice on radicalisation that can lead to terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnia and Herzegovina and its post-conflict society are in a position to face a number of internal and transnational threats to security, peace and stability. One part of the threats is not specific to Bosnia and Herzegovina and generally refers to all countries to a lesser or greater extent. It is the increasingly widespread organised crime, the expansion of general crime, corruption, disruption of public security, etc. The second part of the threats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with far more serious possible consequences, refers to the observed radicalisation of society and individuals according to, *inter alia*, ethnic or somewhat broader ethno-religious identity principle. The aforementioned circumstances make Bosnia and Herzegovina an ideal place for this type of psycho-social research.

There is no doubt that terrorism affects the development of prejudice against the attackers’ social groups. On the other hand, deep-rooted prejudice is the basis for violent acts against members of the outgroup, which has been repeatedly confirmed throughout human history. The direction of causality between these two phenomena has not been fully investigated. One may point to an often quoted “cycle of violence” or “spiral of violence” in which a terrorist act leads to development of prejudice in society, which then leads to new terrorist attacks, etc. To reduce violence in society, it is necessary to break the “cycle/spiral” of violence in a specific, precisely determined place. This place can be a point in time where prejudice that leads to radicalisation is still developing in society, and which has not yet had its manifestation in terrorism. Intervention policies must be carefully created and implemented, respecting the patterns established through scientific and social research.

The book is a selected and abbreviated overview of the author’s doctoral dissertation. It consists of 10 chapters. The first four chapters theoretically address the research variables (terrorism, radicalisation and prejudice), mostly from the etiological aspect. The fifth chapter outlines the known causalities between the variables of prejudice and terrorism. The last five chapters present the empirical research conducted with the aim of determining whether there is an opposite causality, i.e., whether there is an influence of ethnic prejudice on radicalisation that can lead to terrorism.

1

1. DEFINING AND CONCEPTUALISING TERRORISM

Any sound scientific or expert discussion of terrorism begins with its definition. Unfortunately, discussions usually end without a comprehensive, uniform or consensual definition of this phenomenon. The extent of controversies in achieving a single definition of terrorism can be seen in the fact that several recognised authors in this field (Hoffman, Lutz and Lutz, Webel, Hudson) titled the chapters attempting to outline the definition of terrorism as “defining” terrorism rather than “definition of terrorism,” most likely because they were aware that the process is continuous and still short of an end result.

At the root of the word terrorism is terror (Lat. *terror*), which means terror, fear, dread and tremble, rule by intimidation, tyranny, political violence (Domović et al., 2002). The verb *terrere* in Latin means “to make tremble” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007). The suffix *-ism*, (Schmid, 2011; Thackrah, 2005) refers to the systematic character of terrorism, either at the theoretical level where this suffix is used in political philosophy (such as liberalism, socialism, etc.) or at the practical level, which implies a way of acting or an attitude (e.g. fanaticism). The word *terrorism*, although of Latin origin, has already become established in most of the world’s languages, including those of other linguistic origins.

Terrorism as a term comes from the period of the French Revolution – what was at that time called “*regime de la terreur*” - the regime of terror. *Terrorism* was coined by Edmund Burke to describe the state of terror or the “reign of terror” in revolutionary France (Gerwehr & Hubbard, 2007). As early as 1795, Burke wrote about “thousands of those hellhounds called terrorists.” However, the term terror at that time did not contain negative connotations among those it referred to. According to the 1796 French dictionary, the Jacobins used this term when they spoke and wrote about themselves in a positive way (Laqueur, 2002). In dealing with opponents, Maximilian Robespierre, the leader of the revolution, saw terror as prompt, severe and inflexible justice, i.e., an emanation of virtue (Bongar, 2007).

The differentiation of the terms terror and terrorism occurred already at the very beginning of their use. At the ousting of Robespierre and his followers from the Committee of Public Safety in 1794, the delegates to the French National Assembly could not accuse them of “terror” because they would have implicated themselves in the same act. The majority of delegates had previously voted for terror to be the method of enforcing order in France. Accordingly, Robespierre and the others were accused of “terrorism,” despotic, arbitrary and excessive violence, or criminal abuse of power (Schmid, 2011).

Recent research etymologically established the difference between terror and terrorism, although not clearly or consistently enough. They distinguish state terror from factional terror (Wilkinson, 2002), repressive terror from above, i.e., the action of those in power and terrorism as a clandestine resistance to authority (Crenshaw, 2000), terror as political violence by ruling structures directed mainly against the domestic population, and terrorism as violence perpetrated by non-state entities (Hoffman, 2006), simply terrorism from above by nation-states and terrorism from below by sub-national entities, i.e. individuals and like-minded groups (Web-

el, 2004).² Terror is a natural phenomenon, and terrorism is the conscious exploitation of it (Thackrah, 2005). Terror is one of the constitutive elements of terrorism (Bilandžić, 2010).

The meaning and use of the word terrorism has changed over time to adapt to the political language and discourse of each era, but no consistent definition has been established. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 redefined terrorism (Hoffman, 2006). There are many problems and controversies in defining terrorism, and it is concerning that there are no adequate solutions identified to overcome these problems, or they are not identified promptly, systematically, clearly or vigorously enough. The problem of defining terrorism has hindered analyses from the very start of the systematic study of terrorism in the early 1970s. In this sense, the term terrorism was used polemically, rhetorically and as a pejorative label that sought to condemn the opponent's cause as illegitimate (Crenshaw, 2000). When the term was used objectively, no satisfactory definition could be reached that would distinguish terrorism from other violent occurrences (war, political violence, violent extremism, hate crimes, etc.).

When deriving a definition, we should keep in mind the rules of defining and the constituent parts of each definition, i.e., the higher generic term (*genus proximum*) and the specific difference (*diferentia specifica*). In defining terrorism, the higher generic term is violence,³ i.e., violent act, violent action, violent attack or threat of violent attack. The specific differences in the definitions of terrorism are: political and ideological motivation as a basis, fear-mongering as a goal, impact on the wider-undecided mass, i.e., the public in terms of mobilisation, the use of very diverse, unusual methods and means to carry out attacks, etc.

To adequately define terrorism, the definition must contain five components (Mullins, 1997). First of all, the definition must recognise that terrorism is the instrumentalization of violence, which is not the end product of terrorism, but only a means to an end. Next, the definition must recognise that only the threat of violence is sufficient, without the violence itself materialising. Third, the production of fear in the civilian population is the real agent of political change, not violence directed against the government. Furthermore, the definition must recognise that violence is not directed against direct victims, but against civilians who are not victims. Finally, the definition must clearly specify the political purpose of terrorism, i.e., that political change and nothing else lies at the core of terrorism.

Schmid (2011) offers ten elements derived from academic and government definitions that cover the central features of terrorism, with the understanding that we should not expect to find all elements in all violent acts that we characterise as terrorism:

- 1) The open use of violence against human beings;
- 2) The (conditional) threat of (more) violence;
- 3) The deliberate production of terror or fear in a target group;
- 4) The targeting of civilians, non-combatants and innocents;
- 5) The purpose of intimidation, coercion and/or propaganda;
- 6) The fact that it is a method, tactic or strategy of waging conflict;

2 Webel singles out Walter Laqueur as one of the strongest proponents of narrowing the definition of terrorism to terrorism from below.

3 Schmid (2011) cites research from the 1980s in which he and his colleagues studied the frequency of occurrence of 22 elements in 109 definitions of terrorism. They found that violence appears in 83.5% of definitions of terrorism. This is followed by political goals that appear in 65% of the definitions. The element of causing fear and terror was underlined in 51% of the definitions. Next are threat (47%), psychological effects and reactions (41.5%), target differentiation (37.5%), purposeful, planned and systematic tactics (32%). Of the other elements, we single out how the aspect of publicity appears in only 21.5%, and the victimization of civilians in 17.5% of definitions, which are practically unavoidable elements in global terrorism.

- 7) The importance of communicating the act(s) of violence to larger audiences;
- 8) The illegal, criminal and immoral nature of the act(s) of violence;
- 9) The predominantly political character of the act;
- 10) Its use as a tool of psychological warfare to mobilise or immobilise the public sector.

Laqueur (1999) singles out the US Department of Defense definition of terrorism as a better one, which in 1990 described terrorism as the unlawful use, or threat of use, of force or violence against persons or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often in furtherance of political, religious or ideological goals. In this definition, we would remove the word “often,” since political, religious or ideological goals include practically all secondary objectives of terrorism and the word “unlawful,” given that all requirements for lawful use of force/violence are clearly and decisively prescribed both in national and international law. Also, we would reduce the instrumental part of the definition: “coercion or violence” to “violence” as a broader term. Furthermore, we would remove the word “religious” since the issue of terrorism is about the politicisation of religion, regardless of whether it is a deviation of a recognised confession or only a cult. Accordingly, the definition we offer is: **terrorism is committed or threatened violence directed against persons or property to achieve certain political-ideological goals through fear induced in society.**

2. ETIOLOGY OF TERRORISM – CAUSES OF EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is not simple, uniform or singular, but rather an extremely heterogeneous phenomenon by many of its characteristics. Each type and subtype of terrorism has its own specifics, that can be etiological, phenomenological or consequential for a particular society. That is why it is important to consider and study terrorism, as a product a product of its own place and time, in its own political, historical and cultural context (Post, 2006). Theoretical research of terrorism might centre on the causes, conduct and consequences of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1998a).

The causes of involvement in terrorism can be systematised on three levels: the individual/personal level, the group/organisational level and the societal/community level (Bjørge, 2005; Crenshaw, 2000; Horgan, 2009; McAllister & Schmid, 2011; Sageman, 2008). Lia and Skjølberg (2004) distinguish explanations at: a) the individual and group levels (of a psychological or socio-psychological character), b) the societal or national level (attempt to identify correlations between certain historical, cultural, and socio-political characteristics of the society), and c) the international level (seek to establish causal relationships between international relations and the occurrence of international terrorism). The causes of terrorism are therefore observed through three levels: micro-level, macro-level and middle-range analysis (Sageman, 2008).

Micro-level analyses are based on the assumption that there is something specific to terrorists that makes them do what they do. In this sense, for forty years psychologists throughout the world have tried to find this difference in relation to “normal population,” and no “terrorist personality” has emerged. “No one is born a terrorist:⁴ people become terrorists” (Sageman, 2008, str. 18). Research into the psychopathology of terrorism was almost unanimous in its conclusions that mental illnesses and abnormalities are not critical factors in terrorist behaviour. The prevalence of mental illness in a sample of imprisoned terrorists is as low or lower than in the general population (Borum, 2004). Individual psychology failed to provide sufficient explanations of terrorists’ psychology and behaviour. They were provided by group, organisational and social psychology, particularly emphasising collective identity (Post, 2005a). Terrorists subordinate individual identity to collective identity. What is in the interest of the group, organisation or network becomes of primary importance. In nationalist-terrorist groups, the collective identity is adopted extremely early, so that “hatred is bred in the bone” (Post, 2005a, p. 196).

Broader sociological theories form the second most common type of explanation for terrorism. This is a macro level frequently referred to as understanding the “root causes” of terrorism, which are believed to lie in social, economic, political, cultural and historical factors (Sageman, 2008). When analysing the macro level, Sageman rightly raises the question of why so few people become terrorists in the same social, economic, political and cultural environment. Focusing on macro-level society is an external part of an internal micro-level

4 In the same way that Lombroso’s theory of the “born criminal” was abandoned in criminology (AN).

explanation. External factors lead individuals to terrorism.

Sageman (2008) highlights the middle-range perspective as a new approach to the analysis of the causes of terrorism. This approach is focused on the circumstances of terrorist activities in the field – on the way of individual development into terrorists, interaction with other people, involvement in terrorist groups, motivation, influence of ideas and ideologues, etc. Sageman places the emphasis of the middle-range perspective on processes of interaction in the context of: radicalisation, mobilisation, motivation and, perhaps, separation. In radical extremist groups, many would-be terrorists find not only a sense of meaning, but also of belonging, connection and affiliation.

The causes of terrorism differ in terms of the explanations offered, which refer to the individual and group level; explanations at the social and national level; and explanations at the systemic or international level (Björge, 2005). The investigation of psychological motivations for involvement in terrorism, as well as for ending terrorism, should be based on a model that integrates the individual, group and society. Terrorists should not be viewed in isolation from their social and political context (Crenshaw, 2000). Three simple critical variables associated with terrorist development are personal factors, setting events, and the social, political and organisational context (Horgan, 2009). Personal factors relate to the psychological factors as experienced by the individual. These include risk factors such as certain emotional states of an individual, reducing of moral restraints about the use of violence, immediate experiences, peer pressure, etc. Setting events relate to past contextual influence. These are experiences that are unchangeable because they have already happened to an individual as part of their socialisation through friends, family, society, culture, religion, etc. The social, political and organisational context refers to a series of influences of a political, ideological and organisational nature that shape the individual's decision-making.

However, these factors at different levels should not be viewed exclusively. Post (2007) identified that the main influence on an individual's decision to become a terrorist was precisely the social environment.⁵ He found the following important motivational factors:

- Religion that played a strong role;
- Community support, which was also important to the families of fighters;
- Blessing of all actions by the emir;
- Increase in social reputation resulting from joining Hamas or Fatah;
- Simple "institutionalisation" of joining terrorist organisations as a social norm, and
- The hatred for the Israelis, which was strong, especially considering that several terrorists stated that they had no contact with them.

From the above theses, the most interesting seems to be the last one – strong hatred for the Israelis developed among terrorists, although several terrorists stated that they had "no contact with them." It is evident that prejudice and hatred acquired through the socialisation and other social learning processes, i.e., social transmission of prejudice, played an important role, which theoretically strengthens the main hypothesis of our research, according to which prejudice is found in the causal chain that leads to terrorism.

Borum (2004) sees injustice, identity and belonging as factors that strongly influence decisions to enter terrorist organisations and to engage in terrorist activity. McCauley (2012) puts it in simple terms – terrorists kill for the same reasons that groups have killed other groups for centuries. They kill for cause and comrades, that is, with a combination of ideology and intense small-group dynamics. Causes have been set throughout

⁵ The author interviewed 35 terrorists from the Middle East, who are serving sentences in Israeli and Palestinian prisons.

history. Sacrifice in pursuance of the group cause gives meaning not only to life but also to death. Thus, the immortality of an individual results from belonging to a group: family, cultural, religious, ideological. Hoffman (2006) distinguishes terrorists from ordinary criminals precisely on the basis of the cause. Terrorists are altruistic, they serve a higher cause, while criminals follow exclusively egoistic aims. If harming the outgroup is an integral part of the cause, then prejudice against the outgroup is an integral part of this social dynamic.

While, according to Gurr (2006), ideologies are key to the growth of political terrorism, Smelser (2007) points out that ideology must be regarded as only one factor in the motivating process. Other important factors are personality traits, location in the social structure, recruitment mechanisms, group processes that foster commitment, conformity and loyalty, and the media. Horgan (2014) underlines that the influence of ideology is not at all questionable, but it is not clear to what extent ideological content shapes individual behaviour. Bjørgo (2005) divides the levels of causality of terrorism into:

- Structural causes affecting people's lives on a macro level (demographic imbalances, globalisation, rapid modernisation, transitional societies, increasing individualism, relative deprivation, class structure, etc.);
- Facilitator (or accelerator) causes that make terrorism possible or attractive (evolution of modern news media, transportation, weapons technology, etc.);
- Motivational causes (real grievances that people experience on a personal level). Ideology and political leaders are sometimes able to translate causes from a structural level up to a motivational level, thereby moving people to act.
- Triggering causes are the direct precipitators of terrorist acts (significant or provocative events, for example a violent act committed by the enemy or other acts that call for revenge or action).

2.1. The root causes of terrorism in the world

The scientific and expert debates about the causes of terrorism in the world have an important place for the theory on the root causes that lie in the historically conditioned inequalities in the distribution of power and wealth both globally and locally.

Bjørgo (2005) asks whether after the 9/11 terrorist attacks it is even necessary to discuss the issue of the root causes of terrorism in the world? On the one hand, there are authors who argue that it is irrelevant and apologetic and that terrorism needs to be crushed and uprooted. Authors of opposing views argue that dealing exclusively with symptoms, without studying the conditions that favoured the emergence or provided fertile ground for terrorism, extremism and violence can only contribute to its growth and spread. In fact, the war on terrorism can produce more terrorism.

National oppression and social inequalities are often cited as the root causes of terrorism. However, no explanation is given as to why the struggle for political freedom, national liberation or secession only sometimes led to terrorism (Laqueur, 1999, 2002). The author wonders why some national minorities opted for terrorism and others did not. Why, for example, did the Basque militants get involved in a long-term terrorist campaign, while the Catalans did not? History shows that opting for terrorism has little to do with the severity of the oppression measured by any acceptable standard. Terrorism is a matter of perception, of historical, social and cultural traditions, and of political calculus (Laqueur, 1999). Contrary to this claim, Gurr (2006) states that, in addition to other factors, the size of the population also plays an important role. Denying the right to equal social and economic opportunities or preventing the expression of cultural identity, for example through the ban on writing and publishing in one's own language, the ban on practicing religion, especially in case of a fairly large minority, often leads to growth of self-determination movements. If they are also denied access to politics,

the likelihood of choosing violent forms of struggle, including terrorism, increases.

In most cases, terrorism is a continuation and radicalisation of various types of conflicts. The root causes of these conflicts are the root causes of terrorism (Bjørge, 2005). These are conflicts between different ethno-nationalist groups, ethnic minorities and governments, different ideological groups and governments or rival ideological groups, etc. Campaigns of political terrorism in democratic societies almost always emerge from larger conflicts and reflect the political beliefs and aspirations of a larger part of society (Gurr, 1998). In this context, there are two main routes by which members of such groups come to accept extreme means: radicalisation and reaction. Radicalisation is characteristic of groups with future-oriented objectives, where a group has been mobilised in pursuit of a social or political objective but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists. Reaction occurs in defence of a group's threatened rights and status. Members of a community or political group resort to terrorism in response to threatening social change or intervention by authorities. Reaction is characteristic of right-wing terrorism.

The social causes of terrorism are found in the historical interaction of classes and castes, or the ethnic, racial and religious groups (O'Neill & Alberts, 2007). Once peoples began to see themselves as nations, the possibility of political violence rooted in feelings of nationalism became more likely (Lutz & Lutz, 2008). The practice of terrorism is one of the potential tools for any nationalist group that aspires to some kind of political autonomy or independence. O'Neill and Alberts (2007) argue that the situation is particularly dangerous when class differences coincide and are reinforced with racial, ethnic or religious differences, which in itself can lead to violence and terrorism. If racial, ethnic and religious groups coincide with nation-states, we can speak of national cultures and structures. In social situations where two or more groups with different feelings of identity exist within the borders of one nation-state, the term subnationalism is often used to characterise the group. Furthermore, in situations where different identities are reinforced by large differences in social values, structures and language, the term subculture can be applied. Similarly, Weinberg (2006), referring to Engene (2004), states that there is a modest, but meaningful statistical association between ethnic diversity and the incidence of terrorist violence. The more ethnically diverse the country, the more terrorism it experiences, especially when the violence is motivated by ethnic grievances. Socially homogeneous countries are much less vulnerable, and democracies that include permanent ethnic minorities are particularly vulnerable, precisely because of the majority system.⁶

The potential for violence and terrorism exists if a group perceives that it faces disabilities because of ethnic or national differences (Lutz & Lutz, 2008). With respect to ethno-nationalist terrorism, the experience of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origin is the chief root cause (Bjørge, 2005). When sizeable minorities are systematically deprived of their rights to equal social and economic opportunities, obstructed from expressing their cultural identities (e.g., forbidden to use their language or practice their religion), or when they are excluded from political influence, all of the above can result in the growth of the popularity of secessionist movements, which, among other things, can turn to terrorism and similar forms of violent political struggle. This is particularly the case when the conflict becomes long-standing and bitter, with few prospects for a resolution acceptable for both sides. Choi and Piazza (2014) studied whether the exclusion of ethnic groups from political power is an important contributing factor to terrorism generation. Study results showed that countries in which certain ethnic populations are excluded from political power are significantly more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks. Political exclusion is a more consistent and substantive predictor of

⁶ We consider Weinberg's findings extremely important for Bosnia and Herzegovina, bearing in mind the country's social heterogeneity.

domestic terrorist activity than general political repression or economic discrimination. The vast majority of terrorists were middle-class (Sageman, 2008). Accordingly, it is clear that poverty does not cause terrorism even if terrorists claim to carry out attacks in the name of poor brothers. It is a question of indirect poverty, not one's own destitution. Gurr (2006) also finds inequalities a more important source of terrorism than poverty, with the fact that weak states are also a contributing factor to terrorism (Lutz & Lutz, 2008).

Theories about root causes of terrorism address also the influence of globalisation, which has increased inequalities and social polarisation within and between nations. Wars, economic problems and globalisation have bred situations that have contributed to terrorism in later years (Lutz & Lutz, 2008). Economic deprivation increases the demands for political change (Gotchev, 2006). Economic disparities usually lead to political insurgencies and terrorism as a method of achieving the desired goals. Macro studies show that terrorism can occur anywhere but is more common in developing societies rather than in the poorest countries or in the developed West. It is especially likely to emerge in societies characterised by rapid modernisation and lack of political rights (Gurr, 2006).

While in the West, Huntington's thesis about the clash of civilisations, in which fights and wars will take place along the dividing line with the civilisation of Islam, is being thrown out of the debate on terrorism, Korteweg et al. (2010) see exactly the opposite – Islamist extremism considers its war against the West a clash of civilisations. Radical Islamists hate everything that represents “decadent” Western civilisation: commerce, the banking system, sexual freedom, artistic freedom, secularism, democracy, religious tolerance, scientific pursuits and pluralism, and they reject Western civilisation and strive for a puritanical, simple and uncorrupted world, that is based on religious principles. Miller (2004) argues with caution that Huntington's thesis and Osama bin Laden's doctrine are extremely similar. The clash of civilisations thesis provided the perfect ideological foundation for circumventing the complex economic, political and ideological triggers of the globalisation of terrorism (Vidmar-Horvat, 2010).

In conclusion, conditions conducive to terrorism recognised at the level of the UN and the OSCE include prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanisation of victims of terrorism, lack of rule of law, violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalisation and lack of good governance (OSCE, 2014).

2.2. Terrorism and identity issues

At the centre of theoretical considerations of terrorism-identity connection is Henri Tajfel's theory/perspective of social identity. An important theoretical construct for understanding the influence of identity on terrorism is the process of cognitive categorisation that leads to the dehumanisation of outgroups. Sageman (2017) sees this process as crucial to understanding collective behaviour, including terrorism and counter-terrorism.

What is this actually about? Categorisation is a fast and natural process of simplifying our environment by creating categories of objects sorted out on the basis of apparently common attributes (Sageman, 2017). Social categorisation separates people into groups. We share a common collective identity with certain groups. Similar to the process of social categorisation as the basis for the existence of prejudice in which the ingroup (the one to which we belong) and the outgroup are distinguished, terrorism also requires the separation of people into two categories. We distinguish the “we” whose interests should be pursued through terrorist activities, from the “them” that are targeted by terrorist activities. This cognitive dichotomy can be based on religious, ethnic, racial or other cultural criteria. In this dichotomy, “we” are seen as moral, right, good and strong, and “they” are

immoral, wrong, bad and weak (Schwartz et al., 2009).

Such categorisation is not only important for members of terrorist organisations and potential targets of their attacks. Categorisation is, to put it mildly, a construct offered to the entire audience observing terrorist activities. In this sense, we observe terrorist activities in the context of identity determinants on which we were formed (Azinović, 2012). When we share a common identity with groups and individuals who use terrorism, we are more likely to understand their political goals and be more inclined to justify the violence they use. A sense of shared identity leads us to view events in the world in terms of their significance for us as members of a group, rather than what implications these events may have for us as individuals. In other words, when members of a violent political group are on our side, we attribute to them the virtues of “freedom fighters.” When they are on the opposite side, they are terrorists (Sageman, 2017).⁷

For identity formation to result in conflict, two processes need to occur: a formulation of group membership, and an articulation of cultural distance⁸ between groups, allowing for the dehumanisation necessary to victimise outgroups (McAllister & Schmid, 2011). Self-categorisation, or the acquisition of a shared social identity, facilitates and makes collective behaviour possible. It simultaneously decreases intra-group differences and sharpens inter-group differences. It also erases outgroup members’ individual differences and reduces them to one-dimensional stereotypes, which results in the illusion of the homogeneity of the outgroup. Further depersonalisation of outgroup members combined with stereotypes can lead to their dehumanisation (Sageman, 2017). According to the social identity perspective, dehumanisation of outgroup members can be natural and automatic, i.e., part of self-categorisation. In such conditions, there is no need for any additional process of desensitisation, indoctrination, or brainwashing towards radicalisation. For example, the Islamic State dehumanises and demonises anyone who is not a Sunni Muslim aligned with IS (Ingram, 2016). In protracted conflicts, the enemy is more perceived as less than human (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011) – thus dehumanised.

Only a small number of societies managed to separate the phenomenon of collective identity from violence. Most societies are not homogeneous but structured, stratified, differentiated and heterogeneous in identity (Lalić, 2014). Common social differences in socially unfavourable circumstances can lead to strong polarisation leading to intergroup violence. These extremely unfavourable circumstances are usually related to periods of sudden social upheavals during sudden changes in the economic structure, demographic changes, migrations, political instability, acts of terrorism, revolutions or wars. Such changes, in addition to introducing instability into social life, also create insecurity for individuals and social groups who perceive a real or apparent threat to collective identity. The heterogeneity or homogeneity of a society can have an impact on the emergence or outbreak of terrorism as a chosen way of violent expression of certain political aspirations. However, when it comes to individual involvement in a terrorist organisation, some findings show completely different results. Post (1998) points to Clark’s studies (1983) of the social backgrounds of the Basque separatist ETA⁹ terrorists as interesting. The Basque region of Spain is extremely homogenous. Only eight percent of the families are of mixed Basque-Spanish origin. The offspring of these families are treated as half-breeds and reviled. The studies of ETA members reveal that a much higher percentage (more than 40 percent) of terrorists come from mixed Basque-Spanish parentage, suggesting they are sociologically marginal. They are attempting to “out-Basque the

⁷ In this context, Sageman highlights the example of Jalaluddin Haqqani, who was a freedom fighter at the time of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and then became a terrorist, while his activities remained identical.

⁸ Cultural, social, ethnic or similar distance is a measure of prejudice towards outgroups, depending on which basis of social categorization is operative.

⁹ ETA - *Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna* (Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement).

Basques” to demonstrate through their acts of terrorism their authenticity (Post, 1998). Observed through the lens of mass psychology, we consider this finding to be almost expected. The most insecure individuals in the mass show a willingness to commit the most extreme acts. In this case, individuals of “impure” Basque identity strive to “ethnically purify their blood” by engaging in the violent promotion of ethnic Basque ideas.

Terrorist rhetoric is polarising and absolutist (Post, 1998). It is a black and white “us vs. them” rhetoric with no shades of grey. The individual, unable to face his own shortcomings, needs a target to blame and attack. To consider “them” as the source of our problems provides a powerful psychologically satisfying explanation for what has gone wrong in our lives. “Us versus them” thinking evidently exists in conflicts based on ethnicity (Schwartz et al., 2009). Ethnic grievances can convince any group that its territory or rights have been illegally usurped. Cultural values can promote, tolerate or oppose terrorism as a strategy for conducting political conflict. For terrorist activities to develop, it is also necessary that group cultural values include strong collectivist principles, i.e., thinking in the categories of “us and them,” and there is also a need to perceive threats to the group’s existence, and derogation and dehumanisation of members of the outgroup.

At the level of personal identity, Schwartz et al. (2009) observe two potential outcomes that may be particularly relevant for the emergence of a terrorist identity. These are authoritarian foreclosure and the aimless diffusion of identity. Authoritarian foreclosure means the adoption of certain commitments without considering alternatives, while identity diffusion represents noncommitment and involvement with little or no systematic research. In authoritarian foreclosure, being a “terrorist” becomes a central element in defining oneself, although the term one attributes to oneself is usually “freedom fighter,” “defender of faith,” etc. Individuals who are aimlessly diffuse are especially vulnerable to terrorist seduction since terrorist ideologies provide determination, purpose and commitment, in the sense of giving direction to a life that had no guidance before.

Therefore, the social identity theory tried to explain the connections between terrorism and identity issues in the first place. However, it does not provide answers as to why such a large number of people who have a developed collective identity do not at the same time show signs of radicalisation. The social identity perspective emphasises that even if someone identifies with a certain group, he/she does not do everything that the members of that group suggest (Blackwood et al., 2016). In response to this question, Berger (2017b) suggests that for the development of violent extremism it is not enough to identify with an internal group, but also there needs to be the outgroup that is perceived as threatening to the interests of the group which we identify with.¹⁰

On the other hand, McCauley (2007) points out that the strength of group identification is the basis of intergroup conflict, especially in large groups. Schwartz et. al. (2009) explain that not only are the processes of cultural, social and personal identity in the background of terrorism, but also the interaction between specific cultural, social and personal identity configurations plays a major role in determining the probability that someone will engage in terrorism. One of the first preconditions of terrorism is collectivism, i.e., the prioritisation of the group over the individual. Post (2005b) highlights the fusion of individual and group identity with members of terrorist organisations, i.e., the subordination of the individual to the collective identity. Primacy is given to what serves the group, organisation or network. By placing individual identity at the organisation’s disposal, there is no room left for individual ideas, individual identity and individual decision-making. An important role is played by terrorist leaders who can be seen as “identity managers” (Schwartz et al., 2009). Identity is the final element of ideology (Berger, 2017a).

10 One can further argue that even with the existence of a threatening outgroup, not all nor most of the members of the ingroup decide to engage in terrorism. The mechanism that encourages them to radicalise and join, according to our thesis, is the adopted prejudices against the outgroup.

The question of identity is one of the central issues of ethnic terrorism. An ethnic terrorist group begins a struggle to strengthen its ethnic identity. Other identities such as region, tribe, sect, family, and state are rival sources of identity for individuals. Accordingly, the first task for terrorists is to make ethnicity politically salient to the larger ethnic community. This is followed by the mobilisation of identity, which must be organised in order to become politically effective (Byman, 1998). However, issues of identity are not only central to ethnic terrorism. Religious terrorism finds these issues as extremely important, as does radical right-wing terrorism. The sense of identity is at the heart of radicalisation of the extreme right in Europe (Kallis et al., 2018). The identity crisis experienced by especially young immigrants of ethnic origin from Muslim countries to the West is also an important factor in the path of mobilisation and radicalisation towards terrorism. McCauley (2012) outlines the idea of two prominent intellectuals that Muslim radicalisation in Europe is a product of political alienation. In this sense, he refers to Roy (2004) who sees radical Islam as emerging from modern challenges to traditional Muslim identity and Fukuyama (2006) who argues that Muslims in the West, especially in Europe, have adopted the global *Umma* as identity as was proposed by Osama bin Laden. According to this statement, alienation stems from unresolved issues, i.e., the identity crisis of Muslims in the West. Radicalisation is directly related to the identity crisis, and especially to the feeling of not being accepted or not belonging, which can be the result of a number of factors, such as the experience of discrimination and inequality, racism, recent migration, and generally lack of affinity or loss of connection with family, community and state. The search for identity is viewed in a similar context. Schwartz et al. (2009) disagree with the aforementioned – they argue that among the main errors in reasoning about terrorism¹¹ is the claim that individuals engage in terrorism because of the “search” for identity. Quite the opposite, they get involved in terrorism as a way of expressing an already existing identity.

The concept of identity is also important for the opposite side, the one dealing with counterterrorism. Sageman analyses President George Bush’s mobilising speech against Al Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks in which Bush reminded Americans of their social identity by declaring that “any attack on one American, or three thousand, was an attack on all Americans” (Sageman, 2017, p. 2) and concludes that the threat to “us” made our self-conception as Americans far more relevant than our individual identities. The view of “Americans in danger” stressed the shared identity that dwarfed individual differences. Bush eloquently marked “us,” the people who love freedom, against “those” who hate freedom, which maximised Americans’ differences from evildoers and stressed the common traits as Americans. By manufacturing a sense of shared identity in the fight against terrorists, Bush mobilised the country for war.

Sageman (2017) links social identity theory to the root causes of terrorism. His main argument is that political violence arises from the political protest community, i.e., the gradual breaking of the illusions of the effectiveness of peaceful activities. The process of turning to political violence and terrorism begins with grievances, which activates a politicised social identity against the state and society, resulting in political protest community. Some grievances are political in nature from the outset, especially in different constituencies made up of multiple ethnic, sectarian, industrial, immigrant and political interests. The state should ensure that everyone has proportional and fair representation in the political arena, that all members of the country feel included as full-fledged by treating them equally. We agree with the Sageman’s view. Any inequality leads to polarisation between groups that are not treated equally, leading to prejudice against all members of the outgroup. Further polarisation leads to radicalisation, which can result in violent political actions, i.e., terrorism.

11 As the key errors Schwartz et al. point out the neglect of understanding terrorism from the terrorist’s perspective; viewing terrorism as a product of individual psychopathology and classifying terrorists as criminals or antisocial persons.

Identity issues are an important driver of terrorism, regardless of whether it is the preservation of one's own identity, the search for identity or an identity crisis at the individual level. The aforementioned demonstrates an undeniable connection between terrorism and collective identity. The thesis presented here shows that the process of social identification is not a sufficient basis for explaining the causes of terrorism. Almost all people on the planet have a social identity on different grounds, and an extremely small part engages in terrorist acts against other identity groups or their members. We see a transitional phase in the development of prejudice as a step on the road to radicalisation that can lead to terrorism. Of course, not all people who have adopted prejudice automatically turn to violence. The intensity of the behavioural manifestation of adopted prejudices according to Allport (1954) ranges from antilocution to open conflict.

2.3. Psychological theories on the causes of terrorism

In contrast to the first attempts at a psychological explanation of terrorism,¹² which pursued the causes at the individual level, Crenshaw (2000) argues that today it is generally accepted that multiple levels of analysis must be taken into account in the psychological considerations of terrorism, in which individual factors are connected with the group and society as a whole.

Borum (2004) categorises psychological theories of terrorism into:

- First generation psychological research on terrorism, which includes psychoanalytic theory, narcissism and early typologies, emphasising the structure of personality, and
- Contemporary psychological research on terrorism, emphasising motive and vulnerability as psychological factors that can influence the circumstances in which certain people in a certain environment can become involved in the process of becoming a terrorist.

Early psychological theories about the causes of terrorism were all dismissed as unfounded. The psychopathology of terrorism within a psychoanalytic framework comes from unconscious motives and impulses that have their origins in childhood. It is connected with the “conflict of generations” theory, which is based on a Freudian interpretation of terrorism as a psychological reaction of sons against fathers rooted in the Oedipus complex. The narcissistic theory places the roots of terrorism in a personality defect that produced a damage sense of self (Borum, 2004). For the psychopathological theory, Victoroff (2005) argues that at one end of the spectrum there is a popular opinion according to which terrorists are psychopaths or mentally ill. The claim of sociopathy of terrorism, although without empirical evidence, raises the important question of whether terrorism is antisocial or prosocial behaviour. A common-sense conclusion would be that any person who is willing to hurt others manifests antisocial behaviour. Yet several lines of reasoning tend to discredit the simplistic claim that terrorist behaviour is antisocial. First, extensive evidence supports the observation that terrorists are often regarded by their ingroup as heroes, i.e., freedom fighters. Second, evidence exists in literature that the actions of terrorists, even those who fail and die, might benefit their kin or social group they belong to. Horgan (2014) underlines that not all psychopathic individuals engage in violent behaviour, but violence is often an outlet for aggressive and impulsive tendencies associated with psychopathy. When analogies to terrorism are drawn, Horgan sees as relevant indications the psychopath's lack of remorse or guilt for their own activities and egotistical worldview incompatible with feeling

12 Psychological research into terrorism was preceded by criminological research characteristic for the time when terrorism took place. In the 1870s, as terrorism was gaining strength not only in Russia but also in Italy, criminologist Cesare Lombroso believed that criminality in general was a congenital condition, and he attributed terrorist behaviour, and in particular bomb throwing to pellagra and other vitamin deficiencies (Reich, 1998).

any genuine concern for the welfare of others. However, the psychopathy argument is limited.

As we have already emphasised, contemporary psychological theories link terrorism to two factors, motive and vulnerability (Borum, 2004). One's motivation for engaging in terrorism is essentially the cause or ideology of the group. Based on a review of the existing literature three motivational themes – injustice, identity, and belonging – appear to be prominent and consistent. Perceived injustice has long been recognised a central factor in understanding violence generally and terrorism specifically. Search for identity may draw an individual to extremist or terrorist organisations in a variety of ways. A variant on this process is one in which an individual defines his or her identity simply through group membership. In radical extremist groups, many prospective terrorists find not only a sense of meaning, but also a sense of belonging, connectedness and affiliation (Borum, 2004). These motives are also related to potential vulnerability, and one could often see how all three factors appear cumulatively in terrorists.

Victoroff (2005) divided psychological theories of terrorism into psychoanalytic and non-psychoanalytic. Psychoanalysis is based on the proposition that much of mental life is unconscious. Psychological development proceeds in stages based on infantile sexual fantasies, and that psychological distress derives from unresolved intrapsychic conflict regarding those fantasies. According to Victoroff, psychoanalytic theories include identity theory associated with low self-esteem, i.e., undeveloped identity,¹³ narcissism theory, paranoia theory and absolutist-apocalyptic theory. Among the non-psychoanalytic theories, Victoroff includes cognitive theories, novelty-seeking theory and humiliation-revenge theory.

Against these theories, Horgan (2017) argues that psychology cannot currently offer clear answers as to why some individuals engage in terrorism while the majority do not and claims that there is a broader consensus in the psychological literature on terrorism that situational characteristics determine terrorist behaviour, which does not mean that there is no room for personal disposition to terrorism. Similarly, Crenshaw (2000) points out that most terrorism analysts do not consider personal factors important for terrorist behaviour, rather that terrorism primarily constitutes a group activity. Terrorism is not the result of psychopathology or the personality of an individual type. Shared ideological commitment and group solidarity are far more important determinants of terrorist behaviour than individual characteristics. However, Post (2006) argues that within each group we can find motivational differences among the members. Furthermore, Horgan (2005a) argues that an individual psychological approach to understanding terrorists is not possible due to the immense heterogeneity of terrorism. Arguments about heterogeneity are also supported by cultural factors. It is quite clear how Western analysts have very little knowledge and do not understand the fundamental social, cultural and other relevant differences that exist between Western Europe, the Middle East or Asia. Horgan points out that researchers must recognise the importance of the heterogeneity of terrorism, not only across the spectrum of different terrorist groups, but even within specific groups.

Analyses of terrorism from the individual level, which were based on the psychological characteristics of the individual, after the initial research in this direction, led to the rejection of assumptions about the existence of a specific terrorist type of personality. Further research has established that there is no typical terrorist profile and that profiling in the fight against terrorism is an extremely wrong approach. A large number of authors gave their opinion on the (non)existence of abnormal personality traits in terrorists or a specific personality profile of terrorists. There is no terrorist personality, nor is there any accurate psychological or any other profile of a terrorist (Borum, 2004). There is no standard terrorist profile, but there are repeating characteristics (Roy,

13 Identity as understood here is in no way related to social identity theory.

2017a, 2017b). A detailed analysis of the attackers confirmed that there is no single terrorist profile, which is one of the least contested facts in terrorism research (Vidino et al., 2017). There is no identifiable set of sociological, demographic, or personality traits that predict someone will be drawn to terrorism (Braddock, 2019). The notion of a “typical profile” due to its deterministic and behaviouristic character is questionable in theory and counterproductive in practice (Guidère, 2012). Post (2005a) points out that it is not difficult to prove that terrorists are psychologically “normal” in the sense that they are not clinically psychotic, depressed, seriously emotionally disturbed, or crazy fanatics. Schwartz et al. (2009) claim that unlike suicides and murderers who carry out mass murders in schools or workplaces, perpetrators of terrorist acts, including suicidal terrorist acts, do not show signs of depression, psychoticism or sociopathy, but rather an increased sense of purpose, attachment to the group and focus on the task. There is no specific personality or profile behind violent extremists. Extremists are not crazy, irrational fanatics, nor are they poor and less educated than average. They are insignificant from a psychological point of view and are likely to come from educated and higher status groups (El-Said & Barrett, 2011). However, Horgan (2005a) points out that the idea that there is a terrorist personality, which was characteristic of psychological research on terrorism in the late 1970s and 1980s, resurfaced in the months after the 9/11 attacks. In addition to the aspect of individual psychology, there were certain tendencies to prove the biological causes of terrorism, which were also quickly dismissed.

In the multitude of psychological theories that tried to answer the question “why terrorism?”, the proposed theses ranged from psychopathology at one extreme to a rational decision to initiate terror at the other extreme. In the latter sense, the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) stands out, as one of the most common theories that explain different human behaviour. According to it, people are rational actors whose behaviour is the result of cost/benefit calculations according to a previously determined set of preferences. Victoroff (2005) argues that the rejection of theories about the psychopathology of terrorists, that is, mental illnesses or sociopathy, necessarily raises the question of whether the behaviour of terrorists is the result of their rational choice. Crenshaw (1998b) explains how viewed through the lens of this theory, terrorism is assumed to express collective rationality. A radical political organisation that has collective preferences or values opts for terrorism as a course of action from a range of perceived alternatives. In principle, extremists seek either a radical change of the *status quo*, which would bring a new advantage, or the defence of privileges that they perceive to be threatened. The central question is when extremist organisations find terrorism useful. The primary standard by which terrorism is compared with other methods of achieving political goals is efficiency. However, rational choice theory is not developed enough to be accepted as a general theory of the causes of terrorism, nor does it fully explain why and how someone becomes a terrorist.

2.4. Sociological and social-psychological theories about the causes of terrorism

Unlike psychological theories that primarily emphasise individual factors, sociological and social-psychological theories emphasise the group. Victoroff (2005) includes the theory of social learning, the frustration-aggression hypothesis, relative deprivation theory, oppression theory and the national cultural theory among sociological theories of terrorism.

The social learning theory of aggression, introduced by Bandura (1973) suggests that violence follows observation and imitation of an aggressive model. A variant of this theory has been invoked to explain terrorist

behaviours. According to this theory, terrorist behaviour comes not as the consequence of innate aggressivity but of cognitive “reconstrual” of moral imperatives (Victoroff, 2005). Young people living in hotbeds of political strife may directly witness terrorist behaviours and seek to imitate them or, even more commonly, learn from their culture’s public glorification of terrorists. Social learning theory may also take a didactic form. An example is the teaching of an extremist form of jihad in many Pakistani and Palestinian madrasas (Victoroff, 2005).

Horgan (2005a) underlines that according to the frustration-aggression hypothesis (FAH¹⁴), the response to a certain frustration or blocking the attainment of personal or environmental goals can be expressed as a “fight or flight” situation – an aggressive reaction, defensive reaction or none at all. Criticism of this theory refers primarily to its superficial approach, according to which it is difficult to explain how blocking can lead to terrorism, as well as the circumstance according to which only a few of the total number of frustrated people turn to terrorism. Sageman (2006) criticises the frustration-aggression hypothesis because it is so vague that it cannot be completely tested or refuted. Judging from their backgrounds, members of terrorist organisations did not suffer from long-term relative deprivation or from pathological prejudice. In a polemic with these claims by Sageman, we argue that no empirical research was conducted to refute the hypothesis of the (non)existence of pathological prejudices, but is based on the author’s assessment of terrorists’ environments. Victoroff (2005) also emphasises that the application of the frustration-aggression hypothesis to terrorism research has been criticised on several grounds. First, it is underlined that millions of people live in frustrating circumstances but never turn to terrorism. Furthermore, many terrorists do not belong to the desperate classes whose frustration they claim to be expressing. Finally, terrorism does not uniformly appear to be an act of last resort by those who have exhausted alternate approaches. Analyses of the frustration-aggression theory additionally rejected the concept of psychological abnormalities, i.e., the psychological characteristics of an isolated terrorist personality. Horgan (2003) clearly rejects the frustration-aggression hypothesis with all its derivatives, indicating that it is a severely limited analytical tool in the context of explaining terrorism, whether on an individual or collective basis.

Victoroff (2005) points out that the theory of relative deprivation proposed by Gurr (1970) suggests that people become rebels when they cannot bear the misery of the majority of their group (we would add, or the group they identify with on some basis). For extremist structures, actual deprivation is unimportant, they rather focus on the perception of deprivation among the population whose support is sought and among whom potential radicals or, in later stages, terrorists are recruited. In this context, the narratives they suggest play an important role. Extremists create a narrative justification for their beliefs. They link the outgroup to a crisis afflicting the ingroup, and the ingroup to a violent solution against the outgroup (Berger, 2017a). The bigger the crisis is perceived, the more violent and extreme the solution. Such linkages are the substance of extremist ideology. In this sense, one does not need to experience unjust events first-hand in order to feel sufficiently motivated to become a terrorist (Silke, 2003). The grievances of most terrorist groups may be virtual, imaginary or historical (Horgan, 2005b). Counterintuitively, the poorest classes are often less prone to violence, even though they are the most deprived (O’Neill & Alberts, 2007). Economic disparity, globalisation, recession and depression create anxiety and dissatisfaction. Personal poverty and wealth do not play a role (Lutz & Lutz, 2008). Victoroff (2005) nevertheless criticises this theory, connecting it to a greater extent with issues of identity, and to a lesser extent with issues of economic deprivation. If the group that the political actor belongs to (ingroup) faces economic disparities relative to an outgroup, decision to participate in political violence is not linked with

14 FAH –the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis, a theory originally postulated by Berkowitz (1965).

an economic class phenomenon but a group-identity phenomenon.

When it comes to national-cultural theory, Victoroff (2005) notes Weinberg and Eubank (1987) who proposed that terrorism expresses itself differently in collectivist versus individualist cultures. In collectivist cultures, a person's identity is primarily derived from the social system, dividing the world strictly according to ingroups and outgroups. Personal well-being is linked to the well-being of their group. In individualist cultures, identity is derived from personal goals. Weinberg and Eubank propose that collectivist cultures are more prone to terrorism targeting members of the outgroups. On the other hand, individualists would be less inhibited in attacking one of their own. Wiedenhäfer et al. (2007) studied why most of the world's terrorism occurs in only a few countries. As a unique cultural value that is related to terrorism, they identified the avoidance of uncertainty that is related to stress. Alienated group members find comfort in accepting a collective value system that discourages dissent, reinforces the group's sense of purpose, and imposes strict rules. Accordingly, cultures react differently when faced with an uncertain future. Some react anxiously, while others accept it as a fact of life. Reflecting these findings, Post (1998) emphasises that since each terrorist group is unique, it must be studied in the context of its own national culture and history.

As noted above, most authors agree that there is no single terrorist personality or profile. Borum (2004) argues that, accordingly, there is no specific constellation of life experiences sufficient enough to cause terrorism. The role of life experiences in understanding a pathway to terrorism is based mainly on certain emotional and behavioural themes, most often injustice, abuse and humiliation. They often are closely connected. Grievance explanations are among the most popular when it comes to evaluating political violence in general and terrorism in particular. Maskaliūnaitė (2015) sees perceived injustice as one of the strongest motivators to join social movements, but also for joining violent groups. In the context of oppression theory, Chaliand and Blin (2007) argue that the idea of social and economic injustice as a cause of terrorism is linked to the ideological context of modern political doctrines of anarchism, Marxism, nihilism and Fascism that all challenge the bourgeois order embodied today in capitalism and globalisation. The authors here emphasise that after 9/11, in addition to the condemnation of terrorist attacks, there were also accusations against the United States, the West, the capitalist system, liberalism or globalisation for creating the conditions for the development of terrorism in disadvantaged countries that have no other means of resistance (American, Western, capitalist) imperialism. Chaliand and Blind consider such analyses to be fallacious, as well as the position according to which the eradication of injustice is the only possible response to terrorism. In principle, Schmid (2013) agrees with this and argues that the feeling of injustice is a very strong motivating factor that can encourage an individual to join militant groups. However, the fact that on the one hand there is so much injustice in the world, and on the other hand a relatively small number of terrorists, shows that radicalisation towards terrorism cannot be explained only in this way. Something else is needed in terms of a trigger event or cognitive opening. Terrorist organisations make extensive use of narratives of oppression to mobilise support and recruit membership. Narratives play an important role in the process of mobilising support for the goals of a terrorist organisation, but also in the individual process of becoming a terrorist. Underlying these narratives are identity questions, usually formulated through the "us-them" categorisation, within which support and affiliation to one's own group and rejection and hatred towards the outside group are sought. These identity issues go beyond the pure awareness of belonging to a certain group and are aimed at building prejudices against the outgroup. Victoroff (2005) also points out that several authors have accepted the thesis that political oppression causes political violence, where authors often cite unfair treatment by governments that challenge identity, dignity, security and freedom as motives for joining terrorist groups. Oppression itself is difficult to measure, because it revolves around subjective points

of view and impressions. That is why indirect measurement instruments are used to measure prejudice and discrimination. Therefore, there is no convincing empirical evidence available supporting the hypothesis that oppression or its perception drives the behaviour of terrorists (Victoroff, 2005). Perceived discrimination across economic, political or cultural lines can incite tremendous hatred and cause ethnic terrorism. As a continuation of the suffering imposed by such discrimination, there follows the exclusion of a certain group from politics (Byman, 1998). Political exclusion of an ethnic group is a more consistent and significant predictor of domestic terrorist activity than general political repression or economic deprivation (Choi & Piazza, 2014).

Terrorism is truly, according to Victoroff (2006) highly heterogeneous. There is no single explanation of terrorism, there is no single theory that would explain the motivation for the outbreak of terrorism on a group basis, nor the individual motivation for becoming a terrorist.¹⁵ When it comes to the causes of terrorism, Horgan (2005a) states that the frequently asked question “why” someone becomes a terrorist has not been answered. The key question is “how” someone becomes a terrorist, implying the importance of the entire process. In their classification of theories about the causes of terrorism, McAlister and Schmid (2011) referring to the work of McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) also offered a theory they called radicalisation theory. In today’s academic discourse on terrorism, radicalisation is an unavoidable topic. Our hypothesis posits the importance of adopting prejudices as a stage of the overall process of radicalisation towards terrorism.

15 Bilandžić (2011), taking into account the extent of the social danger of terrorism on the one hand, and the insufficient research of the concept on the other, suggests that by systematizing theoretical knowledge about terrorism and connecting it with rich empirical findings we should start creating a theory of terrorism

3. RADICALISATION

The term “radical” originally had no negative connotations and was used to describe those who advocated democracy rather than despotism, or republicanism rather than royalism (Schmid, 2013). Radicalism literally means an approach of fundamental change (going back to the roots, uprooting and starting again) attributed to women’s rights advocates, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, Margaret Thatcher and, in retrospect, Jesus, Copernicus, Muhammad and Thomas Paine (Bailey & Edwards, 2017). The adjective radical (Lat. *radicalis* from *radix* gen. *radicis* root) means rooted, complete, fundamental, primordial, innate, and the noun radicals denotes those who strive for a radical change of a state (Domović et al., 2002). The radicals of the 19th century were mostly not revolutionaries but reformists. 19th century radicalism primarily referred to liberal, anti-clerical, pro-democratic, progressive political positions that later became mainstream. Today’s connotation of radical Islamists moves in the opposite direction, encompassing anti-liberal, fundamentalist, anti-democratic and regressive positions (Schmid, 2013). The recent conceptualisation of the term radical forgets that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries radical meant progressive and pro-democratic (Lindekilde, 2016). Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the traditional use of the term radicalism as an expression of legitimate political opinion from the recent introduction into debates about terrorism. The close connection between radicalism and violence is a recent phenomenon.

Terrorism discussion widely use the term radicalisation, but it is poorly defined (Borum, 2011a). Radicalisation, in general, is the development of beliefs, feelings and activities in support of a group or cause in conflict (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011), or more precisely, a process of adopting a belief system to justify the use of violence to effect social change and coming to actively support as well as employ violent means for political purposes (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015). According to the latter definition, radicalisation is a slow and gradual process, with the final result of involvement in a violent campaign. Regardless of the degrees, two distinct stages of radicalisation stand out: adopting beliefs and acting on them.

Dzhekova et al. (2016) emphasise that it is necessary to distinguish between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation as proposed by Neumann (2013), or take Borum’s (2011b) differentiating between the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs from action patterns as the actual involvement in terrorism and violent extremist actions. Cognitive radicalisation refers to attitudes, opinions, beliefs, ideas. Behavioural radicalisation refers to behaviour that inclines to violence or terrorism. The process of turning to political violence is commonly called radicalisation, but there are differences between acquisition of extreme or radical ideas and the readiness to use violence. The vast majority of people who share radical ideas do not continue to use violence to fulfil them (Sageman, 2017). It is important to recognise that radicalisation of attitudes is not the same as radicalisation of behaviour (McCauley, 2012), and terrorism is only the end result of the radicalisation process (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

The assumed link between radicalisation and terrorism requires a systematic research approach and concrete empirical evidence. The causal link between terrorism and radicalisation is still problematic, although many scientists have warned that radicalisation should not be understood as a precursor to terrorism (Dzhekova et al., 2016). Terrorism is one of the worst possible outcomes of violent radicalisation, but one that can be avoided. Every terrorist is a radical, but not every radical is a terrorist (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Being a sympathiser is not the same as being a terrorist. The population from which future terrorists are recruited is the population of sympathisers. Since terrorism is, among other things, an act of communication aimed at existing sympathisers and a wider undecided mass, it is essential for a terrorist organisation to build radical attitudes and opinions among as many people as possible. The formation of radical attitudes is helped by the creation of prejudices against the outgroup.

The classification of the causes of terrorism is complementary to the understanding of the causes of radicalisation, which points to the important circumstance that through a systematic study of terrorism, radicalisation has been established as an important stage on the way to becoming a terrorist. Schmid (2013) systematises the causes of radicalisation that can lead to terrorism into the following levels:

1. *Micro-level*: the individual level, involving e.g., identity problems, failed integration, feelings of alienation, marginalisation, discrimination, relative deprivation, humiliation, etc.;
2. *Meso-level*: the wider radical milieu, which is supportive or which serves as a rallying point or reference group that is aggrieved and suffering injustices;
3. *Macro-level*: role of government and society at home and abroad, the radicalisation of public opinion and party politics, and tense majority-minority relationships.¹⁶

Borum (2004) classifies the causes of radicalisation into the following levels: individual, group, network, organisation, mass movement, socio-cultural context and international/interstate context. As in the case of understanding terrorism, there is a consensus that the greatest analytical power for understanding the complex phenomenon of radicalisation is provided by group, organisational and social psychology with a special emphasis on collective identity (Post, 2006).

3.1. Radicalisation factors

Radicalisation can be understood as a process through which individuals are persuaded that violent activity is justified and eventually become determined to engage in violence (Dandurand, 2015). Essentially, it is a phenomenon that results from the complex interaction of several factors that do not necessarily lead to violence; it is a process in which people accept options, views and ideas that may or may not lead to acts of violence. Silke (2003) talks about the combined influence of numerous factors that push and pull someone to become a terrorist. These factors vary depending on the culture, social context, terrorist group, and individuals involved. Ransborg (2016) also agrees with this approach, who sees the mechanisms of radicalisation as a mutual influence:

1. The push-factors that involve: social, political and economic grievances; a sense of injustice and discrimination; personal crisis and tragedies; frustration; alienation; a fascination with violence; searching for answers to the meaning of life; an identity crisis; social exclusion; alienation; marginalisation; disappointment with democratic processes; polarisation, etc., and

16 In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we consider the tense majority-minority relationships extremely significant, as will be discussed below.

2. The pull-factors that involve; a sense of belonging to a cause, ideology or social network; power and control; a sense of loyalty and commitment; a sense of excitement and adventure; a romanticised view of ideology and cause; the possibility of heroism, personal redemption, etc.

One of the approaches to the systematisation of radicalisation factors refers to the aforementioned levels of analysis of the causes of terrorism or radicalisation. Radicalisation factors are organised around three levels of analysis: individual (micro-level), group (meso-level) and social (macro-level) (Lindekilde, 2016). The literature on radicalisation mainly focused on individual vulnerability and/or exposure and mobilisation of radical environments (micro and meso levels). Far less attention was given to factors at higher social and political levels (macro-level). When it comes to individual vulnerability, Lindekilde (2016) identified, in the works of several authors, self-doubt, poor coping with stress, misunderstanding of the other's perspective, critical life events (enrolment to college, migration, death in the family, loss of job and the like) and the experience of social, cultural or political suffering. At the meso-level of analysis there is exposure to a radicalised milieu through self-selection, social selection or external recruitment. Exposure means talking to agents of radicalisation or reading radical materials (offline or online). Coming into contact with like-minded people confirms the correctness of initial attitudes and beliefs. Lindekilde called the macro-level of analysis the outbreak/emergence of radicalising settings.

As with terrorism, the trigger event, in the sense of a catalyst for radicalisation, plays an important role. It is an event that triggered the process of radicalisation. Radicalisation most often occurs after a certain event that the subject considers unbearable or extremely unjust (Guidère, 2012). Propaganda and recruitment are also often catalysts. Propaganda offers doctrinal arguments that serve to legitimise extremist positions. Recruitment is a way of bringing radicals into the orbit of organised terrorist activities (Dzhekova et al., 2016).

Schmid (2013) refers to "root causes" of radicalisation, which in turn are similar to the root causes of terrorism, but somewhat broader. Veldhuis and Staun (2009) offer their model of root causes of radicalisation according to which they distinguish between the macro and micro levels within which they differentiate radicalisation causes from radicalisation catalysts. At the macro level, they distinguish political, economic and cultural causes, on which trigger events act as a catalyst. Among the causes at the macro level, they particularly highlight the poor integration of immigrants, mistakes in international relations and politics, economic deprivation and poverty, and globalisation and modernisation (not only market economies, but also ideology, thus the globalisation of Salafism). At the micro level, they distinguish between social and individual causes. They categorise social causes into social identification, social interaction and group process, and relative deprivation, the catalysts of which are recruitment and trigger events. Individual causes are related to psychological characteristics, personal experiences and radicalisation as a strategic choice with the same catalysts.

In a review of the scientific contribution to the understanding of radicalisation and violent extremism, Borum (2011a) highlighted, among other theories, social psychology as a potentially promising science that could support further research into the process of radicalisation. In researching radicalisation, social psychology focuses on intergroup dynamics and conflict. In this sense, the key points are the phenomena of: group polarisation (the cultivation of extreme attitudes in the group context), group thinking (the effort to deviate from one's own opinion towards the group's in the desire to achieve consensus), bias¹⁷ towards the out/in group (more positive attributions and more positive behaviour towards members of the ingroup compared to the outgroup), a reduction in the sense of responsibility for "group" activities (in the context of violence), perceived stimuli

17 In this work, the author uses the term bias. Borum's work from 2011 is one of the few theoretical works that hinted at the existence of prejudices (i.e., bias) in the context of a possible factor causing radicalization.

and rewards (a sense of belonging, a sense of meaning, excitement seeking or a pragmatic way of securing basic survival needs), group norms and rules (which regulate the behaviour of group members in terms of what they think and how they behave, through social conformity pressure). All of the phenomena cited by Borum are directly or indirectly related to prejudice.

An important construct for understanding the phenomenon of radicalisation is the polarisation of society. Polarisation is a construct of thought that divides society based on identity assumptions of “us” and “them” through narratives that overemphasise the differences between group members, while simplifying and stereotyping narratives about others, all leading to creation and strengthening of prejudices against members of outgroups. Polarisation does not necessarily lead to radicalisation, i.e., radicalisation does not necessarily result from growing polarisation. However, divided communities with strong “us and them” thinking and hostilities between groups represent an ideal breeding ground for extremist ideologies that exploit feelings of fear, mistrust and rejection (Lenos et al., 2017). One of the crucial ingredients of violent radicalisation is the “us versus them” mentality (Yusoufzai & Emmerling, 2017).

Furthermore, membership in a certain group and the dynamics of relationships in the group are also important factors in radicalisation. Group membership plays a key role in understanding why people choose this type of violence, as 95% of terrorist attacks are committed by a group of people (Doosje et al., 2016). Terrorism is a group phenomenon, since it is easier for a group to prepare an attack, and groups also act as a motivating factor for the actual execution of an attack. There are also certain settings that give priority to specific factors or a combination of factors that provide a synergistic effect for radicalisation. With religious radicalisation, we should keep in mind that no religion is an instrument of radicalisation or de-radicalisation. Ranstorp (2010) distinguishes between internal and external factors of radicalisation of Islamists. Internal factors refer to the prevailing lack of public debate among Muslims on the justification of violence, polarising public rhetoric, stigmatisation, political polarisation, identity crisis, alienation, presence of radical imams, glorification of jihad and martyrdom, discrimination and criminalisation. External factors are mainly related to Western policy as a source of radicalisation of individuals in Muslim communities. In this context, the double standard of the West dominates as an external factor in regions such as Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, Somalia and Palestine. Roy (2006) believes that Salafism is fundamentally opposed to all cultural or national forms of Islam, and radicalisation is a consequence of the Westernisation of Muslims born and living in Europe. Deculturation and individualisation are two key issues in the radicalisation process. Islam is an expression of the reconstructed self in relation to the virtual ummah.

With respect to the radicalisation of right-wing and left-wing groups, slightly different factors play an important role. The new radical right-wing implements exclusionary populism directed against unemployed foreigners, foreigners accused of crimes, refugees, immigrants, minorities (ethnic, religious, sexual), and is characterised by racism, xenophobia and ultra-nationalism (Dzhekova et al., 2016). Right-wing extremism contains two sets of social constructions (Frindte et al., 1996): first, social constructions about inequality that revolve around the view that people are naturally unequal, and second, social constructions about violence that accept violence as such and also willingness for the use of violence. In contrast to right-wing radical ideas that are driven by exclusion and hostility towards outsiders, left-oriented radicals believe in an inclusive society, i.e., the transformation of the world into a society of justice and equality in a revolutionary way. Their “enemies” are not migrants, but the rich and upper classes. Renewed left extremism today is linked to anti-globalisation processes, environmentalism, anarchists, indigenous rights activists, various ethnic and other groups, as well as the so-called “single-issue” groups (Dzhekova et al., 2016).

3.2. Radicalisation process

Radicalisation does not occur suddenly, but should be seen as a process comprising phases. Neumann (2008) points out that experts started to view radicalisation as a process composed of stages, asking themselves the question “what goes on before the bomb goes off.”

The transition to becoming a terrorist is rarely sudden or abrupt (Borum, 2004). As there is no unique type of terrorism, the process of radicalisation cannot be considered unique, uniform and suitable for every framework of attitudes and behaviour that can lead to terrorism. Understanding the process of radicalisation and recruitment is a complex task since there are no single causes or mechanisms (Ranstorp, 2010). Most definitions of radicalisation agree that it is a process, what they do not agree upon is where that process leads (Maskaliūnaitė, 2015). Phase radicalisation models often contain different perspectives on radicalisation but their aim is the same: to capture the chronology of radicalisation (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

A typical model of radicalisation is a process consisting of six steps (Berger, 2016):

1. Curiosity – first contact with violent extremism ideology;
2. Consideration – evaluation of credibility and relevance of violent extremism ideology;
3. Identification – of oneself as an adherent of an ideology;
4. Self-critique – asks oneself if what one is doing is enough for the cause;
5. Decision to act – decision whether to undertake violent or material action on behalf of violent extremism ideology;
6. Movement-critique – asking whether the cause is doing enough for him/her? If the movement is not seen as deserving of the sacrifices, the user may disengage. If the movement is seen as worthy, the self-critique step repeats.

In their model of radicalisation/de-radicalisation, Kruglanski et. al. (2014) focus on the importance of individual predisposition to terrorism through personal significance quest. They emphasise three crucial components:

1. The motivational component, in terms of the personal significance quest, defining the goal people devote themselves to;
2. The ideological component that identifies violent means as appropriate in the attainment of the goal; and
3. The component of the social process of networking and group dynamics by which an individual begins to participate in an ideology that justifies violence as a means of gaining personal significance.

Therefore, the path of radicalisation begins with the personal significance quest, which motivates the further search for some means that could fulfil that role. This search is strengthened by finding a relevant ideology through which one wants to achieve personal affirmation. Borum (2011a) underlines that most theories or models of violent radicalisation account for at least three factors: developing antipathy toward a target group, creating justifications and mandates for violent action, and eliminating social and psychological barriers that might inhibit violent action.

In understanding the process of radicalisation and becoming a terrorist, it is important to visualise terrorist organisations and their support networks as an often-cited pyramid-type hierarchy. McCauley (2007) emphasises the importance of understanding the pyramidal concept of terrorist organisations, whereby the terrorist group is the apex of a pyramid of supporters and sympathisers. The base of the pyramid is composed of all those who sympathise with the terrorist organisation's cause, but not necessarily with violence as its means. Braddock (2019) also emphasises that the number of individuals who engage in terrorist behaviour is vastly smaller than the number of people who adopt beliefs and attitudes consistent with terrorist ideologies.

Similar to the pyramid-concept, Moghaddam (2007) offers a concept of staircase/floors that lead to a terrorist act at the top of a building, a kind of decision tree behaviour conceptualisation. On their way to higher floors, people stay on a certain floor depending on the door they come across and their assessment of whether the space behind the door is open for them. The fundamentally important feature is not the actual number of floors, staircases, rooms, etc. In some contexts, it is more important how people perceive the building and the doors they think are open to them. As people climb the stairs, their choices narrow until the only possible outcome left is the destruction of others, themselves, or both.

Beutel (2007) outlines Wiktorowicz's (2004) diagram of radicalisation as a process of four steps: 1) cognitive opening – a step in which an individual becomes receptive to new ideas and worldviews; 2) religious seeking – a step in which an individual seeks meaning through a religious idiom; 3) frame alignment – a step in which an individual finds sense in the public representation proffered by the radical group that attracts his initial interest; and 4) socialisation – in which an individual experiences religious lessons and activities that facilitate indoctrination, identity-construction, and value changes. The first three steps are necessary prior conditions for the fourth. In other words, if an individual is not open to new ideas, does not encounter the movement message, or rejects them after initial exposure, he will not participate in any activities of the group. Schmid (2013) also observes Wiktorowicz's (2005) slightly refined model according to which the first step is preceded by the state of exogenous conditions (economic, political, social, cultural and individual) and emphasises that Wiktorowicz found that people who have only a superficial religious background are vulnerable to radicalisation. The difference between terrorists and radicals who have not yet engaged in violence is not the level of knowledge of religion, but the willingness to delve more deeply into religion, to recognise its complexity and admit one's own ignorance (Bartlett et al., 2010).

Silber and Bhatt (2007) observe four stages of radicalisation of Islamist extremists: pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadization.¹⁸ Each of these phases is unique and specific. Many people stop or abandon this process at different points. Although the model is sequential, individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression, and individuals who do pass through the entire process are quite likely to be involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist act. Sageman (2006) points out that the process of joining jihad is a process of activity that goes bottom-up, rather than top-down, as was characteristic of earlier terrorist organisations. Many young Muslims want to join the jihad, but do not know how. He compares joining the jihad to enrolling in a prestigious university with many attempting but few succeeding to enrol.

Self-radicalisation and mass radicalisation are particularly serious problems. Kirby (2007) calls self-radicalisation a self-starter that he says is largely driven by social dynamics, but steeped in radical Islamic ideology and rhetoric. OSCE (2014) calls the phenomenon a self-directed or self-initiated terrorist radicalisation, characterised by a minimum degree of interaction with individuals actively seeking to radicalise, or acting on one's own without any clear outside direction, support or organisational affiliation. A special problem for society is mass radicalisation, i.e., increasing numbers who sympathise with terrorist goals and justify terrorist means (McCauley, 2012).

The study of the process of radicalisation that can lead to terrorism is not complete without a more detailed insight into the last phase, which refers to the formal joining of a terrorist organisation – the recruitment of terrorists. Bloom (2017) sees recruitment as the initial stage of the “life-cycle” of a terrorist organisation. In this context, successful terrorist groups engage in “talent spotting” and recruit individuals with specific expertise.

18 This model is also called the NYPD model, named after authors' organization (New York Police). The guidelines given by the authors are of great importance for practitioners in terms of recognizing recurring patterns.

Over time, as an organisation becomes more established, terrorist organisations become more selective, systematic and bureaucratic in their recruitment criteria. This imposes the need for terrorist groups to constantly adapt to respond to endogenous and exogenous pressures to survive. As with radicalisation, there is no uniform pattern of recruitment. The convenience of social media and online recruitment allows terrorist organisations to select and target potential terrorists who are far from the organisation itself.

3.3. De-radicalization, counter-radicalisation and disengagement

Countering terrorism or suppressing terrorism traditionally revolved around different forms and concepts of repressive action by competent state bodies. In this sense, the developed concepts moved along the continuum of preventive-repressive and repressive:

- Actions by police bodies and judiciary (from preventive, in terms of protection of important persons and objects, to repressive, in terms of investigating and proving terrorist acts and employment of anti-terrorist tactics);
- Intelligence work (from proactive infiltration into terrorist organisations to special operations to make them inactive);
- Military action (from special operations of targeted killings to declared war on terror).

Repressive action, as a direct way to counter terrorism, was followed by certain political, diplomatic and international legal initiatives. El-Said and Harrigan (2011) claim that a consensus has been reached between the academic community, government officials and security and intelligence agencies according to which exclusively military and security approaches are not only unable to reduce violent extremism, but may end up radicalising more people, thus increasing the threat of violent activism, prompting the search for a “softer,” preventive response compared to the traditional, repressive concept of countering terrorism

In recent times, countering terrorism tries to introduce concepts that follow the sequence of action on factors that directly or indirectly affect the process by which an individual becomes a terrorist. In this sense, viewed from the lens of the degree of the potential terrorist, three different concepts are most often discussed: de-radicalisation, disengagement and, unfortunately, less often, counter-radicalisation. These three concepts are often not demarcated in the literature, conceptually they are made equal or overlapping, although they constitute completely different approaches. Deradicalization is often used as a generic term that includes the other two. The distinction, although not always clear, exists and needs to be elaborated.

Lindekilde (2016) simply defines deradicalization as the reverse process of radicalisation, however defined. Köhler (2014) argues that the concept of deradicalization denotes a process of individual or collective cognitive change from criminal, radical or extremist identity to a non-criminal or moderate psychological state.

In differentiating the terms deradicalization and disengagement, most authors start from the dichotomy cognitive (deradicalization) – behavioural (disengagement). Thus, behavioural change differs from a change in attitudes and beliefs (Koomen & Van der Pligt, 2016); a change in values and ideas from a change in behaviour (Bjørge, 2013); ideological change and renunciation of radical beliefs and tactics from the behavioural change that entails moving away from radical activities (Lindekilde, 2016); changes in the belief system that supports violence from the cessation of active participation in violence (Kruglanski et al., 2014). Köhler (2014) argues that deradicalization has to be strongly differentiated from disengagement, which denotes the mere behavioural role change. Horgan (2014) also distinguishes between physical and psychological disengagement. Physical disengagement exists when a person ceases involvement in terrorist activities, which implies a complete and

sudden cessation of contact with the movement or a gradual decline in activity, usually following a change of roles. However, it does not necessarily imply a decline in commitment to the group. Often there may be a physical disengagement from terrorist activities, but no change in support. Psychological disengagement occurs when terrorists change their attitudes and beliefs about the fundamental importance of continued involvement and engagement, which can occur at any time, from the point of early involvement, later in the process, or even while serving a prison sentence.

The issue of preventing radicalisation is systematised by Verdegaal and Haanstra (2017) on the aforementioned three levels of countering radicalisation. The authors distinguish *generic* prevention, which is aimed at all young people in an indirect way, *targeted* prevention, which aims to reach young people who show a tendency to radicalise or are interested in anti-democratic or extremist ideologies, as well as young people who have already been in contact with extremist groups, and *indicated* prevention targeting young people who have already joined extremist groups and want to drop out. These three approaches to prevention best describe the distinction of the concepts. Generic prevention is essentially counter-radicalisation, a concept aimed at the widest population. Targeted prevention is de-radicalisation, a concept that refers to young people who show a tendency to radicalise, and disengagement is indicated prevention aimed at people who have already moved into the sphere of behaviour, i.e., involvement in terrorist organisations. Berger (2016) explains that in efforts to combat violent extremism, it is necessary to distinguish between *disengagement*, in which individuals are dissuaded from violent participation in and material support for violent extremist organisations and movements, and *de-radicalisation/counter-radicalisation*, in which individuals are dissuaded from adopting extremist ideologies. Therefore, radicalisation is related to its antonym in deradicalization. Recruiting is related to its antonym in disengagement. These are opposite processes.

The importance of preventive counter-radicalisation activities was observed by Schmid (2013) who states that there is a partial shift of focus from the deradicalization of prisoners to preventive work in local and foreign communities from which future terrorists come. It seeks to prevent members from non-radicalised population from radicalisation without using heavy means of coercion and repression, which are considered possibly counterproductive.

The majority of the offered deradicalization concepts are exclusively related to the indicated population (most often prison population) which has already moved from ideological to behavioural application of violence. These concepts are certainly important, but a major methodological error is to focus exclusively on convicted terrorists. The main focus of counter-radicalisation are not the terrorists themselves but rather the strengthening and empowering of the community from which they might emerge (Schmid, 2013). Little empirical research has been conducted on the early stages of radicalisation. Preventive interventions should disrupt the pre-radicalisation phase, i.e., the period in which people are just beginning to develop sympathies towards extremist ideas or terrorist movements, still without any direct involvement (Bhui et al., 2014). In the area of counter-radicalisation, “community resilience” has become a key perspective that refers to efforts undertaken to strengthen protective resources and reduce the possibility of radicalisation in communities (Lindekilde, 2016). Therefore, a much broader perspective is offered by community-oriented concepts of counter-radicalisation.

In the fight against terrorism, it is necessary to take a so-called broad approach that is not focused exclusively on the terrorist acts themselves, but on the entire series of events that precede them. The idea is to take action as early as possible in the chain of becoming a terrorist (Buijs, 2009). Preljević (2017), referring to Farhan Zahid, points out that counter-radicalisation is much more useful than de-radicalisation if it is carried out carefully. Counter-radicalisation is aimed at preventing the radicalisation of new individuals, eradicating

terrorism and violent radicalism. De-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation are aimed at individuals and/or groups inspired and motivated by violent ideologies. It is up to the decision makers whether to apply measures to combat cognitive or behavioural radicalism or both.

The program or concept that we offer is essentially of an counter-radicalisation character. It is aimed at the wider community, and it refers to the removal of prejudices towards the outgroup in persons who are in the early stages of the radicalisation process. Terrorism, as a strategy of choice for conflict, depends on the membership of the organisation. A reduced possibility of recruitment into terrorist organisations leads to a reduced threat of terrorism. Therefore, the concept of counter-radicalisation is strongly recommended for any society with pronounced internal conflict, regardless of whether a conflict, post-conflict or pre-conflict society.

4. PREJUDICE

Prejudice is a widespread phenomenon that the majority of people are not aware of, or not ready to admit them in order to avoid significantly negative connotations thereon. Although the beginnings of scientific research on prejudice are usually attributed to Gordon Allport and his famous “The Nature of Prejudice” from 1954, this phenomenon came to the attention of social psychologists and sociologists somewhat earlier, already in the early 1920s. Prejudices have had a great impact on human relations throughout history of mankind. They existed throughout the entire history of civilisation and dominated in certain historical periods (Hanes, 2007).

Several terms have been used to describe the concept of prejudice: discrimination, ethnocentrism, ingroup favouritism, ingroup bias, outgroup derogation, social antagonism, stereotyping, social distance (Augoustinos & Reynolds, 2001). The word prejudice derives from the Latin noun *praejudicium* which means a judgment made in advance of a trial (Bronner, 2014).

The often-cited definition of prejudice proposed by Gordon Allport (1954) emphasizes that it is an antipathy based on an erroneous or inflexible generalisation that someone feels or expresses and directs towards a certain group as a whole or some member of that group only for reasons of belonging to that group. Prejudice is an unreasonable negative attitude, emotion or behaviour towards others because of their belonging to a certain group (Fishbein, 2002), without prior knowledge of or experience with that group (Hanes, 2007), which directly or indirectly implies some negativity or antipathy towards that group (Brown, 2010). Prejudice has traditionally been considered negatively oriented toward members of certain groups, bad, unjustified, irrational, erroneous, and rigid (Augoustinos & Reynolds, 2001). Duckitt (1994) sees prejudice as a negative, bad, unjustified or irrational intergroup phenomenon.

People generally divide the social world into two distinct categories, “us” and “them” (Baron & Byrne, 1991). They view people as belonging to their own group (often called the ingroup) or to another group (the outgroup). Such differences are based on multiple dimensions, including race, religion, gender, age, nationality, occupation and income, etc. Prejudicial attitudes and beliefs can be based on almost any role that can reasonably be used to separate people into separate groups: national, tribal, racial, social, religious, etc. (Duckitt, 1994).

By categorising as a basic cognitive process, people simplify information from the social environment by giving meaning to certain terms. On the basis of categorisation, under the influence of the first impression of a certain category (group), stereotypes that represent a simplified picture of social reality, usually erroneous are created. A stereotype is a conclusion derived from assigning a person to a certain category (Brown, 2010). Stereotypes gradually develop into prejudice against individuals or groups. Up to this point, the person is still in a mental relation to others. When prejudice turns into discrimination, a person moves into a behavioural relationship towards others. Stereotypes are not always negative. Whether favourable or unfavourable, a stereotype is an exaggerated belief associated with a category. Its function is the rationalisation of our behaviour in relation to that category (Allport, 1954).

Prejudices can be systematised¹⁹ (Kite & Whitley, 2016) into: racial (racism), class (classism), religious, ethnic prejudices, prejudices related to gender and sexual orientation, age, ability (prejudices against people with physical disabilities) and appearance (prejudice against overweight people and people who are not physically attractive). Racial prejudice focuses on physical biological traits such as skin colour. Religious prejudice refers to beliefs that others hold regarding the religious denomination with which they are affiliated. Ethnic prejudice identifies people who share the same ancestry or social customs. Nationalism is a form of prejudice that focuses on the political system under which others live. Sexism is prejudice against men and women based on gender. Sexual orientation prejudices are usually directed towards homosexuals and transgender people. Some prejudices are focused on the handicaps of others, from physical handicaps to mental illnesses (Hanes, 2007).

By systematically studying the phenomenon of prejudice, several different theories were formulated that tried to explain the causes and the way prejudices are adopted. Similar to terrorism, the psychosocial processes of the adoption of prejudice are mainly classified at the level of the individual, the group to which he belongs, and the interactions between the groups (Pennington, 2001). Duckitt (1994) classified the theories of the causes of prejudice into:

1. Theories on psychological fundamentals of prejudice;
2. Theories focusing on individual characteristics,
3. Theories of social transmission of prejudice to individuals,
4. Theories on social dynamics of groups in interaction.

4.1. Individual level of causality of prejudice

Many social-psychological theories are based on the idea that prejudices are not simply absorbed from the social environment, but are also influenced by the psychological characteristics of the individual's personality. These theories include the theory of ethnocentrism, projection, belief congruence and similarity social identity theory, frustration-aggression-displacement theory, universal colour bias, and cognitive categorisation. Each of the aforementioned theories locates the roots of prejudice in certain innate bases of human psychological functioning.

We discussed the connections between terrorism and identity issues. This section refers to the connection between social identity theory and prejudice. The social identity theory was developed in the 1970s by social psychologist Henri Tajfel. The theory states that a person's overall identity consists of personal and social identity. While personal identity refers to individual traits that make us unique and different from other individuals, social identity includes self-descriptions that arise from belonging to a certain social group (by gender, race, nationality, political affiliation, occupation, etc.). Social identity theory investigates how certain identities associated with belonging to a certain group can lead to intergroup prejudice. The concept of social categorisation, discussed earlier, is important here. Social identity is a product of the process of social categorisation and identification with the groups to which we belong (Spears, 2011). By activating social identity, people place themselves and others in clearly distinct and contrasting categories (Kite & Whitley, 2016). Threats to identity can be a powerful source of prejudice (Brown, 2010).

¹⁹ We find this classification of prejudice very important, since it implies the limitations and expectations of our research. The research here is based on ethnic prejudices that can lead to radicalization towards (predominantly) ethnic terrorism. However, the classifications of prejudices according to which there are also, for example, class prejudices, manifested through classism, point to the applicability of the theory to all other forms of terrorism, even terrorism of the extreme left-wing.

Furthermore, numerous theories are based on the idea that prejudices are influenced by individual, social and psychological characteristics. These are theories of frustration, psychological adjustment, theories that consider systems of political and religious beliefs, theories that focus on socio-economic status and the like, and theories on authoritarian personality, as well as individual cognitive factors. A classic example is the theory of the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1969) which was probably the dominant psychological approach to the study of prejudices in the 1950s. We deal in more detail with individual dimensions that are interesting for the subject of the research.

Religious and political belief systems can influence prejudice tendencies. Research suggests that religious involvement and activity may be associated with prejudice. Adorno et al. (1969) found that respondents who have religious affiliations express more prejudices than those who do not have such tendencies. A significant distinction in this sense was made by Allport (1966) who distinguishes between internal (intrinsic) and external (extrinsic) religious orientation. Extrinsic orientation includes religious beliefs as a means to other, instrumental and utilitarian ends. In contrast to this, intrinsic orientation includes religion as an end in itself, the main life motive, a *credo* that a person has completely internalised and lives by. Allport suggested that an extrinsic orientation is fully compatible with prejudice, while intrinsic excludes hostility, contempt, and hypocrisy.²⁰

The left-right dichotomy in politics, typically articulated in terms of liberalism and conservatism, appears to be related to attitudes toward outgroups and minorities (Duckitt, 1994). It is generally accepted that social, political and economic beliefs and attitudes tend to organise into reasonably coherent clusters or patterns. Attitudes towards outgroups or minorities also form part of these patterns. The majority view is that socio-political beliefs are grouped into one basic bipolar, left-right dimension with one pole often called conservatism and the other liberalism or radicalism. Several sociological studies have shown that racial tolerance, low ethnocentrism, support for integration, opposition to segregation, belief in the equality of women and tolerance of homosexuality tend to be associated with liberalism. On the other hand, less favourable attitudes towards minorities and outgroups are often associated with conservatism. Duckitt (1994) argues that indeed conservatism seems to predispose individuals to be more prone to prejudiced attitudes toward outgroups. The reason why this is so and the nature of the causalities involved are still not definitively elucidated.

Duckitt (1994) analysed the association of a number of social and sociodemographic characteristics with prejudice, such as education, socio-economic status, age, social and geographic mobility, and urbanity. In modern industrial societies, the concept of status is typically measured as socio-economic status (SES), a combination or compound of educational attainment, occupational prestige, and income. Research has generally found that SES is negatively correlated with prejudice against outgroups or minorities, meaning that higher SES means less prejudice and vice versa. Duckitt (1994) emphasises that the internal correlations between education, income and occupation are often quite strong and that the notion of status in relation to prejudice can essentially be reduced to the level of formal education. In this sense, a higher level of education is associated with lower prejudice. This correlation existed even when the factors of status, occupation or income were controlled. Allport (1954) also pointed out that people with higher education are slightly less intolerant than people with primary or secondary education.

20 We remind that Wiktorowicz (2005) found that people who have a superficial approach to religion are more vulnerable to radicalization towards terrorism. In a similar context, Sageman (2008) points out that people mistakenly assume that jihadists are well educated religiously. According to data from his research sample, a quarter of jihadists were deeply religious at a young age, and two-thirds were secular. The rest were converts from Christianity. The majority arrived at religious knowledge through self-education.

In the case of age, Duckitt (1994) found that numerous studies have shown that younger people are less prejudiced than older people. This phenomenon persisted even when the tendency of young people towards better education was controlled.

Duckitt's (1994) analysis revealed that numerous studies have established the connection between the concept of urbanity and prejudice, in such a way that those who live in rural areas or smaller towns are more prone to prejudice than those who live in big cities.

Authoritarian personality theory (Adorno et al., 1969) was the most ambitious and influential attempt to understand the psychology of prejudice (Duckitt, 1994). The theory follows the formation of a general syndrome of personality that is more sensitive to prejudices, beliefs and ideologies. Adorno et al. (1969) developed the so-called F scale²¹ for measuring authoritarianism. The research revealed evidence that individual differences in authoritarianism support a general tendency towards prejudice and ethnocentrism (Duckitt, 1994). Also, for one type of violent extremism and its related terrorism, a direct connection with prejudices, was identified – the development phase of accepting extremism was preceded by the adoption of prejudice. This is the right-wing authoritarianism, the so-called RWA. People with high RWA tend to be prejudiced against a wide range of groups, especially groups that they perceive as violators of traditional values, that is, groups that are condemned by authority figures (Kite & Whitley, 2016).

4.2. Social transmission of prejudice to individuals

One of the fundamental theoretical questions is how normative patterns of prejudice, characteristic for social groups, are transmitted and acquired by individual members of these groups in the form of attitudes and beliefs. The processes of socialisation and conformity pressures are particularly important in the social transmission of prejudices to individuals. These two processes are complemented by two factors, perceptual-attributional processes and interpersonal contact experiences (Duckitt, 1994). While socialisation and conformity explain how individuals acquire existing patterns of prejudice from their social groups, they do not explain how these patterns of prejudice might have arisen in the first place. Before a particular prejudiced attitude becomes a social norm, it must have come to be widely adopted by the individuals comprising a social group. Perceptual and attributional processes and shared interpersonal contact experiences resulting from the mere fact of membership in a particular group could generate shared patterns of prejudice in situations where social or cultural norms did not yet exist (Duckitt, 1994).

It is generally considered that basic social attitudes are acquired in childhood as part of the socialisation process. When it comes to the socialisation of prejudices, there is a dichotomy of direct versus indirect process or acquisition. Prejudices can be directly and intentionally learned and reinforced. In contrast, they can be transmitted indirectly, without the conscious intention of the agents of socialisation and acquired through processes of observation and imitation. Finally, prejudices can be socialised even less directly. This can happen, for example, through the learning of social values and beliefs that do not in themselves involve prejudice, but which may be generalised to facilitate or reinforce the acquisition of prejudice. Thus, the social transmission of cultural values and beliefs, such as intolerance of differences, mistrust of foreigners and excessive pride in the identity of one's own group, could generate intergroup prejudices. Kite and Whitley (2016) point out that Bandura (1977, 1986) formulated a theory of social learning according to which social development, which includes the

²¹ The F scale was conceived to measure personality traits that tend toward fascism, hence its name.

development of prejudices, is influenced by three learning processes: direct teaching (rewarding certain child behaviour), learning by observing (imitating the attitudes or behaviour of living models) and indirect learning (observing the rewarding of another child for certain behaviour). Therefore, society can transmit prejudices to new generations directly, through open learning and reinforcement of prejudicial attitudes and beliefs, indirectly through children's observation and modelling of the actions of important persons and even less directly through cultural values. Socialisation is the process of adopting social norms, from birth to personality formation. The so-called socialisation agents have a significant influence in this process, and they change throughout childhood. Four primary agents are involved in the socialisation of prejudice and intergroup attitudes: parents, peers, schools, and mass media (Ashmore, 1970). All four agents of socialisation play an important role in radicalisation towards terrorism.

The process through which internalised beliefs and norms are reinforced and maintained is the normative conforming pressure of groups or important persons on individuals. Normative conformity can be viewed as controlling behaviour and beliefs in three ways: sanction/reward, internalisation of norms, and general social support system (Duckitt, 1994).

The idea that direct contact with people from outgroups we dislike should reduce prejudice is commonly known as the contact hypothesis. Later experiences refuted this hypothesis, and as Allport (1954) emphasised, only certain types of contact can reduce prejudice, i.e., contact between majority and minority groups in a position of equal status and in pursuit of common goals. Duckitt (1994) points out that Amir (1976) and Stephan and Stephan (1984) on the other hand, found that prejudice will be increased when the contact is between persons of unequal status; institutional opposition to or lack of support for contact; when the contact situation involves competition, opposing interests and values, tensions, frustrations, and superficial contact and when contact tends to confirm negative stereotypes.

Merely being a member of a social group may generate certain common perceptions of and attributions about outgroups such that individual ingroup members come to share prejudiced attitudes towards those outgroups. Duckitt (1994) identifies two fairly distinct perceptual processes. The first involves the perception of common ingroup interests which conflict with an outgroup's interests, and the second involves the perception of certain differences between groups that are explained by attributing traits to the outgroups which explicitly or implicitly have the effect of derogating them. Stereotypes generally explain observed group differences by attributing differences to stable traits or dispositions. Because of this, groups that are considered inferior in any dimension of social values will retain the tendency to be attributed negative traits that indicate inferiority. Therefore, the mere perception of difference of the outgroup can result in prejudice. This fact tends to appear when outgroups are perceived as lower on the scale of social values, such as status, power, wealth, education, sophistication, socio-economic role, etc.

4.3. Social dynamics of groups in interaction

The conditions of intergroup contacts and real conflicts between social groups are the main factors of intergroup dynamics influence on the development of prejudice. Besides them, perceived threats and deprivation play an important role.

Brown (2010) notes that Campbell (1965) who formulated the theory of realistic conflict, and Sherif (1966) who supported it, pointed out that prejudice is an intergroup phenomenon, shifting the focus from individual psychology to social psychology. The analysis of prejudice through this theory rests on the assumption that there is a fundamental material conflict between groups over one or more important resources (Platow & Hunter, 2001). In order to be able to talk about a realistic conflict, it is necessary that the contestants view the rivalry as an ethnic matter (Allport, 1954). According to realistic conflict theory, this competition leads to conflict between groups, the results of which can be aversion or prejudice towards members of the groups we compete with. The nature of intergroup relations, which can be competitive or cooperative, makes people repulsed to members of groups with which they compete and attracted to members of groups with which they cooperate.

Esses et al. (2005) analysed Allport's views on realistic conflict between groups and found that competitiveness is twofold – competitiveness regarding resources and regarding less tangible things like religious or political belief systems. When it comes to religion, there can be a conflict between fundamentalist beliefs according to which there is only one true religion, but also within one religion in the interpretations of the correctness of the chosen direction, which is often resorted to by religious extremists in terrorist organisations. As for the political system, the fight for voters between the left, right and centre is a classic example of realistic conflict. Cultural worldviews can also be at the heart of perceived competition. The correctness of a cultural worldview can be promoted by proving the incorrectness of opposing views. When groups engaged in reciprocally competitive and frustrating activities, such that the gain of desired goals by one results in loss for the other, unfavourable stereotypes of the outgroup and its members are activated. In time, the negative attitudes are standardised in a sets, and the outgroup is placed at a prejudicial distance, even to the point that members of the other group are completely avoided (Duckitt, 1994). A great deal of historical evidence can be cited in support of this thesis. For example, direct competition between nations over political, economic, or indeed any other issue, invariably elicits markedly hostile intergroup attitudes and perceptions, which is particularly dramatic when conflict takes the form of open warfare.

Conflict or competition over real or relative status is not the only necessary condition for the creation of prejudice in intergroup relations. The next question concerns the kind of macrosocial contacts and interactions between social groups that might tend to create normative patterns of prejudice. Within this mechanism, extremely important factors are the existence of convergent group boundaries, differential treatment of the groups by external authorities, and the relative size of the interacting groups (Duckitt, 1994). When interacting groups are characterised by convergent boundaries that imply the coexistence of several possible differences (regarding religion, social-class status, language, political orientation, etc.), it seems likely that intergroup contact will result in prejudice between them, and contact is less likely to reduce prejudices. When the boundaries between groups are not so convergent, individuals may find themselves belonging to one group by one criterion and to other groups by other criteria. The extent to which different groups are subjected to differential treatment by external agents, such as social or organisational systems, appears to be a significant factor in creating and reinforcing group identities and emphasising intergroup differences and preferences. The effect of differential treatment seems particularly strong when one group receives more favourable treatment than others, as was

recorded in the apartheid regime, institutional discrimination. Furthermore, the different distribution of social and economic roles between groups can strongly influence the way they see each other. Differential power and status are important in the development of prejudice and discrimination, suggesting that equal status is central to reducing such attitudes and behaviours (Fishbein, 2002). It is assumed that the relative size of interacting groups can influence intergroup attitudes. Relatively equal representation of two social categories will make the differences between the categories less salient, while the existence of a clear minority will increase the prominence of the categories (Brewer & Kramer, 1985). In this context, the often-used term “minority” refers only to some group that is smaller in relation to some other group with which it is compared. However, the term itself also has a psychological flavour as it implies the existence of stereotyped ideas of the dominant group towards a minority part of the population with ethnoid characteristics, leading to discrimination (Allport, 1954). Conversely, members of this part of the population grow dissatisfied and often intensify their determination to remain a different group. Stephan et. al. (2009) explain how in the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians, the size of the group plays a role in relation to the perceived threat. Individually, Palestinians may feel threatened by Israelis because they are a smaller group numerically. Israelis, on the other hand, may feel threatened since they are a minority in a predominantly Muslim area of the world. In addition to the above, prior relationships between groups also play a role. The relations between Israelis and Palestinians were characterised by intense conflicts which may trigger high levels of threat in both groups (Stephan et al., 2009).

Although mixed social environments can provoke conflict, such diversity can also promote intergroup contact and reduce prejudice (Fell & Hewstone, 2014). Diversity provides an opportunity for conflict resolution through contact between opposing groups, which can have a significant and lasting positive effect on intergroup relations. Therefore, this theory posits how people’s attitudes, beliefs and feelings towards each other will change through intergroup contact and interaction. The essential premise of the theory is the so-called the contact hypothesis, which Allport already recognised as requiring a special structuring of contacts.

The possible development of prejudice in the context of relative deprivation is addressed by Kite and Whitley (2016) who explain that people become dissatisfied with their current status and situation by comparing it either with past experiences or by comparing themselves with other people who are in the same situational framework. They are not necessarily deprived in absolute terms; their objective situation might be quite good. They feel relatively deprived compared to how they used to be or compared to the resources they think other people have. If people start blaming others for causing their deprivation, they begin to develop prejudice against those groups. The perception of deprivation conditioned by another group motivates hostility towards that group. Prejudices caused by feelings of relative deprivation can come from one’s memory of recent ingroup gains/losses or, more commonly, from comparing the position of the ingroup to the outgroup (Brown, 2010). There is a difference between personal and group relative deprivation. Personal relative deprivation refers to the degree to which a person feels deprived as an individual. Group relative deprivation refers to the degree to which an individual feels that the group with which he identifies has been deprived in some way, regardless of the experience of deprivation. This distinction is important because group relative deprivation is in principle related to prejudice, while personal deprivation is not (Kite & Whitley, 2016). Correlations between deprivation and prejudice do exist, but they have not always been strong. The feeling of relative deprivation is similar to the feeling of injustice.

In the original version, the intergroup threat theory was formulated and called the integrated threat theory by Stephan and Stephan (2000). The theory included four types of threats, later reduced to realistic and symbolic threats. Intergroup threat exists when members of one group perceive another group as being in a position

that can harm them (Stephan et al., 2009). Evil means a realistic threat in the sense of physical harm or loss of resources and a symbolic threat in the sense of an attack on the integrity and value system of the group. Symbolic threats refer to any perceived threat to the way an ingroup defines itself and to what symbolises its identity. These threats include different religions, worldviews, cultural values or languages. Realistic threats include economic competition, conflicts over land and other limited resources, and threats to the physical security and survival of the ingroup (Brown, 2010). Behavioural responses to threat range from withdrawal, submissiveness, and negotiation to aggression, discrimination, abuse, revenge, war, and other forms of open intergroup conflict.

Integrated threat theory explains how social identity theory, relative deprivation theory, and realistic conflict theory are interconnected (Kite & Whitley, 2016). The perception of a realistic threat may stem from intergroup conflict and feelings of group relative deprivation. The perception of symbolic threat can be derived from social identity. Such interactions between groups lead to prejudices and can lead to resorting to terrorism as a form of expressing violence against a perceived or real threat to one's own identity group. In this sense, social identity theory explains prejudice as a link between a person's self-concept and belonging to groups that are important to them. Relative deprivation theory explains prejudice as a reaction to the feeling of unfair treatment. Realistic conflict theory argues that people view outgroup members unfavourably because of competition for resources.

Therefore, the theories of social identity, realistic conflict and relative deprivation appear as explanations of both prejudice and terrorism. It is characteristic of all three theories that they refer to entire populations in interaction (identity, conflict, if there is one, and deprivation). And yet, a small number of people develop prejudices against the outgroup, and a far smaller number become radicalised and engage in terrorism. Such fact-based descriptions create the idea of a pyramid or an inverted funnel in which, as already explained, at the bottom there is the entire population with which one identifies (the ingroup), then there are people who show prejudice towards the outgroups, and further towards at the top of radicalised persons who are in the prejudice-discrimination transition phase. At the top of the pyramid are terrorists (the smallest number of people). There is no skipping of steps here, the next step is filled by the following one. Terrorism is too broad and heterogeneous a phenomenon, and it is not possible to fit all terrorist organisations into such a schematic representation, however, most of them do fit. In other words, an exception will always appear to prove the rule.

4.4. The impact of prejudice on society, from discrimination to extermination

With the development of modern, technologically advanced societies that possess weapons of mass destruction, prejudices acquire the dimension of a potential threat to people's existence. Instead of an evolutionary advantage, technological progress has become an extremely serious threat to the survival of human society and civilisation due to prejudiced intergroup attitudes that have the potential for periodic eruptions into open intergroup conflict.

Prejudice is one of the many manifestations of aggression (Adorno et al., 1969). Prejudice inevitably paves the way for violence in a given society. They represent the first step that an individual takes on this path. Since these are attitudes towards other people, prejudices are kept in the cognitive sphere, but with a tendency to grow into the behavioural. Allport (1954) proposed five intensity degrees of prejudice in behaviour:

1. Antilocution, which refers to the verbal expression of antipathy, characteristic of most people, but that most people never "go beyond."
2. Avoidance, which occurs if the prejudice is more intense. In this case, the bearer of prejudice does not

directly inflict harm upon the outgroup, but bears the burden of adapting to the situation.

3. Discrimination, in which a person moves from previous passive treatment to active treatment. Discrimination refers to the exclusion of all members of a group in terms of employment, housing, political rights, education, recreational opportunities, religious institutions, hospitals, or some social privileges. Segregation is an institutionalised form of discrimination, enforced legally or by custom.
4. Physical attack or acts of violence that occur under conditions of heightened emotions.
5. Extermination, as the ultimate stage of violent expression of prejudice in the sense of lynching, pogrom, massacre and genocide.

The described pattern of prejudice growing into open violence, proposed by Allport in 1954, is incredibly reminiscent of today's patterns of radicalisation leading to terrorism. This view confirms the correctness of the research thesis according to which prejudice against outgroups is an important factor in the process of radicalisation that can lead to terrorism, i.e., in the process of becoming a terrorist.

In contrast to prejudice, which is an attitude or cognitive relation towards members of a certain social group, discrimination is behaviour, conduct, treatment towards members of other groups, therefore, a behavioural construct. Discrimination implies different behaviour towards people based on their belonging to a certain social group (Kite & Whitley, 2016). Discrimination may or may not be the result of prejudice. In many cases, people who hold negative attitudes toward members of different groups are not allowed to express these views directly. Laws, social pressure, and fear of retribution serve to deter prejudice from being put into overt practice (Duckitt, 1994). When such deterrents are absent, negative beliefs, feelings, and behavioural tendencies can find expression in overt action.

In the context of discussions about terrorism, a particularly interesting concept related to prejudice is delegitimization. Bar Tal (1989) sees delegitimization as an extreme form of prejudice and stereotyping. He defines delegitimization as the categorisation of groups into extremely negative social categories. Bar Tal lists several types of delegitimization: (1) dehumanisation, (2) out-casting, (3) trait characterisation, (4) political labelling, and (5) group comparison. Dehumanisation is an indispensable part of the narrative of terrorist organisations in the process of creating animosity towards the outgroup. In the context of Bar Tal's classification, dehumanisation involves categorising a group as inhuman by using categories of inferior race and animals, or negative supernatural creatures such as demons, monsters, and satans. In the narratives of global terrorist networks, but also of earlier radical Islamist organisations or regimes, the US and the West are generally cited in a satanic context. Bar Tal concludes that delegitimization can occur in any context of intergroup relations: international, interreligious, intercultural, or interideological.²² Delegitimization is an extremely negative reaction that increases tensions between groups and is followed by serious negative consequences such as discrimination, exploitation, acts of hostility or even genocide.

22 This thesis also has direct implications for the limitations and expectations of research in terms of the applicability of our hypothesis to almost all ideological types of terrorism.

4.5. Strategies for reducing prejudice

We stated earlier that the etiology of prejudice is related to dynamics at the individual, interpersonal and intergroup levels. In this light, Duckitt (1994, 2001) also proposes implementing actions to reduce prejudice at three levels:

1. At the level of individual susceptibility to adoption and retention of prejudice
2. At the level of interpersonal influences and contact from which people acquire and learn prejudice, and
3. At the level of the type of social conditions and intergroup relations that generate prejudice between social groups and societies in general.

Interventions at the individual level usually have a dual focus: on direct changes in prejudicial attitudes in individuals and on changes in some characteristics of individuals that make them susceptible to adopting prejudices. The latter are focused primarily on individual ideological beliefs and the psychological bases of these beliefs that lie in personality and worldviews (Duckitt, 2001). Interventions are usually broadly cognitive in the sense of focusing on information, knowledge, awareness, and understanding of target prejudice. They can be openly didactic, consisting of lectures, films, discussions and extracurricular readings. The content of the programme is based on the history and achievements of the outgroup. Others rely on affective changes through shared experiences in mixed, working or similar environments. Two ideological beliefs have shown a strong influence on prejudice: right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, i.e., a generalised belief in social inequality and the right of the stronger to dominate the weaker. By changing such ideological beliefs, prejudice can be reduced. Furthermore, prejudice can be influenced by changes in two other individual characteristics. These are intercultural ignorance and cognitive sophistication. Intercultural education, unlike other interventions aimed at emphasising similarities between groups, focuses precisely on differences in order to develop an empathetic understanding of the way in which the outgroup understands the world and thereby avoid misunderstandings, reduce stereotypes and improve intergroup attitudes. Education, in itself, reduces prejudice, and a liberal education that exposes individuals to a diversity of ideas and perspectives reduces both prejudice and authoritarianism. Reducing prejudices on a cognitive level in principle requires the regulation of inhibition of automatically activated stereotypes and the implementation of a planned response. Individuals who want to be low prejudiced must choose to practice “saying no” to stereotypes (Devine & Sharp, 2009).

Duckitt (2001) analyses interventions at the interpersonal level, through two elements: social influence and contact experiences. Social influence interventions are aimed at changing the individual's exposure to information and normative pressure to reduce prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behaviour. The author here states that four such interventions were empirically investigated: mass persuasion campaigns, support for norms of tolerance and non-discrimination, changing media images of target groups, and changing the content of educational curricula. Duckitt points out that research on the effectiveness of mass persuasion were unsystematic, so conclusions could hardly be drawn. Exposure to norms without prejudice can be critically important in reducing prejudice. Organisations and institutions must openly and explicitly adopt, emphasise and publicly implement non-discriminatory policies in all aspects. This applies primarily to education, the business environment and the mass media, but also to all other aspects of society. In modern industrial societies the media play an important role in conditioning the image that individuals have of their societies (Duckitt, 1994). Today, in the era of information and communication technologies, social media are especially important. As for intergroup contact experiences, Duckitt (2001) starts from Allport's conditions according to which contact between groups will reduce prejudice (equal status, sharing common goals, cooperation, and authorities supporting such

contact) and adds a fifth condition elaborated by Pettigrew (1998) according to which the contact situation has the potential for the growth of friendship between members of different groups. The way contact is structured in desegregated schools appears critical to the formation of intergroup attitudes. A multicultural approach to education should be designed into all areas of the school: administrative policy, learning, parent relations, staff development, language and religious policy, as well as the way intergroup contacts are structured in the classroom (Duckitt, 1994). Same can be said for the work environment. Situations of potential intergroup competition must be removed, and work roles and activities restructured in terms of maximising activities involving cooperation between members of different groups. Overall, this level of intervention has greater potential for reducing prejudice than the individual level.

Interventions at the last level imply changes in social conditions. Social structure and intergroup relations inevitably influence prejudice, through structuring social influence and contact experiences. In any society with a history or background of prejudice and discrimination against minority groups, a crucial factor in intervention at this level involves the complete removal of all constitutional, legal and institutional support for discrimination or other overt expression of prejudice. Allport (1954) claims that these changes are of the greatest importance, but are too extensive to be set as the goal of any programme. These are changes that will be best implemented through legislative activity. However, even in democracies, political majorities may have little motivation to reduce prejudice and discrimination against minorities, particularly when this risks a governing party losing political support from majority voters (Duckitt, 1994). Societies can be structured to allow tolerance or prejudice. Tolerant societies will be structured in such a way that ethnic, religious, professional, socio-economic and other differences between groups are not convergent, but intersect so that different identities are highlighted at different times and in different situations. In the context of applying these programs to counter-terrorism policies, Viano (2015) argues that building a society that is equitable, balanced and harmonious, that properly takes into account differences while stressing similarities, is the most solid path to peace. “The mission is a difficult, risky and demanding one, but it is the only true and durable foundation for an effective and successful counter-terrorism policy” (Viano, 2015, p. 10).

Regarding the development of intervention policies, Duckitt (1994) concludes that the nature of the intergroup situation will dictate what objectives for improving intergroup attitudes and relations are feasible, and what measures and policies should be most effective. A careful analysis of the history and nature of the present intergroup relations should precede attempts to set goals and develop intervention policies.

5. KNOWN CAUSALITIES IN THE PREJUDICE-TERRORISM RELATIONSHIP

The cause-and-effect connection between terrorism and prejudice was researched mainly scientifically and professionally and observed in the direction in which terrorism, i.e., committed terrorist attacks, increase the level of prejudice in society or lead to the manifestation of prejudice-like phenomena. In understanding the mechanism of action of terror(ism) on people's behaviour, concrete explanations were offered by the terror management theory.

5.1. Terror Management Theory

Terror Management Theory (TMT²³) is not a theory about terrorism per se, but rather a theory about the modality of how people deal with the existential dilemma of wanting to live knowing they have to die (Pyszczynski et al., 2006). The theory is related to terrorism in its name only. To a greater extent, it is applicable to other forms of political violence (McAllister & Schmid, 2011). The theory is at the centre of the explanation of the causality of the relationship between the terrorist act and the prejudices that the act incites or raises in society. Terror management theory refers to the evolutionary assumption that humans, like other animals, have a wide range of biological systems oriented towards existential continuity. Research has shown that reminders of death (mortality salience) instigate bolstering and defence of both faith in one's worldview and one's self-esteem (Greenberg et al., 2009). The theory is a kind of link between terrorism and prejudice, but with the opposite causality.

The term "terror," in the perspective of this theory, refers to the emotional manifestation of the instinct of self-preservation. Along with the biological need for physical survival, the primary psychological need is to minimise the terror caused by awareness of our vulnerability and mortality (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1992). From a terror management perspective, self-esteem consists of two components. First, the individual must believe in cultural conception of reality and accept the values and standards associated with that conception. Second, in order to effectively suppress anxiety, the individual must believe that he or she meets these cultural value standards. Therefore, in order for an individual to have self-esteem, he must see himself as a valuable actor in a meaningful universe, which effectively protects him from the anxiety that results in an awareness of vulnerability and mortality. In other words, the fear for existence, or the fear of death, is suppressed by self-esteem, or the belief that one fulfils the correct cultural value standards.

According to terror management theory, there is a hierarchy of life's pursuits. At the bottom of the hierarchy is the fundamental motive of simple survival, the same for all people. According to Darwin and Freud,

23 The theory was originally proposed by Greenberg, Pyszczynski and Solomon (1986). The authors argue that it represents a strong theoretical framework for explaining the origins and consequences of terrorism and political violence.

humans, like other living beings, are born with an instinct for survival. Fear of death is simply an emotional manifestation of the survival instinct (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1992). According to the terror management theory, humans and other living beings have a common biological predisposition to continue to exist or at least to avoid premature end of life (Solomon et al., 2004). What distinguishes humans from other living beings are highly developed intellectual capabilities that make people aware of their vulnerabilities. The awareness of imminent death creates the potential for paralyzing terror. Cultural worldviews manage the terror (fear) associated with the awareness of death primarily through the cultural mechanism of self-esteem, which consists of “the belief that one is a valuable contributor to a meaningful universe” (Solomon et al., 2004, p. 22). Thanks to the protection against potential terror provided by psychological structures, people are motivated to maintain faith in their cultural worldviews and strive to meet the value standards of that worldview.

More than 300 experiments conducted in 15 different countries supported the hypotheses set by the theory. Research has shown that: (a) increasing self-esteem makes people less prone to anxiety in response to threats, (b) subtle reminders of mortality increase positive reactions to those who support one’s worldview and negative reactions²⁴ to those who threaten us, (c) threats to self-esteem or one’s worldviews increase the accessibility of death-related thoughts, and (d) boosts to self-esteem or faith in one’s worldviews reduce the accessibility of death-related thoughts (Pyszczynski et al., 2006). Solomon et al. (2004) add that mortality salience also encourages efforts to strengthen self-esteem.

Furthermore, TMT posits that members of the ethnic group targeted by prejudice are caught between two worldviews: the traditional one of their ancestors and that of the prevailing culture. According to Greenberg et al. (2009), in such a context three options are possible for managing one’s terror: complete assimilation, which implies full acceptance of dominant and abandonment of traditional worldviews; militancy, which rejects mainstream worldviews and tries to maintain faith in the value of traditional worldviews, and pluralism, as an attempt to create a worldview that incorporates aspects of traditional worldviews while simultaneously participating in the predominant one.

5.2. The impact of terrorism on the emergence and growth of prejudice in society

McCauley and Moskaleiko (2011) emphasise that terrorism research focuses on terrorists. However, the same radicalisation mechanisms are at work in those who react to terrorism. “The friction of conflict heats both sides” (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2011, p. 223). Zimbardo and McDermott (2007) hint at the link between terrorism and prejudice, emphasising that prejudice against outgroups is one of the consequences of strong negative feelings caused by a terrorist act, which can be particularly problematic when a certain ethnic group is held responsible for a terrorist attack.

There is a body of empirical studies that have shown the connection between terrorism and prejudice, but with the opposite direction of causality. Namely, actual terrorist acts or perceived terrorist threats cause an increase in prejudice against members of the group from which the threat comes or which is perceived as the source of threats, explained by the terror management mechanism. This phenomenon is not harmless at all. Indeed, the ease with which Americans generalise about the millions of Arabs and Muslims after the 9/11 terrorist attack is astonishing (McCauley, 2007). However, not all Americans accepted the idea that all Arabs

²⁴ These negative reactions are prejudice, negative stereotypes, discrimination and similar.

are terrorists, but sometimes even those who intellectually avoided this generalisation find themselves in doubt. Numerous theoretical and empirical studies strive to prove why emerges this mechanism of willingness to blame the entire population for a crime or a threat that comes from individuals, organised into more or less connected (terrorist) groups.

Das et al. (2009) conducted three studies in which they tested the full causal chain from news about terrorism through death-related thoughts to prejudice against outgroup members. The first study found that news of terrorism and the murder of Dutch director Theo van Gogh,²⁵ led to a general increase in death-related thinking. Death-related thoughts led to higher levels of prejudice against Arabs, but only after Theo van Gogh's murder. These findings suggest that death-related thoughts moderate between terrorism news and prejudice. The second study found that news about terrorism (a bomb threat at Amsterdam's central train station) were associated with death-related thoughts, which increased prejudice against Arabs, especially among people with low self-esteem. Findings replicated the moderating role of death-related thoughts as a link between outgroup prejudice following television news viewing. The authors' conclusion was that news about terrorism is likely to increase the prejudices of viewers with low self-esteem. In the third study, the authors looked at the findings of terror management theory in terms of whether news about terrorism can increase prejudice against any outgroup member, regardless of the outgroup's role in the news, and regardless of the background of the observer. The finding was that terrorism news increase prejudice against Arabs among non-Muslims and increase prejudice against Europeans among respondents of the Islamic religion. Therefore, the pattern of prejudice adoption had two directions.

In the context of previous research, Buijs (2009) argues that the position of Muslims in the Netherlands and the government's policies regarding Muslims were influenced not only by the 9/11 attacks, but even more so by the assassination of director Theo van Gogh. The brutal murder activated serious political problems. The authorities responded in a panic, which was the starting point for a series of threats and arson attacks, as well as an escalation of the conflict between Islamic extremism and domestic Dutch right-wing extremism. Many Muslims felt excluded. Prejudice and discrimination were at work. Theo van Gogh's killer was a well-educated and well-integrated Muslim Moroccan who turned to an apocalyptic version of Islamic radicalism. Buijs (2009) notes that after this murder, the Netherlands faced home-grown terrorism. There was no longer a distant enemy that could be used as a scapegoat. "Our own boys and girls have turned into murderers" (Buijs, 2009, p. 423). Commentators went even further, interpreting the murder of van Gogh as proof of the defeat of multiculturalism.

Landau et al. (2004) also came to similar findings of the connection between terrorism, prejudice and "mortality salience" in the four studies they conducted. The first study found that reminding people of their own mortality increased support for George Bush and his counterterrorism policies. As national security issues were a significant component of the Bush administration, the psychological impact of recalling the 9/11 terrorist attack was further explored. The second study demonstrated that subliminal exposure to 9/11-related stimuli brought death-related thoughts closer to consciousness. The third study expanded the finding and showed that reminders of 9/11 is functionally equivalent to mortality salience, increasing support for President Bush.

25 Theo van Gogh was a Dutch filmmaker who was shot twice before his throat was slit by Mohammed Bouyeri, a resident of the Netherlands of Moroccan origin, on November 2, 2004. The motive for the attack was the 10-minute film "Submission" that van Gogh made about the position of women in Islam (Wiedemann, 2005). At the time of the murder, Bouyeri attached a jihadist statement to Van Gogh's chest, which was an open letter to Ayaan Hirsha Ali, a woman born in Somalia, a feminist, writer, activist and politician in the Netherlands (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011).

Mortality salience in the fourth study led participants to become more favourable toward Bush and voting for him in the upcoming election. The presented results clearly showed the growth of President Bush's popularity when thoughts of death or terrorism were particularly emphasised. The fourth study also showed that, while in the control conditions support for candidate Kerry was higher, respondents who were faced with mortality salience preferred President Bush. The findings of this research do not make a concrete contribution to the discussion on the causality of prejudice and terrorism, but they show in which direction the political campaigns of certain leaders increase the possibility of better outcomes in elections, bearing in mind the instrumentalised polarisation of voters.

From the perspective of terror management theory, Pyszczynski et al. (2006) argue that the 9/11 terrorist attacks confronted Americans and the world with a dramatic reminder of death and vulnerability and, at the same time, of cultural worldviews that protect people from these basic fears. After 9/11, Americans searched for meaning, answers, culprits, and became more nationalist than ever before. This was manifested by waving flags, patriotic slogans and songs, as well as outpourings of mercy and affection for the victims of the attacks and admiration for heroes, such as soldiers, policemen and firefighters. The search for solidarity within the group led to the punishment of those who did not support the Bush administration's plans to fight terrorism. Revenge was also sought. At the individual level, there have been attacks on people of Middle Eastern descent or with skin darker than the average American, desecration of homes and mosques, and several deaths. At the national level, the desire for revenge led to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a foreign policy that alienated many allies. Most Americans were severely traumatised by the 9/11 attacks, and although without diagnosed psychopathology, much of the nation was and remains severely shaken by these events. The rise of prejudice and their manifestations that followed are clear consequences of the terrorist attack.

Kastenmüller et al. (2011) investigated the direction of causality of variables within the terror management theory. While not disputing that mortality-related thoughts and prejudice against Muslims are related, the authors investigated whether the threat of terrorism increases prejudice against Muslims due to increased mortality-related thinking, or the threat of terrorism increases mortality-related thoughts due to already developed stronger prejudice against Muslims. Given that the literature distinguishes symbolic from literal immortality,²⁶ and that belief in literal immortality reduces thoughts about one's own death, the authors manipulated this belief system as a way to investigate their hypothesis that the threat of terrorism would increase prejudice to a greater extent in people who do not believe in literal immortality than in those who incline to that belief. Research has confirmed the terror management theory hypothesis that the threat of terrorism increases prejudice against Muslims due to death-related thoughts.

Zimbardo and McDermott (2007) note the influence of warnings about impending terrorist attacks on the population that produce political and psychological effects. In terms of political effects, warnings mobilise first responders to a threat, as well as the public, to increased vigilance. On the other hand, although designed to improve the effectiveness of defence against terrorist attacks, warnings also result in various negative outcomes. First of all, the mental health, in terms of increasing depression and post-traumatic stress disorder in the general population. Second, uncritical support for charismatic leadership in the state is encouraged through a combination of increased ingroup bias and mortality salience. Third, the current system of terrorist warnings poses a threat to the diversity of political culture.

26 Symbolic immortality refers to the belief that a person continues his/her life through his descendants, and literal immortality refers to the belief in the continuation of life after death, either through reincarnation, another world, heaven, etc.

Canetti-Nisim et al. (2009) researched the extent to which exposure to terrorism leads to hostility towards minorities. The authors propose a new stress-based model to explain political extremism, according to which psychological anxiety and threat perception mediate the relationship between exposure to terrorism and attitudes toward minorities. A structural equation modelling indicated that exposure to terrorism was a predictor of psychological distress. The findings provided strong evidence and a mechanism for the hypothesis that terrorism produces undemocratic attitudes that threaten minority rights. Terrorism, apart from the direct losses and fear resulting from attacks, creates enormous challenges to the fabric of democratic societies. There is a severe internal tension between the fundamental need for a sense of security and the aspiration to maintain democratic values and preserve democratic culture. In particular, at the time of a terrorist attack, when direct confrontation with the perpetrators of terrorism is impossible, anger is often directed at minority groups and their members, which can turn into support for undemocratic practices towards minorities. “One of the key psychosocial–political consequences of terrorism is the development of hostile feelings, attitudes, and behaviours toward minority groups” (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009, p. 364), i.e., prejudice.

Above discussions have shown that social categorisation and group identification are related to terrorism and prejudice. Moskaleiko et al. (2006) studied four theories that link group identification with threat – what impact the 9/11 terrorist attacks had on US students’ identification with country, family, ethnicity, religion, and university. These are the theory of group dynamics, the theory of self-presentation via group identification, terror management theory and a version of TMT that converges with social identity theory (SIT). The authors note that each of these theories has found support in laboratory settings but each has been criticised with respect to the generalisability of those results to the outside world. The findings were as follows: Students surveyed immediately after the terrorist attacks²⁷ showed higher results of identification with the country compared to those who did it before the attacks, i.e., eighteen months later. This also applies to the answers about the importance of the country. These results were predicted by the theory of group dynamics and terror management theory. Furthermore, the research did not indicate any reduction in self-esteem in the survey period immediately after the attack, nor a correlation between self-esteem and identification with the observed groups. TMT confirmed the increase in identification with the country, but was wrong in predicting the increase in identification with the university. Finally, TMT/SIT predicted an increase in identification with the university, but was wrong in predicting an increase in identification with the humiliated country. Therefore, none of the four theories studied by Moskaleiko et al. can predict the overall pattern of results. The theory of group dynamics has shown the best results. It is evident from the aforementioned that the connection between terrorism and social identity cannot be viewed simplistically or as the only element sufficient for radicalisation in any direction. Much more important is the dynamics of relations between interacting groups.

Obaidi et al. (2018) studied the extent to which outgroup hostility is conditioned by perceived intergroup threat, realistic or symbolic. Realistic threats arise from the perception of competition for limited resources (jobs, land, political and economic power) and from threats to the physical security and well-being of the ingroup. Symbolic threats are threats to religious values, norms, morals, philosophy and group identity. The research looked at the relationships between three groups (non-Muslims and Muslims in Western societies and Muslims in the Middle East) within seven different cultural contexts. The authors set the hypothesis that non-Muslim respondents from Europe, who observe Muslim culture and practice in conflict with Western

27 The first survey was completed in March 2001, at a time when the United States faced no external threat. The second survey was completed on 15 September 2001, four days after the terrorist attacks. The third survey was completed in March 2003, five days after the United States had declared war on Iraq but before U.S. forces invaded Iraq.

values and lifestyle, will show a greater degree of hostile mobilisation towards Muslims. In addition, equal answers are expected from respondents who see Muslims as a threat to the resources and security of their group. Furthermore, the authors hypothesised that the same mechanism would exist among Muslims living in Europe as members of minority groups and Muslims as the majority in Afghanistan and Turkey. The authors were also guided by the thinking that religious identity has a significant influence, so they expected that individuals who have a strong identification with their religious group will perceive a greater threat, as a result of which this variable can be a mediator between the negative effects of religious identification on hostility towards the outgroup. In total, they conducted five studies to test the hypotheses. In the first study, they found that a symbolic threat predicted the intentions of Norwegian non-Muslims to join anti-Islamic movements, which does not apply to a realistic and terrorist threat. The second study showed that symbolic and realistic threat among Americans predicted the willingness of non-Muslims to persecute Muslims, but not terrorist threat. Studies three and four showed that symbolic threat predicted support among Muslims in Sweden and Turkey for anti-Western behavioural intentions. The fifth study found that symbolic and realistic threats have the same effect on violent intentions among Danish Muslims and non-Muslims and among Muslims in Afghanistan. Meta-analysis showed that symbolic threat was most strongly associated with intergroup hostility. Participants with high religious identification also experienced higher levels of threat. The authors consider group identification to be an important predictor of participation in collective action.

The research conducted by Greenaway et. al. (2013) found that people show a tendency for prejudice when they feel threatened. The research showed that the relationship between threat and prejudice is moderated by people's levels of perceived control. Threat leads to prejudice only when people feel concurrently low in control. The authors conducted three studies that showed that a terrorist threat is associated with heightened prejudice in people who have little control over the threat or their lives in general. Terrorist threat showed an increased desire to exclude migrants among these respondents. Control is an important ingredient in a threatening context. Research has shown that people express prejudice when they feel threatened and have low control.

Onraet and Van Hiel (2013) studied the impact of economic and terrorist threats at the societal and personal level on right-wing attitudes and ethnic prejudice. The authors reached a finding that suggests a distinction between an internal threat that comes from the individual, such as death anxiety, and an external threat that comes from the outside world, such as an economic or terrorist threat. External threat refers to either actual threatening events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the perceived threat of terrorist attacks. Perceived threat can also be seen as a threat to an individual and as a threat to society as a whole. An economic threat can also have consequences at the individual level such as personal unemployment and financial problems. The results confirmed that experiencing the social consequences of economic and terrorist threats goes hand in hand with heightened levels of right-wing attitudes and ethnic prejudice, even when the consequences of the threat are controlled.

The concepts of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism are positively correlated with prejudice. Asbrock and Fritsche (2013) studied the increase in authoritarian attitudes under conditions of terrorist threat and found that it is not clear whether this effect is a genuine response to perceptions of personal or collective threat. Authoritarian and ethnocentric reactions occurred only among people highly identified with their national group under personal threat. This indicates that authoritarian responses may operate as a group-level coping strategy for a threat to the personal self. The results suggest that the effects of terrorist threat on authoritarianism can be attributed to a sense of personal insecurity, raised under conditions of terrorist threat. This was brought about by changes in modern terrorism, as the targets are no longer high-ranking representatives of the state, political

leaders, etc., but anyone who happens to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. People can feel personally threatened by terrorism, but also collectively, when they perceive that their country is a potential target of terrorist attacks.

A similar conclusion was reached by Fritzsche et al. (2011). Personal and collective threat can breed ethnocentrism and intergroup conflict. When people feel threatened in times of social or personal crisis, they often emphasise their belonging to a group, which helps them regain a sense of security and control. This kind of reaction not only increases the favouring of the group to which they belong (ethnocentric tendencies), but can also lead to increased derogation of outgroups. A special type of social crisis that increases the tendencies of ethnocentrism is the terrorist threat. In addition to threatening people and society in a direct way, terrorism also has indirect effects on the political and social climate in the country. Perception of a terrorist threat, in addition to increasing approval of anti-terrorist measures and discrimination against outgroups, also enhances nonspecific ethnocentric reactions such as authoritarian attitudes, identification with ingroups, and prejudice against outgroups.

Dube and Black (2010) conducted a study in which they observed the impact of a terrorist attack on consumer ethnocentrism (a concept related to negative evaluation of products of another ethnic group) and consumer patriotism (positive valuation of products of one's own ethnic group). The influence of a factor on consumer attitudes is best determined by measurements before and after the effect of that factor. Dube and Black note that they were "lucky" to collect consumer attitudes and values just before the events of September 11, 2001 – in the spring of 2001. During spring of 2002, data were collected again from a similar population, which allowed the authors to test the hypotheses. The research found that both consumer ethnocentrism and consumer patriotism increased as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attack. Therefore, the commission of terrorist acts by known (and sometimes unknown but assumed) actors leads to the development of ethnocentric tendencies in the attacked society. The theory of ethnocentrism is one of the theories of the causes of prejudice. Such ethnocentric tendencies are the basis for further development of ethnic (or ethno-religious) prejudice against wider or narrower social groups from which real or perceived attackers come.

On the other hand, Kam and Kinder (2007) find that ethnocentrism strongly emphasises support for the war on terrorism and that the relationship between ethnocentrism and opinion is influenced by the events of 9/11. They analysed the 2000 and 2002 National Election Studies conducted with a representative sample of American voters who were interviewed before and immediately after the 2000 election, and then before and after the 2002 election. The 2000 study included a number of standard political predisposition measures, including ethnocentrism. The 2002 study was conducted after the 9/11 attacks in a completely changed context of domestic security warnings from the Department of Homeland Security, intervention in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime, and in the midst of planning a war against Iraq. The study included a wide range of relevant issues, from immigration restrictions across homeland security issues to the war against the Taliban, etc. Overall, the analysis revealed that Americans strongly supported the war against terrorism. Some Americans said that the antiterrorism costs should be reduced, that less should be spent on border controls, that the war against the Taliban was a mistake, and that President Bush was making a mess in foreign policy. However, the majority disagreed. Many Americans' views were somewhere in between. Explaining the reasons behind this pattern of responses, Kam and Kinder found that support for the war on terror was largely derived from ethnocentrism. Americans who believe their own group is superior to others tend to support greater spending on homeland security, border control, and building stronger national defence. They also want to have the assistance to foreign countries cancelled, and consider President Bush to be effective in responses to terrorist attacks. The effect of

ethnocentrism is statistically significant, although it does not seem to be a strong predictor of attitudes about the value of the war in Afghanistan. Furthermore, support for the war on terrorism is not a reflection of one but of multiple factors: partisanship, threats, authoritarianism, gender, race, and ethnocentrism. When comparing these factors, ethnocentrism appears to be somewhat less influential than partisanship, but more significant than authoritarianism or threat in explaining Americans' support for the war on terrorism. In principle, support for the war on terrorism derives from prejudice in an important way.

In a similar context, Sides and Gross (2013) explored the connection between stereotypes about Muslims and support for the "global war on terror." For the research, they also used data from the American National Election Study²⁸, in which respondents provide answers on a "feeling thermometer" about different ethnic and religious groups on a scale of 0-100. Their research findings indicate that the prevailing stereotypes of Muslims have a specific content including a feeling among the respondents that Muslims are violent, regardless of whether they are Americans or not. Also, they are not trusted (feeling stereotypes), but they are not considered lazy and unintelligent (competence stereotypes). The next key research finding confirmed the connection between these negative stereotypes and support for the war on terror. The perception of Muslims as violent and untrustworthy is the key ingredient in supporting the "war on terror."

Echebarria-Echabe and Fernández-Guede (2006) conducted a quasi-experimental study of the effects of terrorism on racial prejudice and ideological orientation. In the research, they evaluated anti-Arab and anti-Semitic prejudice, authoritarianism and ideological orientation (liberal/conservative) on two samples of 206 respondents who were contacted before and after the terrorist attack of radical Islamists in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The results showed that the terrorist attack brought about changes towards conservative side. Respondents expressed rising prejudice not only against the target group (Arabs), but also against a non-included group (Jews), an increase in authoritarianism, stronger attachment to traditional conservative values, and decreasing attachment to liberal values at the same time. The same findings were reached by Echebarria-Echaba and Gárate in a later study (2008).

Hollander (2010) explored the anti-Muslim and anti-Arab sentiments that intensified after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. She illustrates her thesis with data indicating that four months after these attacks, according to an ABC survey, only 14% of respondents believed that mainstream Islam encouraged violence. Four years later, after "Bush's cultural, political and military 'war on terror', the 14 percent rose to 34 percent" (Hollander, 2010, p. 74). Several surveys showed that views of almost one-fifth of Americans were influenced by Islamophobia. Although the traumatic experience of terrorist attacks had some impact, the author observes the intensification of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab prejudice through the specific historical and cultural context of America, in terms of the country's racial history. In the White Christian America, members of ethnically different groups have historically been a negative mega-signifier that served to invigorate and preserve group identity in a predominantly white culture. In white Christian cultures, race within hegemonic ideology and power structures was a construct that guaranteed the white privilege and reinforced the categories of "us" and "them." Therefore, for the white Anglo-Saxon Christian America, the ethnically different served the psychological function of reinforcing the white group identity.

Eisenman et al. (2009) looked at the correlation between terror-induced fear and avoidant behaviour in multi-ethnic urban areas and found that vulnerable groups (the mentally ill, the disabled, African-Americans, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and those without US citizenship) experienced a disproportionately greater burden

28 ANES – *American National Election Study*.

of psychological impact of terrorism threat and the government's response. In the months following the 9/11 attacks, 40% to 50% of adults from the US feared for own safety. Eleven percent of the respondents reported a change in behaviour, e.g. avoiding public gatherings. The authors also point out that, although there is little systematic research on this topic, previous studies in the US have shown a disparity in fear of terrorism depending on gender, race, ethnicity and education level.

Abrams et al. (2017) tested the hypothesis that contact would affect prejudice against Muslims independently of bombings, that is, that bomb attacks would inhibit the effects of contact on the prejudice. The authors used data collected through national surveys one month before and one month after the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005. According to the findings, prejudice against Muslims increased significantly after the attacks. Psychological threats to physical safety (security threats) and customs (symbolic threats) mediated the impact of bombings on bias, whereas perceived economic threats did not. Social distance from Muslims, the group widely identified as the source of the attacks, was used as a measure of bias. When it comes to the contact hypothesis as formulated by Allport (1954), research findings show that there is unique evidence that intergroup contact can play an important role in reducing prejudice even when it follows an objective threat caused by a terrorist attack.

Hassan and Martin (2015) researched the variables of social distance, Islamophobia²⁹ and fear of terrorism in Australia, as well as the mutual correlation of these variables. The finding of this research indicates the causality between prejudice and fear of terrorism. The causality direction was not established. Research has shown that Islamophobia and fear of terrorism are significantly positively correlated in Australia. Also, there is a significant correlation between the established social distance from Muslims and concerns about terrorism in Australia. Respondents who accept Muslims as immediate family members or close friends show significantly less concern about terrorism in Australia than those who do not accept Muslims. Furthermore, the contact hypothesis also finds its place in Australia. It was found that people who have regular contacts with Muslims fear terrorism much less than those who have no contact with Muslims. In general, people who express tolerance for migrants or lower level of Islamophobia showed less concern about terrorism. Most Australians express very low levels of Islamophobia (almost 70%). The vast majority accept Muslims as family members or close friends, although they are more socially distanced from Muslims than from other religious groups. Higher levels of prejudice and anxiety directed against Muslims were expressed by the elderly and those facing financial insecurity, with women being more inclined to worry about terrorism than men.

Similarly, Goel (2010) conducted a longitudinal study of migrants in Australia to determine whether the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to changes in perceptions of discrimination among Muslim migrants and migrants who fit in the Arab-Muslim stereotype. She found that after 9/11, Muslim men and those who look like Muslims increasingly reported religious and racial intolerance and discrimination in relation to other immigrants. Similarly, after 9/11, latent xenophobic attitudes towards Muslims that were present for more than three decades "exploded into an open Islamophobic discourse" in Slovenia (Vidmar-Horvat, 2010, p. 752).

Pedersen and Hartley (2012) researched predictors of prejudice against Muslims in Australia and found that respondents who showed prejudice were less educated and generally inclined to right-wing views. Also, the respondents expressed strong national identification with Australia, concern for gender equality in the Muslim community and belief that Muslims did not accept Australian values. Prejudice and discrimination against Muslims in Australia intensified after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2002 Bali attacks.

29 According to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference's First Annual Report on Islamophobia, Islamophobia goes far beyond the fear of Islam and includes racial hatred, intolerance, prejudice, discrimination and stereotypes (IC BiH Riyasat, 2011).

Schmuck et al. (2018) explored how coverage of terrorist attacks by unidentified perpetrators affects attitudes about terrorists and Muslims in general. The results showed that respondents attributed terrorist attacks by unknown perpetrators to Islamist terrorist organisations when the victims were non-Muslims. In contrast, terrorist attacks against Muslims were more often attributed to the extreme right. Furthermore, news consumers associated terrorist attacks by unidentified assailants with Islamist extremists to the same extent as those perpetrated by Islamist groups. Consequently, attributing attacks to Islamists is significantly associated with Islamophobic attitudes. The authors explain this attribution of terrorist attacks to Islamists, which has important implications for attitudes toward Muslims in general, in the following way: If Muslims, like Islamic fundamentalists, are perceived as belonging to the “Muslim” outgroup, news consumers will transfer negative evaluations of Islamic fundamentalists to Muslims in general. When the outgroup is viewed negatively, its perceived homogeneity makes it easier to take action because of the appeared similarity between the outgroup members.

Hatton (2018) researched the impact of news stories featuring ISIS propaganda videos on Americans’ attitudes about policies restricting Muslim civil rights and the psychological inflexibility as a possible moderator of reactions to ISIS propaganda. The study results showed that viewing ISIS propaganda, which contributed to the rise of negative feelings among respondents, did not increase support for anti-Muslim security policies, and that psychological inflexibility did not play any role in this attitude. Although both research hypotheses were not confirmed, the research showed that viewing ISIS propaganda with negative feelings may influence opinions about anti-Muslim security policies.


In conclusion, several different studies have proven the causal link between terrorism and prejudice in general, i.e., between terrorism and certain phenomena tangential to prejudice, in the causality direction: terrorism causes prejudice. What about the reverse causality? Does the existing, already adopted prejudice affect radicalisation that may lead to terrorism?

5.3. Influence of prejudice on terrorism

In the context of the influence of previously adopted prejudice on terrorism, very little, mostly theoretical research has been conducted, without direct empirical confirmation. In most cases, these are merely theoretical settings of the problem in which prejudice or certain dimensions of prejudice are placed in a causal link with terrorism.

In the case of terrorism, the perceived right to independence and preservation of indigenous culture can be particularly important for the society. The perception that other societies have achieved this goal, and one’s own has not, can be influenced by deep prejudice (Moghaddam, 1998, 2007). When it comes to theoretical works in the context of causal link where prejudice influences radicalisation to extremism and terrorism, probably the most concrete findings were offered by Koomen and Van der Pligt (2016) in their recent work in which they emphasise that there are social factors and circumstances that may conceive radicalisation or even terrorism among deprived and stigmatised groups in the society. This especially applies to Muslims in the West who are faced with negative stereotypes and prejudice of the majority. Therefore, radicalisation can arise from expressed prejudice against a minority. Authors propose the model in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Main determinants of polarisation and radicalisation



Source: Koomen and Van der Pligt (2016, p. 7)

According to the presented scheme, stereotypes and prejudice reversibly affect four groups of factors (culture including the general social climate and catalytic events, threats, identity, and individual factors), some of which are intertwined and have been determined in several studies as causes of polarisation and radicalisation, that is, used to create extremist ideologies. All of the above directly and indirectly affects the formation of radicalised groups in the society.

Koomen and Van der Pligt (2016) explain how, in order to understand the world and effectively deal with the situations they find themselves in, people resort to structuring of the social environment. Categorisation is one of the ways in which they do it. In this process, stereotypes, meta-stereotypes³⁰ and prejudice play an important role. In the context of the prevailing opinion about immigrants from Morocco as Islamist terrorists in the Netherlands following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the murder of Theo van Gogh, Kamans et al. (2009) explored the extent to which negative meta-stereotypes among Dutch teenagers of Moroccan origin influenced prejudice and assimilation. They found that teenagers of Moroccan origin in the Netherlands were more willing to justify terrorism of Islamic extremists when they simultaneously had negative attitudes towards the Dutch and when they believed that they were viewed through existing meta-stereotypes about their group. The negative image of Moroccans (as criminals, aggressive people, idlers or terrorists) in Dutch society affects Moroccan adolescents. In that regard, they emphasise the statement of Fouad Mourigh, one of such adolescents: “Moroccans are discriminated into pieces; we must destroy this country” (Kamans et al, 2009, p. 850).

When it comes to threats, Koomen and Van der Pligt (2016) point out that both inter-group threats and political threats affect ethnic minorities. They can also be linked to radicalisation both on the left and the right spectrum. In the sphere of inter-group relations, realistic threats, symbolic threats and threats to group respect

³⁰ Meta-stereotypes refer to what you believe others think about you and your group (Koomen & Van der Pligt, 2016).

are distinguished. Threats are different by their content as well. While ethnic minorities pose a particularly serious threat to the radical right, the radical left sees inequality inherent in today's society as the principle threat. In the case of Islamist radicalism, the threat is a combination of deprivation, prejudice, negative stereotypes and meta-stereotypes, discrimination and unsatisfactory contacts with the majority community. Hierarchies and inequalities within a culture may pose a threat to all three types of radicalisation: right-wing, left-wing and Islamist radicalism. In general, in a situation where inequality is an important aspect of the prevailing culture, individuals can fall under the influence of radical leaders more quickly and easily. A threat, be it real or mostly perceived, is a significant factor in the radicalisation process. Brown (2010) sees prejudice as common determinant in threats from the levels of three different theories. He connects the real conflict theory with threats to material interests of a group, the social identity theory with threats to the distinctiveness or integrity of a group, and the relative deprivation theory with threats to the social position of a group. Thus, prejudice stems from perceived threats. In the further process of radicalisation, it can result in new counter-threats, so we can freely talk about the closed circle of violence and prejudice as an important link in the causality chain.

On the issue of identity, Koomen and Van der Pligt (2016) refer to the work of Phinney et al. (2001) who noted that the importance of ethnic identity as a defining characteristic of a group implies that any assimilation pressure, or the feeling of being forced to renounce identity, can lead to anger, depression and sometimes violence. For a group under threat, the ingroup provides refuge and safety and helps to cope with the threatening situation. In such circumstances, the ingroup grows in importance and so does the identification with it. In situations where inter-group tensions or conflicts grow, these processes are even stronger and the outgroup is viewed as uniform and homogeneous.

Regarding individual characteristics, Koomen and Van der Pligt (2016) state that the existence of abnormal personality traits in terrorists has not been confirmed, but they highlight certain characteristics that they consider relevant. First of all, authoritarianism, which creates hostility towards groups perceived as a threat, represents potential danger to society as a whole. Authoritarianism is an important factor of right-wing radicalism which produces prejudice against deprived groups or groups of lower social status, in accordance with the social dominance viewpoints. Furthermore, they highlight male sex as an important individual characteristic, since terrorist behaviour corresponds more closely to traditional male roles. This primarily refers to initiative and a desire to prove oneself bordering aggression. Therefore, men are more tempted to engage in terrorist activities, but they are also more likely to be accepted by terrorist groups.

Koomen and Van der Pligt (2016) conclude that all of the above affects group polarisation, fundamentalism and radical ideologies that play an important role and can have a number of negative consequences, but they alone do not constitute sufficient basis for radicalisation, especially terrorism. Two additional processes that serve as excuses for the use of violence can help people take the final step from radicalism to terrorism. One is dehumanisation, in which outgroup members are considered deficient in certain unique human traits, and the other is denial of responsibility for accepting violence.

Deprivation is often cited as an important factor contributing to the development of radicalisation and potential terrorism. Deprivation also goes hand in hand with stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination. Furthermore, stereotypes, prejudice, poor socio-economic status and discrimination contribute to social isolation and marginalisation of ethnic minorities. (Koomen & Van der Pligt, 2016). Blackwood et. al. (2016) analysed the results of the WRAP programme³¹ in Great Britain, where they found, among other things, that the WRAP

31 WRAP *Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent* which is part of the UK Government's wider counter-terrorism strategy "CON-TEST" aiming at preventing persons from being drawn in terrorism.

programme recognises that social experiences such as discrimination can motivate extremism. There are some limitations in the research findings, since discrimination is only one of the factors that undermines healthy personality development. Through the WRAP project, discrimination was considered along with identity crisis, social exclusion, drug and alcohol abuse, distrust in civil society, mental health, lack of theological resilience, unemployment, etc.

In the context of theories linking terrorism to prejudice, Sageman (2017) points to the work of Henri Tajfel and the process of social categorisation that leads to prejudice and group bias as key to understanding collective behaviour, including social movements, terrorism and counter-terrorism. Self-categorisation or acceptance of a common social identity is what makes collective behaviour possible. On the other hand, it erases individual differences of members of an outgroup and reduces them to one-dimensional stereotypes. Such depersonalisation of outgroup members combined with stereotypes can lead to their dehumanisation. Dehumanisation is an important factor in the process of transition from radicalisation to terrorism because it facilitates the execution of an attack on a victim who loses humanity.


A somewhat more concrete theoretical expression that causally links prejudice to terrorism was put forward by Haeyns et al. (2002) who emphasise that prejudice is a key psychological process that leads to the commission of terrorist acts. In this context, the authors note that Bin Laden called the 9/11 attacks “a blessed attack on global infidels.” The 9/11 terrorist attack is an extension of religious extremism and ethnic and religious prejudice. Accordingly, launching a war against terrorism is a failure. The war against terrorism should be a war against human prejudice. The war against prejudice is not easy to wage and cannot be reduced to military campaigns. “It is a war to be fought within the human heart” (Hayes et al, 2002, p. 7).

5.4. PRaT Model (Prejudice-Radicalisation-Terrorism)

On the basis of what has been presented so far, the connection between the phenomenon of terrorism and prejudice has been determined in a way that terrorism promotes prejudice in society through certain mechanisms such as mortality salience. On the other hand, it was shown to what extent prejudice are dysfunctional for a society and how they are connected to different phenomena looming on the path of radicalisation to terrorism. In this sense, we formulated the PRaT³² model according to which prejudice to any outgroup can be a driver on the way to becoming a terrorist (Figure 2).

32 PRaT - **P**rejudice-**R**adicalisation-**T**errorism.

Figure 2. PRaT Model



Prejudice can be the source of various negative social phenomena, including polarisation in society, discrimination against certain population categories, hate crimes, xenophobia in general, Islamophobia, etc. All these negative social phenomena are found as sources of radicalisation that can lead to terrorism, extremism and political violence, but also as potential sources of non-violent political activism. “The same mechanisms that move a few to terrorism also move many to lower levels of commitment and risk taking for a political cause” (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2011, p. 215). Lower levels of commitment include legal political actions called activism and illegal political actions of lower intensity and limited scope of violence, such as illegal marches, occupation of buildings, violence against property, etc. Furthermore, non-violent political activism may turn into violent extremism and political violence, which can ultimately result in a terrorism campaign.


Thus, prejudice as a negative social phenomenon can lead to radicalisation, directly or indirectly (through polarisation, discrimination, etc. effects), which results in non-violent political actions or violent extremism and different forms of political violence. In the chain of manifestations, violent action may grow into terrorism. A shorter causality path would move along the line of prejudice - radicalisation - terrorism. Prejudice adopted under the influence of individual exposure and/or different social contexts leads to the radicalisation of individ-

uals ready to engage in a conflict that manifests itself in terrorism as the chosen type of struggle. The feedback loop of terrorism, violent extremism, but also non-violent radical political actions, leads to rising prejudice in the society, which has been empirically proven many times.

This model can also be shown in a simpler version of a pyramid, which we mentioned on several occasions (Figure 3). In the PRaT model shown in this way, people who, as members of certain population group (internal), in earlier stages of life, for various reasons, developed prejudice against external groups that they perceive as hostile are at the bottom of the pyramid. The percentage of this part of the population can be larger or smaller, depending on the overall political and social situation. That part of the population is far more vulnerable to radical messages and narratives than the rest, which makes them predisposed to radicalisation. Due to the influence of radicalisation factors, a certain number of prejudiced people become radicalised and climb to the second level of the pyramid. At this level of the pyramid, radicalised individuals are in the cognitive phase, they support the group's goals, but they are not involved in terrorist activities yet, that is, they have not moved from the cognitive to the behavioural. The top of the pyramid is for people who have passed the previous two levels and became involved in terrorist activities.

If we talk about suppression of terrorism, counter-terrorist and counter-radicalisation measures, conceptually designed to reduce prejudice in society, directly affect the percentage of the population that forms the pyramid base. As pyramid base narrows down, the next levels, i.e., the number of radicalised persons and the number of terrorists, decrease proportionally. A small number of terrorists facilitates the work of security agencies in terms of the allocation of available, chronically lacking resources and capacities according to the real problem and further focused approach to suppression of terrorism.

Figure 3 PRaT pyramid model



6. INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH OF INFLUENCE OF PREJUDICE ON TERRORISM

In the previous chapters, theoretical settings and proven causalities between research variables were presented. In accordance with the theoretical findings, a new hypothesis was put forward that follows the causality direction according to which existing prejudice against outgroups (independent variable) influences radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (dependent variable). With the aim of testing the general hypothesis, i.e., verifying the correctness of the proposed PRaT model, empirical research was conducted by surveying first-year students at three universities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Statistical analyses were performed to test the statistical significance of differences in the answers according to the formed groups-categories of respondents, based on which conclusions about the specific hypotheses were drawn. Empirical research was configured in accordance with the standard, widely accepted IMRAD³³ principle.

6.1. Research hypotheses

In accordance with the subject and objectives of the research, a general hypothesis was set:

H: Ethnic prejudice influences the development of radicalisation that can lead to terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Considering the basic theoretical knowledge about the research subject, five specific hypotheses were derived, the content of which is already included in the general hypothesis.

H1: There are statistically significant differences between persons manifesting ethnic prejudice (WP), persons manifesting moderate prejudice (MP) and persons not manifesting prejudice (NP) considering their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT).

This hypothesis was formulated based on knowledge about the existence of a causal link between two variables, which was explained above. The conducted empirical research determined the causality direction and the statistical significance of the link between the observed variables.

³³ IMRAD – Introduction–Methodology–Results–Analysis–Discussion

H2: There are statistically significant differences between different peoples considering their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT).

Different peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats) differ not only in terms of ethnicity, religion and language, but also in terms of the relative size of the groups, both on the overall level and on the “micro-levels,” historical resentments, relative deprivation, real conflict, etc. which is closely related to the development of prejudice. This hypothesis also tests the influence and reach of the social identity theory, which will be explained in detail below.

H3: There are not statistically significant differences between different genders considering their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT).

Previous research has not shown differences between genders in their prejudicial attitudes or support to terrorism, although men appear in greater numbers as perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Men are more tempted to join terrorist activities (Koomen & Van der Pligt, 2016). Thus, cognitive radicalisation should not show any differences between different genders, unlike behavioural radicalisation implying greater willingness to involve men as opposed to women.

H4: There are statistically significant differences between different groups by urbanity of places where respondents come from considering their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT).

Social-psychological research on prejudice has shown that people living in urban areas show significantly less prejudice than those living in predominantly rural areas. Also, terrorist organisations are often labelled as “urban guerrillas” in literature, which suggests stronger connection of terrorism with urban, and less with rural areas. With this hypothesis, we introduced an explanatory variable; “urbanity” in order to test whether there are third (external) factors that influence both variables (dependent and independent). Accordingly, a difference was observed in answers in relation to attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism.

H5: There are statistically significant differences between different groups by population structure of places where respondents come from considering their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT).

This hypothesis refers to differences in attitudes shown by respondents living in different areas by the population structure, i.e., by the respondents belonging to ethnic “majority” or “minority” in their place of residence. In this way we observe the influence of the relative size of a group to which respondents belong to, on the growth of prejudice, and also on attitudes showing radicalisation that can lead to terrorism. We introduced an explanatory variable (population structure) here as well, with the same goal of testing its possible influence on the dependent and independent variables. By introducing this explanatory variable, we examine the influence of the theory of relative deprivation as a possible source of prejudice and radicalisation that can lead to terrorism.

6.2. Research area - Bosnia and Herzegovina

The history of the complex ethno-national and confessional relations between peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina has left its mark on today's constitutional arrangement of the state. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Annex IV to the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement from late 1995, introduced territorial organisation of the country as a union of two entities; Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, and Brčko District. Republika Srpska is centralised, and the Federation consists of ten cantons. Local authorities are organised in cities and municipalities. The Constitution was established by Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, as constituent peoples (in union with others) and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina determines ethnic components as peoples (constituent), which makes the discussion about the qualification of ethnic components in the state precise and clear and normative-legally unambiguous in terms of whether they are nations, peoples, ethnic groups or similar ethnic communities. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a part of the peace agreement that ended the 1992-1995 war. The constitution silenced the antagonisms, at least temporarily, but it did not resolve the internal ethnic contradictions. The dynamics of the war is incorporated in the peace agreement that ended it (Azinović, 2012). Following the narratives expressed in the political discourse, today's predominant political antagonisms are focused on the future vision of the country, and they move along one of three directions: separatism (Serbs), unitarism (Bosniaks), or federalism (Croats).

Only a few countries in Southeast Europe have had such an unstable position and complex, contradictory internal relations like Bosnia and Herzegovina. The dominant reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina included wars, regardless of whether they were initiated from outside or started and fought within the country. Stability and instability alternated in cyclical periods (Redžić, 1993). The contradiction of ethnic relations accumulated ethnic prejudice among the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina through history. Narratives that are used in public discourse nowadays are often related to ethnic relations in different historical periods. Such narratives, either used deliberately or inadvertently, serve to reinforce prejudice among the peoples, thereby influencing radicalisation that can lead to terrorism.

The process of national and ethnic identification and differentiation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was lengthy and influenced by various factors within the country, the Balkan area, but also the wider area of South-east Europe. In the process of identity formation of peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks) religious affiliation played a predominant role. Among the South Slavic peoples, religion is one of the constituent elements of a nation (Hadžijahić, 1974), i.e., its main identifier (Džaja, 1992). Religion played a decisive role in the development of national consciousness in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nowadays, religious institutions play an important role in maintaining national identification. Religious organisations position themselves as exclusive guardians of a people's traditions and provide the narrative used in the construction of ethnic identity (Turjačanin, 2014). Religious organisations not only perceive themselves as pillars of society, but the society perceives them as such, too. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, this is a consequence of the long Ottoman rule, followed by Austria-Hungary, where religion and religious institutions were indeed units of the society's political organisation. As such, they have remained part of the written history, myths and interpretations of ethnic and national groups to this day.

National identification and differentiation in Bosnia and Herzegovina begins with the Ottoman rule, although even earlier, in the Middle Ages, Bosnia's spiritual character became pluralised (Džaja, 1992) to

Catholic, Orthodox and Patarine (Imamović et al., 1998; Klaić, 1882), which was the real basis for a mass conversion to Islam. The process of Islamisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not observed uniformly, but from two opposing viewpoints: Turkophilic and Turkophobic (Džaja, 1992). The Turcophiles believe that the Ottomans brought legal order and religious tolerance to the torn feudal and confessional medieval society. The Turkophobes hold the opposite position and see the Ottomans as invaders who stopped the political and cultural development of the Balkan peoples. Taking different positions about the process of Islamisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina leads to narratives conducive to the adoption and strengthening of ethnic bias, polarisation and radicalisation in society. The complex confessional picture in interaction with the other historical, social, cultural, class and political factors has brought the national identification of Muslims, Serbs and Croats since the 19th century. National identification was accompanied by polarisation and the use of stereotypes and derogatory names for members of external ethnic groups (Lovrenović, 1989). A change of religion also meant an identity change (Džaja, 1992). The Ottoman period left strong antagonisms among the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina who were in the final stage of national identification. Resentments are extremely strong concerning this period and have a mobilising character.

The four decades of Austro-Hungarian rule are among the most significant periods in the recent economic, political and cultural history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a time of deep internal economic, psychosocial, political and cultural turmoil and changes (Imamović, 1997). The large and sudden social and national stratification in Bosnia and Herzegovina took the form of agonial political conflicts, in which various inter-religious, inter-ethnic and social antagonisms were intertwined (Lovrenović, 1989), which continued during the First World War. The conflict of ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which arose in the course of history, have carried on in the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Political parties were formed on primarily national programmes as the bearers of the confessional-national gathering of the people (Redžić, 1993). The Second World War followed, bringing continuation of conflicts and antagonisms in puppet regimes, where those who were in a position of dominance and power expressed hatred and committed crimes against their expected ethnic enemies mirroring the conflicts that had occurred in the First World War. After the Second World War, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a socialist republic, became part of Yugoslavia. The doctrinal concept of "brotherhood and unity" was aimed at reducing ethnic tensions and prejudice in society. The practice was different. Yugoslavia did not solve the national issue as a question of all questions in a nationally complex country (Filandra, 1998). In the first democratic elections, winners were the so-called national parties, proving how wrong was the policy of the previous government, which did not solve the national issue. The referendum on independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina took place on 29 February and 1 March 1992. The declaration of independence started the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was also fought between the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The peoples living in Bosnia and Herzegovina observe the history and political character of the country separately. Although there is a thesis in the political discourse about the centuries-old mutual hatred of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a reasonable level of caution should be kept when qualifying ethnic relations (Džaja, 1992). The presented historical facts indicate the complexity and contradictions of ethnic relations and antagonisms that influence the development of ethnic prejudice in society, which occasionally turned into extreme forms of violence.

Bearing in mind the above, Bosnia and Herzegovina seems to be an ideal area for the research we conducted. A post-conflict state in which the war did not end with Clausewitz's (1939) definition of "subjugation of the enemy to our will" (none of the parties in the conflict emerged victorious in this sense), but through the

inversion of another definition by the same author, it continued through politics as different means. A divided society, a complex constitutional structure with a combination of competencies and powers on four levels of asymmetrical government, constant tension and polarisation of society, hybrid conflicts projected from outside and inside, etc. make Bosnia and Herzegovina a very relevant area for conducting this kind of research.

When it comes to the terrorist potential in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an area of research, it is important to emphasize that, like other controversial political topics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, terrorism is also given different connotations by different domestic and foreign political actors. The political nature of terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina thereby obtains a purely pseudo-political version (exaggeration of the problem) or a dilettante-pseudo political version (problem denial). According to one point of view, Bosnia and Herzegovina is connoted as a country with a clear terrorist potential. On the other hand, the existence of terrorism is denied with allegations of a small number of terrorist attacks. As usual, the truth lies somewhere in between.

A dominant position in the overall terrorist potential of Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e., the Balkans, is occupied by activities of extremist Islamist organisations and movements. However, terrorism in the Balkans, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, is not exclusively linked to the activities of radical Islamist groups. In the Western Balkan countries, EUROPOL deems religiously motivated terrorism the primary threat, and ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism the secondary threat. Also, EUROPOL assesses the threats of extreme left, anarchist and extreme right terrorism as insignificant (Europol, 2017).

Where does the radical Salafi extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina come from? The doctrine of Salafism and Salafi proselytism, that is, a strict interpretation of Islam, arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina through foreign fighters at the beginning of the war, in the summer of 1992. The Salafi ideology that came to Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time was the most rigid form of Salafism, since a part of the Salafis came directly from training camps in Afghanistan, promoting Salafism in its most militant form. (Bećirević, 2016). In the beginning, this movement was monolithic and aimed at fighting jihad, a holy war in defense of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the war, there was a stratification into moderate and militant Salafis, further popularisation and spread of the ideology.

The arrival of foreign fighters - the mujahideen from Afghanistan to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 90s was not spontaneous, but organised under the auspices of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda's connections with Bosnia and Herzegovina have been widely researched and documented (Alexander & Swetnam, 2001; Azinović, 2007; Deliso, 2007; Kohlmann, 2006; Migaux, 2007; Mlivončić, 2007; Sageman, 2006; Scheuer, 2007; SEERECON, 2014) and they point to activities of certain Al Qaeda's intel officers in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina during and after the war, the participation of Al Qaeda's operatives who fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina in terrorist attacks and preparations of terrorist attacks throughout the world (among others, the Millennium Plot and the terrorist attack in Madrid in 2004), and Al Qaeda's financial operations through various humanitarian organisations. In his speeches and articles, Bin Laden himself very often refers to the Balkans, that is, to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, as places where Muslims were severely wronged, and the injustice should be the source of their mobilisation and radicalisation. However, to conclude that the establishment of an Islamic government based on Sharia in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the ultimate goal in Al Qaeda's plans would be inaccurate. Rather, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the means of spreading the global jihad against the West. However, at the very beginning of the war, the idea of a heroic rescue of the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina already gave way to the primary goal of using Bosnia and Herzegovina as a springboard for a larger and more expansive international "holy war". (Kohlmann, 2006). The place and timing were ideal. For the "Islamist International," after the victory in Afghanistan, the timing of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was perfect (Schindler, 2007).

Most of the foreign Afghan-Arab fighters left Bosnia and Herzegovina when the war ended, having been exposed to strong political pressure from the West. However, the spreading militant Salafism ideology did not leave the country with them. The fragile internal structure, dysfunctional administration, frozen conflict, unresolved identity issues and a divided and polarised society were conducive to the ideology expansion (Azinović, 2017). In less than a quarter of a century, Bosnia and Herzegovina turned from a country of destination into a country of origin of foreign fighters (Azinović & Jusić, 2016), who joined terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq, which is a very significant phenomenon in the overall scientific-expert terrorism discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The numbers of foreign fighters and family members vary depending on the used methodology, but the total of 188 men, 61 women and 81 children who stayed in Syria have been identified (Azinović & Jusić, 2016), i.e. a total of 301 “travellers”. (Kržalić et al, 2020).

Unlike in the West, where radicalisation is specific for young people who have failed to integrate or are socially and economically marginalised in their countries, it occurs within local communities in the Balkans (Azinović, 2017). The radicalisation and recruitment process usually takes place in the privacy of homes and in religious buildings that have not been approved by the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the official religious institution. Some of the illegal micro-communities, i.e., “parajamaats/paramasjids” are considered centres of ideological radicalisation and recruitment for departures to Syria and Iraq (Azinović & Jusić, 2016). Engaging in violent jihad in Syria and Iraq cannot be attributed to the usual drivers, such as economic deprivation, social marginalisation or failure to integrate that are specific for Western countries. The region’s recent history produced narratives based on identity, which is why, in many cases, joining jihad was identity-driven (Azinović, 2017). The removal or “abduction” of Bosniak ethnic identity, as Azinović calls it, refers to the eradication of an entire existing belief system, in order to absorb it into a unique global community - *the ummah*, which is defined exclusively by the religious identity. The very process of radicalisation and recruitment would begin through personal interaction with a “recognised” authority, later followed by interaction with the like-minded who reinforced ones viewpoints through the group dynamics. At the same time, the role of social media appears to be of tertiary importance, serving as a multiplier of the already established positions. The critical phase of the radicalisation process is separation from biological families and joining new ideological families that offer respect, care, support, and often money, i.e., everything that the newly radicalised persons lacked in their past lives (Azinović, 2017). Azinović’s (2017) thesis on potential development of a “Gaza Strip mentality” among young people who feel trapped in a hostile ethnic, religious and political environment seems particularly interesting. This kind of mentality can hardly develop without adopting prejudice against outgroups, that is, external enemies.

Therefore, apart from the complex inter-ethnic relations in the country, one can conclude that Bosnia and Herzegovina also represents a significant psychosocial research area in the context of potential radicalisation to terrorism.

7. METHODOLOGY

Many natural science rules are precisely established with regard to the generally accepted measurement units and developed measuring instruments. Measurements in the research of social phenomena are different and imply the construction of special measuring instruments whose exactness cannot or can hardly reach the level of exactness achieved in measuring the natural science variables. In this context, and considering the set hypotheses, this research faced two particular challenges:

1. How to devise a way to measure the independent variable (prejudice) and the dependent variable (radicalisation that can lead to terrorism)?
2. What analytical procedure should be used to determine the causality of these two variables?

Bearing in mind that variables are attitudes (prejudice and radical attitudes that can lead to terrorism), we found a solution to the measurement challenges by constructing a special survey questionnaire that examined the attitudes and opinions of respondents on certain issues. The next step was to analyse the respondents' answers divided into subgroups according to certain criteria, and then to test the statistical significance of differences in the answers using an adequate statistical method.

7.1. Selection of relevant sample of respondents

Statistical surveys can be carried out through a census and a sample. A sample must be statistical (formed by applying statistical rules) and socially representative, that is, it must really represent the population in all its essential properties and characteristics; in its composition and structure (Termiz, 2013). An intentional sample of first-year university students in Bosnia and Herzegovina was planned for conducting the survey of attitudes according to the hypotheses. Although this sample is not statistically representative of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is socially representative for research on radicalisation that can lead to terrorism, primarily because it is conducted on the young population, which is the most vulnerable to radicalisation processes.³⁴ The inference process refers to the statistical significance of differences between subgroups of respondents grouped on the basis of sociodemographic characteristics and the expressed attitudes on social distance scale, which leads to a general conclusion confirming or refuting the general and special hypotheses.

³⁴ We selected the intentional sample of first-year university students in Bosnia and Herzegovina because it is conceptually more meaningful to conduct an ideological radicalisation survey on young people in their early and middle formative years. Researching radicalisation that can lead to terrorism does not seem significant on the older population because their personalities are fully formed and socialisation agents no longer have the same effect on them as they do on people in their early formative years.

Bearing in mind the main research subject, especially the dependent variable – radicalisation that can lead to terrorism, and in view of the previously conducted theoretical research, we noticed that³⁵ young people striving for higher education constitute a relevant sample (Borum, 2004; El-Said & Barrett, 2011; Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Gurr, 2006). Previous terrorist profiling efforts showed a large share of highly educated people in the terrorist population and a much higher share of young people in terrorist groups compared to the total population. Accordingly, a decision was taken to conduct the survey on first-year students at the University of Mostar, the University of Sarajevo and the University of Banja Luka, each predominantly frequented by members of one of the peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the sample we used in this research cannot be described as representative because it does not represent the entire population. It is an intentional sample that is fully appropriate and consistent with the objectives and subject of the research.

7.2. Survey questionnaire

The survey questionnaire consists of four parts with a series of questions grouped in meaningful units. These questions were preceded by an introductory address to the respondents. After thanking them for their participation, it was emphasised that attitudes and opinions on certain social issues were tested and that there were no right/wrong answers. The anonymity of respondents was also stressed, which enabled them to express their true views freely.

The first part of the questionnaire is about sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents: year of birth (age), gender, nationality, urbanity level, and population structure of their place of living. The first three characteristics are clear, and apart from Bosniak, Croat and Serb ethnicities, foreign students or those from Bosnia and Herzegovina who did not belong to, or identified with, any of the three peoples were able to declare themselves differently. When it comes to the size of the place the students come from (urban or rural area), we avoided mentioning “rural” areas because of possible stigma and deliberately incorrect answers. We named the category “urbanity level,” which offered the following answers: places of lower urbanity level (below 10,000 inhabitants), medium urbanity (10,000 – 50,000 inhabitants) and high urbanity level (over 50,000 inhabitants). This category is important to us because prejudice (independent variable) is more associated with rural and less with urban environments (Duckitt, 1994), which inversely also applies to terrorism, the dependent variable (Borum, 2004). The question about population structure of the place where students live (does not apply to the place of studying) answers whether the students constitute a minority or majority there, or enjoy equal numerical status, and the following answering options were offered: almost mono-ethnic environment, dominated by my ethnic group; almost mono-ethnic environment, dominated by the ethnic group which I do not belong to; a multi-ethnic environment without a dominant majority, a multi-ethnic environment with a dominant ethnic majority to which I belong; and a multi-ethnic environment with a dominant ethnic majority to which I do not belong. This category is important in the context of testing the theory of relative deprivation, i.e., its potential impact on research results. Population size plays an important role along with the other terrorism generating factors (Gurr, 2006). The relative size of interacting groups is also important in the context of development of mutual prejudice (Duckitt, 1994).

35 If we consider the characteristics that are repeated from previous terrorist profiling attempts (young, highly educated people), we can conclude that the used sample is partly statistically representative, but particular caution is advised when drawing any conclusions that may apply to the entire population.

The second part of the questionnaire includes questions representing a specially constructed Bogardus social distance scale, which was modified, modernised and adapted to the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the sample, which was used as a measure of prejudice. Social distance is one of the main measures of prejudice against certain social groups (Augoustinos & Reynolds, 2001; Duckitt, 1994; Olson, 2009). The answers offered measure the respondents' social distance from Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs as peoples with whom the respondents live in the same country, and from Americans, Germans, Russians and Turks with whom the respondents may share an identification framework based on religious affiliation or historical, broader cultural or social basis, or political affiliation. The second part of the questionnaire measures explicit bias. Explicit prejudice refers to inter-group stereotypes and attitudes that people deliberately recall when asked for an opinion on an issue, unlike implicit prejudice that is activated unconsciously when one meets an outgroup member. (Kite & Whitley, 2016).

Social distance represents a continuum of attitudes ranging from intimate and warm to indifferent, and eventually hostile (Supek, 1968). With regard to the presented attitudes on the social distance scale, the respondents were grouped into NP (no prejudice), MP (with moderate prejudice) and WP (with entrenched/developed prejudice) groups. The Bogardus social distance scale consists of attitudes about seven different criteria to which the respondents give answers: (1) close kin by marriage; (2) friendship in my club; (3) neighbour in my street; (4) employee in my office; (5) citizen in my country; (6) only as a visitor in my country; (7) I want to exclude him/her from the country. We adapted these statements - attitudes to the sample while keeping the meaning of each one (e.g., since the respondents are students, the attitude about attending the same study course instead of working in the same office will be explored). Also, we removed a number of statements for streamlining purposes, to ensure clarity of the questions asked. The new, streamlined and modified statements from the Bogardus scale read as follows:

1. I accept the possibility of marrying him/her in the future.
2. I accept them as fellow students at the university.
3. I accept them as citizens in my country.
4. I would be happier if they didn't live in my country.

Statement 1 is specific for unbiased persons (NP), i.e., persons who, by accepting marriage, do not show any ethnic distance from the other groups. Statements 2 and 3 outline persons who accept other ethnic communities, but not through the closest kind of relationship (marriage). Tentatively speaking, these are persons with moderate prejudice (MP), that is, with less ethnic distance from the other groups. Statement 4 is specific for biased persons (WP), i.e., persons who show full ethnic distance from the other groups. Therefore, the Bogardus scale only serves us to determine attitudes regarding the independent variable – the degree of ethnic prejudice and to categorise all respondents into the three groups.

The third and fourth parts include questions we used to measure the dependent variable - radicalisation that can lead to terrorism. The third part features nine briefly described cases of terrorism (or acts resembling terrorism) that were selected in view of the research subject. In this regard, attitudes were tested towards various acts with elements of terrorism that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the world, in which some identity framework of the respondents can be found, primarily ethnic or religious one. The first seven cases involve persons/organisations that Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs can ethnically identify with (as perpetrators of attacks or victims, depending on the case). The last two cases can offer identification in the domain of religion considering the object of the attack or the perpetrators. In addition to testing the hypothesis in accordance with the

set theory, this part of the questionnaire also tests the theory of social identity.³⁶ Since these are cases in which certain groups may identify with the perpetrators, but also with the victims, identical answers from the respondents are not expected considering their respective ethnic group. Deviations from the expected results point to possible other causes of radicalisation that can lead to terrorism beyond the social identity theory findings, in accordance with the set hypotheses.

Respondents were asked to express their position on each of the chronologically ordered events from recent and distant past and say to what extent they support the execution of the said act and the perpetrator. The offered answers are formulated in the form of the Likert scale with numerical answers on a continuum of 1-5, where 1 means no support at all, 2 support to a small extent, 3 indifferent, 4 largely support, and 5 fully support. Answers were requested regarding support for the perpetrators of the following terrorist attacks or events with elements of terrorism:

- 1) *In 1914, with the logistical support of the “Crna ruka” organisation from Serbia, Gavrilo Princip, a member of the “Mlada Bosna” organisation assassinated the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sofia in Sarajevo.*

This incident, which was a prelude of (and by no means the cause), or gave rise to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, was carried out as a conventional regicide - an attack on the highest government representatives. Bearing in mind the name of the organisation that carried out the attack (“Mlada Bosna”)³⁷ as well as the organisation that logistically supported it (“Crna ruka”)³⁸ and the country from which it comes (Serbia), greater support is expected from Serbs and Bosniaks than from Croats who should give less support or be indifferent in this matter.

- 2) *In 1928, in the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Puniša Račić, a representative of the radical party and a member of the Chetnik movement, shot the representative of the Croatian Peasant Party, Stjepan Radić, who died from injuries, together with two other representatives of the same party.*

Considering that a representative of a radical party of Serbian nationality and a member of the Chetnik movement is the direct perpetrator (which is deliberately emphasised) in this case, and one of the victims is a highly respected Croat politician (Stjepan Radić), together with the other victims, also Croatian representatives, greater support was expected from Serb respondents, and no support (or opposition) was expected from Croat respondents. Bosniaks are expected to be indifferent or to oppose the act less than Croats.

- 3) *In 1934, with the logistical support of the Ustaša-Croatian Revolutionary Organisation (UHRO) at the time, Veličko Dimitrov, a Macedonian nationalist member of the VMRO organisation assassinated the Yugoslav king Alexander I Karađorđević in Marseilles, during the king’s official visit to France.*

36 As this theory was also tested as part of the research subject, a brief overview of the expected results for each case from the perspective of the ethnic group the respondents belong to is provided below. A deviation from the expected results supports the theory, i.e., the established PRaT model, which we would say upgrades the social identity theory, rather than refuting it.

37 Mlada Bosna - Young Bosnia

38 Crna ruka - Black Hand

In this event, the situation is the opposite to the first one. Bearing in mind that the Ustasha organisation - the Croatian revolutionary organisation - UHRO (which is deliberately emphasised) was logistically behind the attack, and that the target of the conventional regicide was the Yugoslav king, Serb Aleksandar I Karađorđević, greater support for the attack is expected from Croat respondents, Serb respondents are expected to oppose the attack, while indifference or opposition is expected from Bosniak respondents.

- 4) *In 1974, Muharem Kurbegović, posing as Rasim, the field leader of the “Foreigners in America” organisation, planted an explosive device at the Los Angeles International Airport that killed three and injured 36 people.*

Unlike the first three incidents, which are well-known historical events, this one is relatively unknown. It was selected because it belongs to the beginnings of modern terrorism, and a Bosniak from Bosnia and Herzegovina is the perpetrator. Bearing this in mind, greater support is expected from Bosniak respondents, and an indifferent attitude or opposition from Croat and Serb respondents. The target is the United States and has no connection to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- 5) *In 1976, a plane was hijacked at the New York Airport, followed by an explosion at the Central Railway Station in New York, killing a police officer who tried to defuse the device. The group “Fighters for Free Croatia” was condemned for both incidents.*

This event is similar to the previous one, but with different attackers. The target was the United States of America again. In this case, the perpetrators are “Fighters for free Croatia,” which is why we expect greater support from Croat respondents, and opposition or indifferent attitude from Bosniaks and Serbs.

- 6) *In 2011, Mevlid Jašarević carried out a firearm attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo, wounding one of the police officers securing the building.*

Recent events that are directly connected to Bosnia and Herzegovina are following. In this particular attack, considering that the attacker is ethnic Bosniak, greater support is expected from Bosniak respondents, along with the opposition or indifferent attitude of Croats and Serbs. Although the incident took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the direct target was the United States.

- 7) *In 2015, Nerdin Ibrić attacked the Zvornik Police Station with a firearm, killing one and injuring two police officers from the Republika Srpska Ministry of Interior.*

This incident is one of the last recorded terrorist attacks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Considering that the attacker is ethnic Bosniak, and victims are police officers from the Republika Srpska Ministry of Interior, greater support from Bosniak respondents is expected, along with the opposition of Serb respondents and indifference of Croat respondents.

8) *In 2019, in a murder spree, Brenton Tarrant killed 50 and injured 39 people during prayers in several mosques in the city of Christchurch, New Zealand.*

In this incident, Muslim believers were attacked. In accordance with religious affiliation and identification, greater opposition is expected from Bosniak respondents than from Croats and Serbs.

9) *In 2019, during Easter, 8 attacks with explosive devices were carried out in Sri Lanka, killing 290 people and injuring more than 500. The attack has been linked to a branch of the Islamic State organisation operating in that country.*

In this incident, the attack was carried out by radical Islamists, and Christian believers were attacked during a religious holiday. Greater opposition is expected from Christian respondents (Serbs and Croats) than from Muslim respondents (Bosniaks).

Therefore, this part of the survey questionnaire gives us an insight into the state of cognitive radicalisation of respondents based on their support for certain events. Based on analyses of answers and the existence of statistically significant differences, conclusions will be drawn about the specific hypotheses.

The fourth part of the questionnaire consists of questions soliciting the respondents' attitudes showing tendencies to radicalisation that can lead to terrorism through the declared willingness to directly participate in various activities involving elements of terrorism.

The filter question asked was:

If you believed that your people were threatened by the other, would you personally be ready to take certain actions against the group that threatens your people?

An important word that was used as a trigger for participation in the offered activities is "*threatened*." By formulating the question in such a way that a member of one people is threatened by a member of another people, the theory of relative deprivation is tested (the respondents did not personally experience deprivation, but the possibility of being threatened by others is emphasised), and partly also the theory of the root causes of terrorism, including inequality. Answering options were 'yes', 'no' and 'I don't know.' Respondents who answered 'yes' to this question were asked to circle each of the offered activities that they are willing to take (several options can be selected). The offered options were:

1. *Posting comments online to send messages of political protest.*
2. *Writing graffiti with political messages.*
3. *Street protests.*
4. *"Small" courier jobs for an organisation.*
5. *Transfer of cash for purposes unknown to you.*
6. *Keeping entrusted amount of funds in your house or premises you use.*
7. *Other logistical tasks that do not involve your direct role in any violence.*
8. *Hiding weapons, explosives and other means of attack.*
9. *Hiding persons wanted by the authorities.*
10. *Observing an attack target.*
11. *Keeping watch during the attack.*
12. *Driver to the person who will carry out an attack.*
13. *Planting an explosive device.*
14. *Activating an explosive device in situations that cannot produce human casualties.*

15. *Activating an explosive device in situations that can produce human casualties.*

In order to get as honest answers as possible from the respondents, without revealing the research hypothesis, the word terrorism was not mentioned until the very end of the questionnaire, in which open-ended questions about terrorism were asked (these questions are not an integral part of the issue in question). In this way, we tried to avoid that the respondents recognise the research topic and give socially acceptable answers instead of honest and truthful ones, considering the extremely negative connotation and social condemnation of terrorism as a phenomenon. The finalisation of the questionnaire was preceded by two pre-tests.

As mentioned above, respondents were offered 15 answers to the question of what they are willing to do in a situation where their people is threatened by another people. Respondents could select multiple answers, from none to all fifteen offered options. The answering options which explicitly mention certain acts of execution, do not constitute equal social threats, which is why the degree of social threat should be measured (“weighed”). In this respect, we sent questionnaires to 30 experts in criminal law and criminology in order to solicit their opinions on the level of social threat posed by these actions, whereby they would qualify the least socially threatening acts with score 1, and the most threatening ones with score 5. Ten questionnaires were sent to the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (a state-level police agency that investigates terrorism) to be filled out by officers working on terrorism cases. Unlike respondents who were not presented with the dissertation topic, experts were clearly explained what kind of opinion was asked of them within the empirical research on the dissertation topic *“The influence of ethnic prejudice on radicalisation that can lead to terrorism”* and that in this regard, and for the sake of correctness of the statistical processing of results, it was necessary to assess the severity of individual actions in terms of the level of social threat in the context of terrorism. Experts gave their opinions, which are listed in Table 1.

Table 1 Social threat posed by individual acts

Question	Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina										Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina										SIPA (police)										Σ	N	X
Posting comments online to send messages of political protest.	1	1	2	3	2	2	5	3	3	1	2	4	3	1	2	2	1	3	1	1	1	4	4	2	4	2	2	3	65	28	2,32		
	1	1	2	3	2	2	4	3	3	1	2	5	2	2	3	1	2	1	2	1	4	3	1	1	2	2	2	2	60	28	2,14		
Writing graffiti with political messages.	2	1	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	1	2	5	2	2	4	2	X	X	2	2	4	2	3	1	2	2	2	2	61	26	2,35		
Street protests.	2	1	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	1	2	5	2	2	4	2	X	X	2	2	4	2	3	1	2	2	2	2	61	26	2,35		
"Small" courier jobs for an organisation.	2	1	3	3	3	1	4	4	4	2	3	4	4	3	3	4	2	X	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	1	73	27	2,70		
Transfer of cash for purposes unknown to you.	3	5	4	4	5	1	4	4	4	2	3	3	4	4	3	3	4	2	3	2	5	2	3	3	2	5	4	4	94	28	3,36		
Keeping entrusted amount of funds in your house or premises you use.	3	3	4	4	4	1	4	4	4	2	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	4	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	4	3	86	28	3,07		
Other logistical tasks that do not involve your direct role in any violence.	3	3	4	4	4	1	4	4	4	2	4	4	4	3	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	4	2	2	4	3	88	28	3,14			
Hiding weapons, explosives and other means of attack.	4	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	3	3	4	3	4	3	5	3	3	5	5	124	28	4,43		
Hiding persons wanted by the authorities.	5	5	5	X	5	1	5	5	5	3	4	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	3	2	5	5	5	114	27	4,22		
Observing an attack target.	5	5	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	3	3	4	3	4	5	5	120	28	4,29		
Keeping watch during the attack.	5	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	4	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	5	4	3	4	5	5	5	124	28	4,43		
Driver to the person who will carry out an attack.	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	3	5	4	5	4	4	5	5	4	4	4	4	5	4	3	4	5	5	5	126	28	4,50		
Planting an explosive device.	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	139	28	4,96		
Activating an explosive device in situations that cannot produce human casualties.	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	4	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	5	135	28	4,82		
Activating an explosive device in situations that can produce human casualties.	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	140	28	5,00		

For each action, the arithmetic mean was calculated that represents the degree of social threat which ranges from 2.14 to 5.00, depending on the action.³⁹ The last action – activating an explosive device in situations that can produce human casualties – is the most severe and valued with 5 (all respondents gave it score 5), while ‘writing graffiti with political messages’ was rated as the least socially threatening action (2.14).

7.3. Survey

When the survey questionnaire was finalised, in accordance with the foreseen procedures, a request for approval was sent to the ethical committees of the universities for conducting the testing-survey of first-year students. The universities in Sarajevo and Banja Luka carried out approval procedures before their ethical committees, while the University of Mostar assessed that there were no ethical obstacles to conducting the survey without applying a special procedure.

The lapse of time from the last terrorist act in Bosnia and Herzegovina (end of 2015) to the survey (more than five years) is extremely important. In this way, a potential opposite causal link in the sense that certain acts of terrorism led to polarisation and prejudice was completely avoided. In contrast, the respondents, first-year students were in their formative years at the time of the most recent terrorist attack, approximately 15 years old, which makes them ideal for the research.

The survey was carried out on Google Forms. The invitation to students to take the survey and the survey link were sent by organisational units, i.e., companies that provide administrative and IT services to the three universities where the survey was conducted, to e-mail addresses of all first-year students of all faculties of the University of Mostar, University of Sarajevo and the University of Banja Luka. The invitation included the accompanying text of the survey, with the surveyor’s words of gratitude for their participation in the survey, emphasising again that the survey is completely anonymous and that there are no wrong/correct answers, but rather their personal opinion and attitude are solicited, which they are absolutely entitled to as young persons. This wording was supposed to be a motivating factor for participation and a contributing factor to the expression of their true views in the survey. The total of 8941 students were invited to complete the survey, as follows: University of Mostar – 2171 students; University of Banja Luka – 2314 students, and University of Sarajevo – 4456 students. The survey was conducted from 17 May to 8 June 2021. The total of 646 students (7.22%) responded to the survey, which is enough for statistical processing and analysis of the results.

7.4. Analysis of indicators and methodological procedures of preparation for statistical analyses

Before the performance of statistical analyses to test the statistical significance of differences in the respondents’ answers, the original survey results (indicators) should be analysed and processed (coded) into a format recognised by SPSS (programme for conducting statistical analyses). In that sense, the following was done:

³⁹ Answers of two experts, one from the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina and one from the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are omitted from the table. The expert from the Prosecutor’s Office whose answers were omitted either failed to understand the purpose of the questionnaire, or answered the questions superficially; for example, he assessed writing graffiti as a greater social threat (score 4) than activating an explosive device in situations that can produce human casualties (score 2). The expert from the Court whose answers were omitted did not give any answer for most of the proposed actions (11).

Based on answers to the question about social (ethnic) distance, the respondents were classified into the three aforementioned categories. Category 1 (NP – people with no prejudice) includes respondents who accept everyone, do not want to exclude anyone, accept marriage with everyone or almost everyone (not only with people from similar culture). Category 2 (MP – persons with moderate prejudice) consists of respondents who accept everyone, do not want marriage except with members of their own nation or culturally similar nations, refuse to marry B&H citizens of different nationalities, but do not want to exclude anyone. Category 3 (WP – persons with significant prejudice) includes respondents who want to exclude any of the offered nationalities.⁴⁰

As for the question about what the respondents are willing to do if their people is threatened, answers were recoded according to the values of each action, and the results were grouped for three different processing types. All processing types were named “Willingness to take action,” (SnA)⁴¹ with the indices 1, 2, and 3 added. SnA-1 processing included all fifteen actions, that is, acts of political violence (answers 1-3), terrorism in a broad sense (answers 4-7 and 9) and terrorism in a narrow sense (answers 8 and 10-15).⁴² SnA-2 processing included 12 answers, that is, acts of terrorism in a broad sense (answers 4-7 and 9) and terrorism in a narrow sense (answers 8 and 10-15), and SnA-3 processing included only terrorism in a narrow sense (answers 8 and 10-15).

Other socio-demographic indicators did not need to be processed separately because they are more or less clear (gender, ethnicity, urbanity level and population structure).

Each question from the third part of the questionnaire (events with elements of terrorism - DET⁴³) was observed as a separate Likert scale. In this respect, for each of the nine events mentioned, the existence of statistically significant differences between respondents was tested by:

- a) inclination to prejudice (H1)
- b) ethnic background (H2)
- c) gender (H3)
- d) urbanity level (H4)
- e) population structure of the place they come from (H5)
- f) that is, combinations of special hypotheses.

The same categories of statistical significance of differences were tested in relation to the responses to the question about willingness to take action (SnA-1, -2, -3).

7.5. Respondents

As mentioned above, a total of 646 students from three universities from Bosnia and Herzegovina participated in the research, 132 from the University of Banja Luka, 277 from the University of Mostar, and 237 from the University of Sarajevo. The age range of the respondents is from 19 to 54⁴⁴ (M=21.5; SD=3.75). The three main

⁴⁰ 17 respondents gave ambiguous or equivocal answers, which could not be classified into any category, and were assigned score “0,” which excluded them from processing related to this feature, but they were included in processing regarding differences in other socio-demographic characteristics.

⁴¹ SnA – hrv. Spremnost na akciju (willingness to take action).

⁴² Terrorism in the broadest sense includes activities that do not involve violence, and in the narrow sense, it includes everything that is directly related to violence.

⁴³ DET – hrv. Događaji s elementima terorizma (events with the elements of terrorism).

⁴⁴ Only 34 respondents (5.3%) are older than 25. All central tendency measures range around 20, which means that the arithmetic mean is a good indicator of grouping of results (arithmetic mean M=21.5; median C=20, dominant value D = 20). Extreme (aberrant) results do not significantly move the arithmetic mean from the “centre.”

ethnic groups are represented in the sample, 44.8% Croats, 19.8% Serbs, and 33.6% Bosniaks. The detailed structure of the sample by ethnic distance and sociodemographic characteristics is shown in table 2.


Table 2 Ethnic distance and sociodemographic characteristics of respondents

	F	%
Prejudice		
no prejudice	206	32,8
moderate prejudice	251	40,0
significant prejudice	171	27,2
Total	628	100,0
Ethnic background		
Croat	288	44,8
Serb	127	19,8
Bosniak	216	33,6
Other	12	1,9
Total	643	100,0
Gender		
M	211	32,7
F	435	67,3
Total	646	100,0
Urbanity level		
Low urbanity (under 10,000 inhabitants)	201	31,1
Medium urbanity (10,000 – 50,000 inhabitants)	227	35,1
High urbanity (above 50,000 inhabitants)	218	33,7
Total	646	100,0
Population structure		
Almost mono-ethnic environment of my ethnic group	253	39,2
Almost mono-ethnic environment of ethnic group different from mine	8	1,2
Multi-ethnic environment without a dominant majority	88	13,6
Multi-ethnic environment with dominant majority of my ethnic group	250	38,7
Multi-ethnic environment with dominant majority of ethnic group different from mine	47	7,3
Total	646	100,0

In order to describe the sample of respondents in more detail and to check the conditions for the implementation of further, more complex statistical processing, data related to the sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents and attitudes regarding ethnic distance (explicit prejudice) were analysed.


In terms of social (ethnic) distance, i.e., existence of prejudice against other ethnicities, approximately one-third of respondents (32.8%) harbour no prejudice, slightly more than one-third (40%) have moderate prejudice, while slightly less than one-third of respondents (27.2%) expressed significant prejudice against other ethnic groups (Graph 1).

Graph 1 Sample structure by explicit prejudice




However, not all three peoples have equally strong prejudice (Graph 2). While the same percentage of Serbs and Croats harbour significant prejudice (29%), a slightly smaller share is found among Bosniaks (24%). Croats and Bosniaks, on the other hand, have an equal share of respondents with moderate prejudice (43%), and the percentage of Serbs is slightly lower (30%). The highest share of Serbs harbours no prejudice (40%), followed by Bosniaks (32%), and Croats (28%). This leads us to think critically about Allport's contact hypothesis, since Serbs who, relatively speaking, have less contacts with the other ethnic groups than Bosniaks and Croats, show less prejudice.

Graph 2 Sample structure by explicit prejudice and ethnic background




All three ethnic groups are sufficiently represented in the sample (Graph 3), with somewhat more Croats (44.8%) than Serbs (19.8%) and Bosniaks (33.6%). This distribution does not follow the actual shares of individual peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina (nor the censuses of 1991 and 2013). Distribution could not be influenced as the survey was conducted online and was entirely voluntary. However, bearing in mind that all relevant statistical analyses observe differences in the responses of respondent subgroups, and that the absolute number of respondents in the groups is sufficiently large, this distribution is not significant. The exception includes 12 respondents (about 2%) who indicated different ethnicity or refused to declare their affiliation, and were therefore classified in the “other” group. Unfortunately, due to the insufficient number of respondents in this category, they could not be considered during the main analyses of differences in answers by the respondents’ ethnic background.

Graph 3 Sample structure by ethnic background




The sample also includes about two-thirds of women and one-third of men (Graph 4), which is expected considering the data collection technique used (online), and considering that there are more women (girls) in the student population and that women are generally more likely to agree to participate in research.

Graph 4 Sample structure by gender




The sample is fairly uniform across the peoples by gender (Graph 5), with a slightly higher proportion of men compared to women among the Serb respondents.

Graph 5 Sample structure by gender and ethnic background




The sample is also uniform by urbanity level (Graph 6). The survey included a balanced number of respondents from places of lower urbanity level (below 10,000 inhabitants), medium urbanity (10,000 - 50,000 inhabitants), and respondents from places of high urbanity level (over 50,000 inhabitants).

Graph 6 Sample structure by urbanity level



Observed by individual peoples, a uniform sample like this shows certain deviations (Graph 7).

Graph 7 Sample structure by ethnic background and urbanity level




While the distribution is fairly uniform among Serb and Bosniak respondents with slightly more than 40% of respondents from places of high urbanity, about one-third from places of medium urbanity, and about one-fifth from places of low urbanity level, we find a completely inverse picture among Croats. The Croat sample includes 43% of respondents from places with low urbanity level, about one-third from places of medium urbanity, and about one-fifth from places of high urbanity level.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ This deviation practically results from the fact that Croats mostly live in only one city with over 50,000 inhabitants (Mostar), and that the University in Mostar, which has the largest number of Croat respondents, mostly attracts students from places with medium and low urbanity levels.


With regard to the population structure (Graph 8), more than one-third of respondents (39.2%) come from a mono-ethnic environment of their ethnic group, and almost as many (38.7%) come from a multi-ethnic environment dominated by their ethnic group, while other groups of different population structures are represented by almost one quarter of respondents (22.1% in total) (almost mono-ethnic environment of ethnic group other than mine; multi-ethnic environment without a dominant majority; multi-ethnic environment with dominant ethnic majority other than mine). Conditionally speaking, 88% of respondents come from areas where they constitute the majority, and 22% from areas where they belong to the minority.

Graph 8 Sample structure by population structure



We also find variations in the population structure of places where the respondents come from, observed through the prism of different peoples (Graph 9). Bosniaks and Serbs in equal proportions, slightly more than a half, come from multi-ethnic environments dominated by their ethnic majority, unlike only one-fifth of Croats from this category. Half of the Croats come from an almost mono-ethnic environment to which they belong, in contrast to 39% of Serbs and 29% of Bosniaks. When observed together, these two categories in which certain peoples constitute the majority provide the distribution of 91.4% Serbs, 82.4% Bosniaks, and 71.2% Croats. Croats are also frontrunners in the category without dominant majority (slightly less than one-fifth of Croats), unlike 11% of Bosniaks and 6% of Serbs. As a “minority,” in the areas where they live, Croats are represented in the sample by a share of 10%, Bosniaks 7%, and Serbs with 3%.

Graph 9 Sample structure by population structure and ethnic background



The presented distributions of the respondents in sample subgroups will be considered when drawing conclusions about individual analyses and research aspects.

7.6. Statistical and analytical procedures

The used sample is appropriate considering the number of respondents. An a priori statistical power analysis was performed using GPower (Faul et al., 2007), where the statistical power ($1 - \beta$) was set to 0.95 and α to .05 (two-tailed testing), and the effect size to $d = 0.25$, which was set based on the review of earlier research mentioned in the introduction to this paper. Statistical power analysis indicates that a total sample size of 400 respondents is required for this research.

The statistical package SPSS v23 was used to analyse the collected data. In order to meet the set research objectives, descriptive and inferential statistical procedures were used, and the results were presented in tables and graphs.

Due to the deviation from the normality of observed variables, non-parametric statistics were first used to test the difference between individual groups, namely the Mann Whitney U test for testing the differences between two groups of respondents and the Kruskal-Vallis test for testing differences between more than two groups, and then the same hypotheses were tested using parametric statistics and the t-test and variance analysis (ANOVA). The t-test and variance analysis (ANOVA) are considered to be quite robust statistical analyses that will give reliable results even in situations where the response distributions deviate from normal, especially if the groups with tested response differences are equal in size. In this research, it was shown that non-parametric and parametric methods give the same results even in a situation of asymmetric distributions. Given the robustness of the t-test and variance analysis, as well as the numerous advantages of parametric versus non-parametric methods, only results based on parametric statistics are presented.

One-way variance analysis (ANOVA) was used to examine differences between three or more respondent groups, and t-test was used to examine differences between two respondent groups. Interaction effects were tested using multiway variance analysis. Before conducting the main analyses, the conditions for conducting individual analyses were checked. The condition of homogeneity of variances and equal number of respondents in the groups was fulfilled. The significance level of .05 was used to determine statistical significance.

8. RESULTS

Table 3 shows the overall results of respondents' responses regarding the two groups of observed attitudes: 1) attitudes about radicalisation, which essentially represent support for the events from the questionnaire in terms of cognitive radicalisation (DET-1 – DET-9⁴⁶) and 2) willingness to take action, which represents the activities that respondents are willing to take if their people is threatened, grouped according to three categories (SnA-1, 2 and 3), that is, aspects of cognitive-behavioural radicalisation.

⁴⁶ DET – events involving elements of terrorism

DET-1 In 1914, with the logistical support of the “Crna ruka” organisation from Serbia, Gavrilo Princip, a member of the “Mlada Bosna” organisation assassinated the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sofia in Sarajevo.

DET-2 In 1928, in the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Puniša Račić, a representative of the radical party and a member of the Chetnik movement, shot the representative of the Croatian Peasant Party, Stjepan Radić, who died from injuries, together with two other representatives of the same party.

DET-3 In 1934, with the logistical support of the Ustaša-Croatian Revolutionary Organisation (UHRO) at the time, Veličko Dimitrov, a Macedonian nationalist member of the VMRO organisation assassinated the Yugoslav king Alexander I Karađorđević in Marseilles, during the king's official visit to France.

DET-4 In 1974, Muharem Kurbegović, posing as Rasim, the field leader of the “Foreigners in America” organisation, planted an explosive device at the Los Angeles International Airport that killed three and injured 36 people.

DET-5 In 1976, a plane was hijacked at the New York Airport, followed by an explosion at the Central Railway Station in New York, killing a police officer who tried to defuse the device. The group “Fighters for Free Croatia” was condemned for both incidents.

DET-6 In 2011, Mevlid Jašarević carried out a firearm attack on the US Embassy in Sarajevo, wounding one of the police officers securing the building.

DET-7 In 2015, Nerdin Ibrić attacked the Zvornik Police Station with a firearm, killing one and injuring two police officers from the Republika Srpska Ministry of Interior.

DET-8 In 2019, in a murder spree, Brenton Tarrant killed 50 and injured 39 people during prayers in several mosques in the city of Christchurch, New Zealand.


DET-9 In 2019, during Easter, 8 attacks with explosive devices were carried out in Sri Lanka, killing 290 people and injuring more than 500. The attack has been linked to a branch of the Islamic State organisation operating in that country.

Table 3 Views of radicalisation and willingness to take action

	N	M	C	D	Sd	Min	Max
Views of radicalisation							
DET-1	641	1,84	1	1	1,29	1	5
DET-2	636	1,45	1	1	0,96	1	5
DET-3	637	1,55	1	1	1,02	1	5
DET-4	638	1,18	1	1	0,57	1	5
DET-5	636	1,29	1	1	0,76	1	5
DET-6	637	1,21	1	1	0,65	1	5
DET-7	639	1,21	1	1	0,66	1	5
DET-8	636	1,17	1	1	0,59	1	5
DET-9	635	1,14	1	1	0,54	1	5
Willingness to take action							
SnA-1	645	4,52	0	0	8,42	0	55,73
SnA-2	645	3,04	0	0	7,31	0	48,92
SnA-3	643	1,42	0	0	4,86	0	32,43

As expected, the obtained results showed that respondents mostly did not support the execution of events from the near and distant past described in the questionnaire, nor did they support the perpetrators of those acts, which indicates general attitudes about radicalisation. In other words, the vast majority of respondents do not support events with elements of terrorism. The average supporting of these events on a scale from 1 - 'not at all' to 5 - 'fully support' ranges from M=1.14 for DET-9 (Sri Lanka) that the respondents supported the least, to M=1.84 for DET -1 (Gavrilo Princip) that was supported the most. This can be generally considered a very low level of support for terrorist acts, i.e., a low share of respondents with radicalised views regarding the observed sample. Other central tendency indicators, the median (C) and the dominant value (D), which both equal 1 for all described events, point to the same conclusion.

Graph 10 Distribution of respondents' answers about support for certain events involving elements of terrorism (DET-1 – DET-9)




The obtained average willingness to take a specific activity against a group that threatens their people (willingness to take action) is low on average, although a small number of respondents express a high level of willingness to take action. The average willingness to take action in case of political violence and terrorism in the broad and narrow sense (SnA-1) equals $M=4.52$, ranging from 0 to 55.73. When it comes to terrorism in the broad and narrow sense, the average willingness to take action (SnA-2) equals $M=3.03$ in the range from 0 to 48.9, while the average willingness to undertake an act of terrorism in the narrow sense (SnA-3) equals $M=1.42$, ranging from minimum 0 to maximum 32.4. The median (C) is 0 for all three indicators, as is the dominant value ($D=0$), which indicates that the vast majority of respondents are not willing to undertake extreme activities against a group that threatens their people.


Looking at Graph 10, it is evident how respondents' answers about their support for the nine past events involving elements of terrorism are distributed positively asymmetrically, with a long right side of the distribution tail and respondents grouped mostly around the left end of the scale. Distributions vary slightly with respect to individual events. The obtained results are in line with the expectations considering the research subject (radicalism), and the deviation from the normal distribution is expected.

Graphs 11, 12 and 13 show the distributions of respondents' responses by their willingness to take action.


Graph 11 Distribution of respondents' answers about willingness to engage in political violence and terrorism in broad and narrow sense



Graph 12 Distribution of respondents' answers about willingness to engage in terrorism in broad and narrow sense



Graph 13 Distribution of respondents' answers about willingness to engage in terrorism in narrow sense



With regard to the willingness to take action, the same pattern is evident, i.e., respondents' answers are distributed according to positively asymmetric curve that, as expected, deviates from the normal distribution, indicating that most people are not willing to undertake political violence or terrorist activities even if they consider that their people is threatened by another people. The distribution normality of these variables was additionally checked with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests.

Table 4 Test of normality of distribution of responses for views of radicalisation and willingness to take action


	Kolmogorov-Smirnov			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	Df	p	Statistic	Df	P
Views of radicalisation						
DET-1	0,392	616	0,00	0,671	616	0,00
DET-2	0,462	616	0,00	0,535	616	0,00
DET-3	0,434	616	0,00	0,598	616	0,00
DET-4	0,516	616	0,00	0,365	616	0,00
DET-5	0,491	616	0,00	0,434	616	0,00
DET-6	0,514	616	0,00	0,367	616	0,00
DET-7	0,51	616	0,00	0,367	616	0,00
DET-8	0,518	616	0,00	0,311	616	0,00
DET-9	0,522	616	0,00	0,291	616	0,00
Willingness to take action						
SnA-1	0,296	616	0,00	0,593	616	0,00
SnA-2	0,389	616	0,00	0,481	616	0,00
SnA-3	0,485	616	0,00	0,333	616	0,00

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Shapiro-Wilk test were used to check whether the distributions of the dependent variables deviate with statistical significance from the normal distribution. The results show that the distributions of all variables deviate significantly from the normal distribution, which is expected since the questionnaire examined attitudes pertaining to support for terrorism.

8.1. Orientation of prejudice

The orientation of prejudice of respondents who expressed significant prejudice against one or more peoples from the social distance scale is presented below.⁴⁷ Respondents could choose options 1-7, which refers to the prejudice orientation towards only one people, two or even all seven offered peoples, including their own. We present the distributions in total for all respondents, and by the respondents' ethnicity in general and combined with other socio-demographic characteristics: gender, urbanity level and population structure of the areas they come from.⁴⁸

Graph 14 General orientation of prejudice




Out of a total of 171 respondents who expressed strong prejudice against other peoples-nations (Graph 14), 60.6% believe that they would be more satisfied if Turks did not live in their country. Approximately two-fifths of respondents (39.4%) believe that they would be more satisfied if Americans did not live in their country, while between one-third and a quarter of respondents would be more satisfied if Bosniaks (25.3%), Croats (24.7%), Serbs (31.2%), Germans (25.9%) and Russians (28.8%) did not live in their country. Therefore, prejudice is mostly directed against Turks, slightly less against Americans and even less against Serbs, Russians, Germans, Bosniaks, and finally Croats.

⁴⁷ The respondents that we categorised as those with “no prejudice” and with “moderate prejudice” were not considered in this context.

⁴⁸ When analysing the distribution, one should keep in mind that in the total sample, 44.8% are Croats, 33.6% Bosniaks and 19.8% Serbs. For example, 7.7% of Bosniaks, 9.5% of Croats and 8.9% of Serbs are prejudiced against Germans (Graph 15). At first sight, this would mean that Croats are the most biased against Germans, followed by Serbs and Bosniaks. Bearing in mind the representation of a particular people in the sample, twice as many Serbs are biased against Germans compared to Croats and Bosniaks.

Graph 15 Orientation of prejudice by respondents' ethnicity




Compared to other peoples (Graph 15), Croats respondents harbour the highest level of prejudice against Turks (33%), followed by prejudice against Americans (17.3%), Bosniaks (16.7%), Serbs (12.5%), and Russians (11.3%). Croats expressed the least prejudice against Germans among the offered nations (9.5%). It is interesting to note that Croats also expressed prejudice against members of their own people (1.8%).

Compared to others, Bosniaks express the most prejudice against Serbs (17.3%), followed by Russians (15.5%) and Croats (13.1%). Bosniaks are somewhat less prejudiced against Americans and Turks (8.9%), and the least prejudiced against Germans (7.7%). Bosniaks also expressed prejudice against members of their own people (1.8%).


Compared to other nationalities, Serb respondents expressed the most prejudice against Turks (17.3%) and Americans (13.7%). They expressed slightly less prejudice against Croats (9.5%), Germans (8.9%) and Bosniaks (6.5%). They are almost not biased against Russians at all (1.2%).

Graph 16 Orientation of prejudice by respondents' ethnicity and gender




Observing the orientation of prejudice among respondents of different ethnicities considering their gender, almost identical distributions can be observed (Graph 16), with men showing a higher percentage of prejudice in all categories than women. Variations between men and women considering the respondents' ethnicity are noted in the level of prejudice against Germans, where Croat and Serb women show less prejudice than men of the same ethnicity.




Graph 17 Orientation of prejudice by respondents' ethnicity and urbanity level



When it comes to the urbanity level of areas that the respondents come from, different distributions can be observed by ethnicity of the respondents (Graph 17). Namely, Serb respondents from high urbanity areas express significantly more prejudice against all groups than Serbs from areas of low and medium urbanity levels. With Croats, the situation is reversed. Respondents from areas of low and medium urbanity levels express significantly more prejudice than those from more urban areas. Bosniak respondents from areas of medium urbanity level express more prejudice against peoples who are not from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Russians, Americans, Germans) unlike respondents from more urban areas who express stronger prejudice against the other peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbs and Croats).

Graph 18 Orientation of prejudice by respondents' ethnicity and population structure in areas they come from





There are also differences in the distribution of responses between respondents of different ethnicity considering the population structure of the places they come from (Graph 18). There are no Croats in almost mono-ethnic environments of a different ethnic group, and there is a very small number of Serb respondents in multi-ethnic environments without a dominant majority who expressed prejudice only against Turks. In such environments, Croats have dominantly prejudiced attitudes, followed by Bosniaks. Biased Croats dominate even in almost mono-ethnic environments of their ethnic group, with almost equal numbers of Serbs and Bosniaks. On the other hand, in multi-ethnic environments with a dominant majority of own ethnic group, biased Bosniaks dominate, followed by Serbs, and Croats hardly show any prejudice (except against Turks). In multi-ethnic environments with a dominant ethnic majority of a different ethnic group, Croats are the most prejudiced against Turks, less against Bosniaks, Bosniaks are biased against Serbs and Croats, and Serbs equally against everyone, except Turks against whom they are somewhat more biased.

9. ANALYSIS

In order to test the general hypothesis according to which ethnic prejudice influences radicalisation that can lead to terrorism, five special hypotheses were developed to examine the existence of statistically significant differences between respondents who were classified into subgroups according to the aforementioned criteria. Considering the theoretical assumptions of the research, certain hypotheses were formed as null hypotheses. The obtained results constitute the basis for drawing a conclusion confirming or rejecting the specific hypotheses, which provide an overall evaluation of the general hypothesis in terms of confirmation or rejection.⁴⁹

9.1. Analysis of differences in radicalisation between persons with different levels of ethnic prejudice

The specific hypothesis that is tested by this analytical procedure reads:

H1: There are statistically significant differences between persons manifesting ethnic prejudice (WP), persons manifesting moderate prejudice (MP) and persons not manifesting prejudice (NP) considering their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT).

This hypothesis is essentially the most important one of the special hypotheses because it directly examines the differences in the responses of respondents who harbour a higher or lower level of prejudice, and those who have no prejudice against other nations. In order to test the first hypothesis, that is, to examine if there are statistically significant differences between persons manifesting ethnic prejudice (WP), persons manifesting moderate prejudice (MP) and persons not manifesting prejudice (NP) in view of their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT), a series of one-way variance analyses was conducted.⁵⁰ The individual support for nine offered events with elements of terrorism from the recent and distant past that represent cognitive radicalisation (DET-1 - DET-9) and three types of willingness to take action were analysed in terms of cognitive-behavioural radicalisation (SnA-1, -2, -3), which is essentially a dependent variable, considering three groups of respondents with different degrees of prejudice against other ethnic groups as an independent variable.

⁴⁹ The conducted analyses refer to the differences in the level of support for certain events. One should keep in mind that, considering the positively asymmetric distribution of responses (support), it is mostly about ranges between 'not supporting at all' and 'supporting to a small extent' (with a small number of statements of extreme support), which implies a high level of opposition. Differences between subgroups exist and we conduct analyses to test whether they are statistically significant and whether there is a causal link.

⁵⁰ The procedure for analysing indicators of belonging to one of the three subgroups (NP-MP-WP) was explained earlier.

Table 5 Support for events with elements of terrorism and willingness to take action by level of expressed prejudice

	no prejudice		moderate prejudice		significant prejudice		df	F	P
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD			
DET-1	1.98 _a	1,32	1.57 _b	1,06	2.08 _a	1,49	2, 620	9,50	0,000
DET-2	1.41 _a	0,80	1.29 _a	0,74	1.76 _b	1,31	2, 622	12,65	0,000
DET-3	1.48 _a	0,91	1.42 _a	0,86	1.79 _b	1,27	2, 615	7,41	0,001
DET-4	1.22 _a	0,59	1.12 _a	0,43	1.23 _a	0,69	2, 617	2,44	0,088
DET-5	1.25 _a	0,67	1.23 _a	0,63	1.40 _a	0,96	2, 616	2,73	0,066
DET-6	1.21 _{a,b}	0,66	1.14 _a	0,50	1.33 _b	0,82	2, 616	3,93	0,020
DET-7	1.29 _a	0,75	1.11 _b	0,43	1.30 _a	0,82	2, 618	6,04	0,003
DET-8	1.21 _a	0,65	1.09 _b	0,38	1.23 _a	0,76	2, 615	3,67	0,026
DET-9	1.17 _{a,b}	0,55	1.07 _a	0,33	1.23 _b	0,75	2, 614	4,14	0,016
SnA-1	3.78 _a	8,19	3.40 _a	6,67	6.81 _b	10,14	2, 624	9,74	0,000
SnA-2	2.44 _a	7,14	2.04 _a	5,54	5.11 _b	8,97	2, 624	10,38	0,000
SnA-3	1.14 _a	4,70	.74 _a	3,39	2.69 _b	6,27	2, 622	8,99	0,000

Note. Bonferroni post-hoc: average values in individual rows that do not have the same letter as exponent are statistically significantly different ($p < 0.05$)

Analysis of variance with a risk of less than 5% revealed the existence of statistically significant differences between the group of respondents with no prejudice, the group with moderately expressed prejudice and the group with significant prejudice expressed in seven of the nine described events from the recent and distant past that constitute cognitive radicalisation (Table 5). A statistically significant difference between the three groups was obtained for the support to events: DET-1, DET-2, DET-3, DET-6, DET-7, DET-8 and DET-9, where a clear trend is visible according to which **the group of respondents with significantly expressed prejudice supports** these events from recent and distant past, that is, the perpetrators of those **acts to a maximum extent**.⁵¹ These results are fully in line with expectations. Furthermore, higher level of support for the two remaining events (DET-4 and DET-5) is observed in respondents expressing significant prejudice, but it is not statistically significant. The common element of these events (*Kurbegović and BSH*⁵²) is that they took place in the same area (United States) in the same time period (1970s). This can imply that the distance from the area where the respondents live and the passage of time contributed to smaller differences between the observed groups.

A statistically significant difference between groups with strong prejudice compared to those with no prejudice and with moderate prejudice was also established by their willingness to take action in all three areas (political violence and terrorism in the broad and narrow sense, SnA-1), (terrorism in the broad and in the narrow sense, SnA-2) and (terrorism in the narrow sense, SnA-3) where the group with significant prejudice shows the greatest willingness to take action. The non-prejudiced and moderately prejudiced groups do not differ in a statistically significant way.

⁵¹ In events DET-2, 3, 6, 9, there is statistically significant higher support among respondents with strong prejudice compared to the other two groups, and in events DET-1, 7, 8, statistically significant lower support among respondents with moderate prejudice compared to the other two groups.

⁵² BSH – hrv. Borci za slobodnu Hrvatsku (Fighters for Free Croatia).

Also, it was observed that the group with no prejudice shows a statistically significantly higher level of support for the events DET-1, DET-6, DET-7, DET-8, DET-9 than the group with moderate prejudice. These results may be directly influenced by a small number of respondents (18) whom the ethnic distance indicator analysis qualified as people with no prejudice, but at the same time their results were very high both in terms of willingness to take action and in terms of support for certain events. Despite the extreme views of these respondents, the overall finding is not distorted, according to which the statistically significant greater support and willingness to take action is shown by people with significant prejudice expressed. Also, one should not lose sight of the fact that there is a very thin line between people with moderate prejudice and people with no prejudice, considering the methodology we used during the classification.⁵³

Through the conducted analyses, we conclude that hypothesis H1 is confirmed and that there are statistically significant differences in the manifestation of radicalisation considering the respondents' prejudice, i.e., ethnic prejudice do influence the process of radicalisation that can lead to terrorism.

9.2. Analysis of differences in radicalisation between members of different peoples

The specific hypothesis that is tested by this analytical procedure reads:

H2: There are statistically significant differences between different peoples considering their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT).

Testing this particular hypothesis aimed at analysing the social identity theory through events DET-1 - DET-9, where greater support was expected for perpetrators of terrorist activities of the same ethnic or religious identity.

Testing of the second hypothesis, which examines whether there are statistically significant differences between different peoples considering their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism, was carried out by analysing the variance of responses of respondents of different ethnic background related to support for nine events involving elements of terrorism from the recent and distant past (cognitive radicalisation) and three forms of willingness to take action (cognitive-behavioural radicalisation). The variance analysis was used.

Variance analysis with a risk of less than 5% revealed statistically significant differences between different peoples (Croat, Serb and Bosniak) in terms of support for four of the nine offered events (Table 6).⁵⁴ These are events: DET-1, DET-2, DET-6 and DET-7. The post-hoc analysis with the Bonferroni test shows that three of the four offered acts (expected: DET-1-*Princip*, DET-2-*Račić/Radić* and unexpected: DET-6 *Jašarević*) were statistically significantly more supported by Serbs compared to Croats and Bosniaks, while the fourth event (DET-7-*Ibrić*) was statistically significantly more supported by Bosniaks than Serbs and Croats, which

⁵³ People without prejudice are those who agree to the most intimate form of contact, marriage with members of different ethnicity. Moderately prejudiced people are those who accept all forms of contact except for marriage. This issue can also be purely cultural.

⁵⁴ The previous processing has shown statistically significant differences in as many as seven out of nine events involving elements of terrorism which, viewed one-dimensionally, implies that prejudice has a much stronger influence on radicalisation than ethnic identity.

was expected. While the support for events DET-1, DET-2 and DET-7 can be described as expected in accordance with the social identity theory, a surprise here is the statistically significantly higher support of Serb respondents for event DET-6 compared to Bosniaks, since it is a terrorist act in which Mevlid Jašarević (Bosniak, member of the Salafi movement) attacked the US Embassy. This leads to a conclusion that over the social identity theory greater influence in radicalisation have the prejudice that individual Serb respondents harbour against US citizens. This conclusion is also confirmed by Graph 15, which shows that Serb respondents (13.7%) are more biased against Americans than Bosniak respondents (8.9%).

Statistically significant differences between different peoples in terms of their willingness to engage in political violence or terrorism in the narrow or broad sense were **not obtained**, which implies that members of all three peoples are equally willing to take action (Bosniaks slightly more compared to Serbs and Croats on the SnA-1 and SnA-2 scales, and Serbs compared to Bosniaks and Croats on the SnA-3 scale, but it is **not statistically significant**).

Table 6 Support for events with elements of terrorism and willingness to take action by ethnicity

	Croat		Serb		Bosniak		Df	F	P
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD			
DET-1	1.44 _a	0,90	3.33 _b	1,45	1.51 _a	1,01	2, 624	152,383	0,000
DET-2	1.16 _a	0,55	2.29 _b	1,36	1.35 _c	0,82	2, 619	77,554	0,000
DET-3	1.63 _a	1,12	1.46 _a	0,90	1.49 _a	0,94	2, 620	1,722	0,180
DET-4	1.13 _a	0,49	1.26 _a	0,67	1.20 _a	0,56	2, 621	2,506	0,082
DET-5	1.32 _a	0,90	1.27 _a	0,66	1.24 _a	0,58	2, 620	0,800	0,450
DET-6	1.16 _a	0,54	1.38 _b	0,84	1.17 _a	0,62	2, 620	5,584	0,004
DET-7	1.13 _a	0,47	1.23 _{a,b}	0,69	1.30 _b	0,82	2, 622	4,362	0,013
DET-8	1.14 _a	0,55	1.26 _a	0,72	1.12 _a	0,54	2, 619	2,459	0,086
DET-9	1.14 _a	0,52	1.19 _a	0,68	1.11 _a	0,44	2, 618	0,979	0,376
SnA-1	3.84 _a	7,59	5.03 _a	10,02	5.34 _a	8,61	2, 627	2,132	0,119
SnA-2	2.57 _a	6,47	3.52 _a	8,80	3.53 _a	7,60	2, 629	1,297	0,274
SnA-3	1.17 _a	4,07	1.70 _a	6,14	1.67 _a	5,14	2, 625	0,847	0,429

Note. Bonferroni post-hoc: average values in individual rows that do not have the same letter as exponent are statistically significantly different ($p < 0.05$)

Through the conducted analyses, we have concluded that hypothesis H2 cannot be fully confirmed⁵⁵ and that belonging to a certain people (identification) is not enough for radicalisation that can lead to terrorism, but that other factors have an influence, especially bias.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ The analyses have shown the expected results in only three of the nine events.

⁵⁶ Of note, this research does not refute the social identity theory, but builds on it.

9.3. Analysis of differences in radicalisation between members of different gender

The specific hypothesis that is tested by this analytical procedure reads:

H3: There are not statistically significant differences between different genders considering their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT).

The paper also examines the influence of gender on attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT) through expressed support for events involving elements of terrorism and willingness to take action. As differences between two groups only were tested, the t-test was used. Although the hypothesis is formulated as a null hypothesis, it primarily refers to cognitive radicalisation. The cognitive-behavioural radicalisation, especially behavioural disposition to terrorism is more specific for men. The terrorist behaviour corresponds more to traditional male roles, the initiative and desire to prove oneself that evolves into aggression, which on the one hand makes men more prone to the terrorism temptations, and more acceptable to terrorist groups on the other (Koomen & Van der Pligt, 2016). The hypothesis was formulated in order to exclude potential influence of the disproportion in numbers of respondents of different gender on the overall research results.

Gender proved to be statistically significant in three of the nine described events involving elements of terrorism (DET-1, DET-2, DET-3), where men expressed more support for the commission of the three acts, which is statistically significant (Table 7). These are three most famous events from history, but also the three oldest ones described. The mobilisation effect of big historical events obviously has a stronger effect on the male population than on women.

Table 7 Support for events with elements of terrorism and willingness to take action by gender

	M		F		df	T	P
	M	SD	M	SD			
DET-1	2.26 _a	1,51	1.63 _b	1,12	639	35,151	0,000
DET-2	1.59 _a	1,10	1.38 _b	0,87	634	6,262	0,013
DET-3	1.82 _a	1,24	1.41 _b	0,85	635	23,316	0,000
DET-4	1.17 _a	0,53	1.19 _a	0,58	636	0,156	0,693
DET-5	1.37 _a	0,95	1.25 _a	0,65	634	3,658	0,056
DET-6	1.24 _a	0,71	1.20 _a	0,62	635	0,466	0,495
DET-7	1.26 _a	0,77	1.19 _a	0,60	637	1,687	0,195
DET-8	1.17 _a	0,63	1.16 _a	0,57	634	0,009	0,925
DET-9	1.12 _a	0,46	1.16 _a	0,58	633	0,873	0,350
SnA-1	6.63 _a	10,86	3.51 _b	6,73	643	20,060	0,000
SnA-2	4.81 _a	9,78	2.18 _b	5,58	643	18,832	0,000
SnA-3	2.52 _a	6,79	.90 _b	3,48	641	15,900	0,000

Note. Bonferroni post-hoc: average values in individual rows that do not have the same letter as exponent are statistically significantly different ($p < 0.05$)

As for willingness to take action, men are expectedly more willing to take action than women, which is statistically significant, in the form of political violence and terrorism in the narrow or broad sense, as well as terrorism in the broad and narrow sense, and also in only violent forms of terrorist activity (terrorism in the narrow sense).

These analyses resulted in a conclusion that hypothesis H3 cannot be fully confirmed, but that the obtained results were expected. This hypothesis has no special significance in directly proving the general hypothesis and was only intended to show whether and to what extent gender influences the results of other examined variables.

9.4. Analysis of differences in radicalisation between respondents of different urbanity levels

The specific hypothesis that is tested by this analytical procedure reads:

H4: There are statistically significant differences between different groups by urbanity of places where respondents come from considering their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT).

This hypothesis was used to determine if there are other factors that have a causal effect on both variables (dependent and independent) and thereby influence the research results. The urbanity level of the place from which the respondents come to university was taken as explanatory variable, bearing in mind the theoretical assumptions that people from rural areas are more inclined to prejudice (Duckitt, 1994) and that terrorism as a form of violence is more specific for urban areas (Borum, 2004). Accordingly, the influence of urbanity level of places the respondents come from on their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT) was analysed. The variance analysis was used.

Table 8 Support for events with elements of terrorism and willingness to take action by urbanity level

	low urbanity (under 10,000 inhabitants)		medium urbanity (10,000 – 50,000 inhabitants)		high urbanity (above 50,000 inhabitants)		Df	F	P
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD			
DET-1	1.75 _a	1,21	1.83 _a	1,28	1.93 _a	1,38	2, 638	0,932	0,394
DET-2	1.41 _{a,b}	0,89	1.36 _a	0,82	1.58 _b	1,12	2, 633	3,254	0,039
DET-3	1.62 _a	1,06	1.60 _a	1,06	1.43 _a	0,91	2, 634	2,134	0,119
DET-4	1.17 _a	0,53	1.17 _a	0,54	1.21 _a	0,62	2, 635	0,408	0,665
DET-5	1.34 _a	0,81	1.28 _a	0,79	1.24 _a	0,67	2, 633	0,949	0,388
DET-6	1.21 _a	0,61	1.20 _a	0,69	1.23 _a	0,65	2, 634	0,113	0,893
DET-7	1.22 _a	0,67	1.18 _a	0,60	1.24 _a	0,72	2, 636	0,458	0,633
DET-8	1.12 _a	0,47	1.17 _a	0,64	1.20 _a	0,63	2, 633	0,970	0,380
DET-9	1.10 _a	0,42	1.15 _a	0,58	1.18 _a	0,60	2, 634	1,122	0,326
SnA-1	4.62 _a	8,80	5.16 _a	9,06	3.77 _a	7,27	2, 642	1,526	0,218
SnA-2	3.15 _a	7,62	3.56 _a	7,96	2.39 _a	6,23	2, 642	1,442	0,237
SnA-3	1.56 _a	5,01	1.70 _a	5,34	1.01 _a	4,14	2, 640	1,203	0,301

Note. Bonferroni post-hoc: average values in individual rows that do not have the same letter as exponent are statistically significantly different ($p < 0.05$)

The variance analysis showed that there are statistically significant differences in only one of the observed nine cases involving elements of terrorism (DET-2 - Radić/Račić) where people from high urbanity areas express more support to the perpetrator of this terrorist act compared to respondents from medium and low urbanity areas (Table 8). Graph 17, which shows the orientation of prejudice of certain peoples by urbanity level of areas they come from, indicates that the Serb respondents (gray-rose colour) who come from high urbanity places express far more prejudice against all offered peoples, except for Russians and Serbs, than Serbs from low and medium urbanity areas. This leads us to the conclusion that statistically significant differences, according to which respondents from high urbanity areas express more support to the DET-2 event than respondents from medium and lower urbanity areas, may actually be the result of bias, which further confirms the general research hypothesis. Bearing in mind that a statistically significant difference was determined for only one of the offered events involving elements of terrorism, the overall impact of this variable can be ignored.

No statistically significant differences were found with regard to the willingness to take action. One can conclude that the influence of urbanity level of places the respondents come from on their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT) is not statistically significant.

Therefore, **the conducted analyses result in the conclusion that hypothesis H4 can be dismissed.** The urbanity level explanatory variable can be excluded from the influence on the causality of prejudice as an independent variable and radicalisation that can lead to terrorism as a dependent variable.

9.5. Analysis of differences in radicalisation between respondents by different population structure of areas they come from

The specific hypothesis that is tested by this analytical procedure reads:

H5: There are statistically significant differences between different groups by population structure of places where respondents come from by their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT).

Bearing in mind the research area (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in the context of the relative deprivation and the root causes of terrorism theories, the population structure of areas that the respondents come from was established as an important explanatory variable. With regard to bias, this variable is significant in the context of contact hypothesis. Most of the respondents were born after the most recent war and during their socialisation processes, they grew up in different environments by population structure. It was analysed whether there are statistically significant differences in the level of support for events involving elements of terrorism and willingness to take action between different respondent subgroups by population structure of places where respondents come from. The variance analysis was used.

The conducted variance analysis found statistically significant difference between different groups by population structure of places where respondents come from in their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (ARLT) with regard to one terrorist act only (Table 9). It is the DET-3 incident (*assassination of king Aleksandar*). It proved out that respondents from an almost mono-ethnic environment of their ethnic group express the statistically significant greatest support for this event, and the least support was expressed by

respondents from a multi-ethnic environment dominated by their ethnic majority. Graph 18 shows that Croat respondents coming from an almost mono-ethnic environment of their ethnic group express the strongest prejudice against ethnic Serbs (20%), while the least prejudice against ethnic Serbs (3.6%) was expressed by Croat respondents who come from a multi-ethnic environment dominated by their ethnic majority, observed against the other three respondent subgroups. In view of this finding, we can conclude that in this case, too, support for the event is not related to the population structure, but to bias. Considering that a statistically significant difference was found for only one of the offered events involving elements of terrorism, the overall impact of this variable can be ignored.

Table 9 Support for events with elements of terrorism and willingness to take action by population structure

	almost mono-ethnic environment of my ethnic group		almost mono-ethnic environment of ethnic group other than mine		multi-ethnic environment without a dominant majority		multi-ethnic environment with dominant majority of my ethnic group		multi-ethnic environment with dominant majority of ethnic group different from mine		df	F	P
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD			
DET-1	1.88 _a	1,32	2.13 _a	0,99	1.60 _a	1,07	1.91 _a	1,35	1.64 _a	1,17	4,636	1,412	0,228
DET-2	1.44 _a	0,95	1.50 _a	0,76	1.28 _a	0,66	1.54 _a	1,06	1.34 _a	0,81	4,631	1,443	0,218
DET-3	1.74 _a	1,20	1.75 _{a,b}	1,16	1.48 _{a,b}	0,96	1.39 _b	0,80	1.47 _{a,b}	0,91	4,632	4,105	0,003
DET-4	1.20 _a	0,61	1.38 _a	0,52	1.17 _a	0,53	1.15 _a	0,52	1.23 _a	0,63	4,633	0,586	0,673
DET-5	1.37 _a	0,87	1.25 _a	0,46	1.28 _a	0,71	1.22 _a	0,67	1.28 _a	0,68	4,631	1,221	0,301
DET-6	1.25 _a	0,68	1.63 _a	1,06	1.23 _a	0,64	1.17 _a	0,62	1.13 _a	0,49	4,632	1,527	0,193
DET-7	1.22 _a	0,68	1.37 _a	0,74	1.16 _a	0,57	1.22 _a	0,66	1.21 _a	0,75	4,634	0,259	0,904
DET-8	1.21 _a	0,66	1.38 _a	0,52	1.12 _a	0,47	1.14 _a	0,57	1.15 _a	0,51	4,631	0,832	0,505
DET-9	1.19 _a	0,64	1.25 _a	0,46	1.08 _a	0,38	1.11 _a	0,48	1.17 _a	0,56	4,630	1,174	0,321
SnA-1	5.15 _a	9,05	5.75 _a	4,25	2.82 _a	5,95	4.28 _a	8,29	5.38 _a	9,70	4,640	1,477	0,207
SnA-2	3.61 _a	7,78	3.45 _a	4,20	1.90 _a	4,92	2.77 _a	7,35	3.42 _a	8,54	4,640	1,044	0,384
SnA-3	1.62 _a	5,03	2.20 _a	3,31	.94 _a	2,93	1.40 _a	5,20	1.26 _a	5,23	4,638	0,382	0,821

Note. Bonferroni post-hoc: average values in individual rows that do not have the same letter as exponent are statistically significantly different ($p < 0.05$)

Regarding the willingness to commit political violence and terrorism in a broad or narrow sense, the population structure did not prove to be a statistically significant factor.⁵⁷

The conducted analyses result in the conclusion that hypothesis H5 can be dismissed. The population structure explanatory variable can be excluded from the influence on the causality of prejudice as an indepen-

⁵⁷ The obtained result regarding the influence of population structure of places where respondents come from on their attitudes about radicalisation that can lead to terrorism should be viewed with reservations. Namely, the unequal distribution of respondents into groups by population structure along with the asymmetric distribution of attitudes about radicalisation could have influenced the results in a way that even a small difference was declared statistically significant for this one act, while it most likely does not exist in the population. The same applies to the influence of urbanity level from the previous subsection.

dent variable and radicalisation that can lead to terrorism as a dependent variable.

9.6. Comparative review of statistically significant differences of the observed variables

If we compare the statistical significance of the results of previous analyses against the observed variables, we can see that prejudice is a far greater predictor⁵⁸ compared to other observed variables (table 10). This shows that prejudice is an important driver on the path of radicalisation to terrorism. Ethnicity is another important variable in terms of cognitive support, which confirms the importance and reach of the social identity theory. An important variable in terms of cognitive-behavioural support is the respondents' gender.

Table 10 Comparative review of statistical significance of the observed variables

	Prejudice	Ethnicity	Gender	Urbanity	Population structure
DET-1	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,394	0,228
DET-2	0,000	0,000	0,013	0,039	0,218
DET-3	0,001	0,180	0,000	0,119	0,003
DET-4	0,088	0,082	0,693	0,665	0,673
DET-5	0,066	0,450	0,056	0,388	0,301
DET-6	0,020	0,004	0,495	0,893	0,193
DET-7	0,003	0,013	0,195	0,633	0,904
DET-8	0,026	0,086	0,925	0,380	0,505
DET-9	0,016	0,376	0,350	0,326	0,321
SnA-1	0,000	0,119	0,000	0,218	0,207
SnA-2	0,000	0,274	0,000	0,237	0,384
SnA-3	0,000	0,429	0,000	0,301	0,821

As statistical significance appears in certain events for two or more variables, interaction effects were analysed (results not included in this edition). Certain interaction effects additionally confirmed the influence of prejudice on radicalisation that can lead to terrorism.

⁵⁸ Numbers in bold.

10. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The research we conducted shows that previously adopted prejudice influences radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (in Bosnia and Herzegovina), thus confirming the general research hypothesis. We drew this conclusion from a series of the following factually established judgments related to specific hypotheses:

1. By analysing the differences in radicalisation between people who expressed different levels of ethnic bias, it was found that biased people also expressed a statistically significant higher level of both cognitive and cognitive-behavioural radicalisation. Respondents who expressed significant prejudice largely supported the perpetrators of attacks with elements of terrorism and largely expressed willingness to take action, including terrorism, if their people was threatened. This applies to all events except for those from the seventies that took place on the territory of the United States of America. Statistically significant differences in terms of support for events involving elements of religious radicalisation were found only in persons with different degrees of inherent bias. Grouping according to other criteria in the conducted analyses did not show statistically significant differences for the described events involving elements of religious identification.
2. When it comes to the analysis of differences in radicalisation between respondents of different ethnic background, it was found that the respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not differ in terms of cognitive-behavioural radicalisation, which is expected. None of the peoples has shown greater willingness to take action in protection against potential threats than the other two. With regard to cognitive radicalisation, it was found that the respondents partially hold attitudes as expected in accordance with the social identity theory, expressing significantly more support to perpetrators from their own people who committed terrorist acts. This especially comes to the fore in events from distant past involving elements of terrorism, where related resentments concerning ethnic conflicts can be found (Princip, Radić, King Aleksandar). One event yielded unexpected results. It is the event in which Serb respondents expressed more support for the terrorist attack committed by an ethnic Bosniak on the Embassy of the United States of America in Sarajevo than Bosniak respondents. This finding also suggests that another factor was more important than ethnicity in supporting this event. That factor could be prejudice against Americans because it was found that Serb respondents are more biased against Americans than Bosniak respondents (13.7% compared to 8.9%),⁵⁹ which additionally confirms the general research hypothesis.
3. As expected, men show more willingness to take action, that is, a disposition to cognitive-behavioural radicalisation, and an unexpectedly greater cognitive radicalisation in three historical events involving elements of terrorism.

⁵⁹ This ratio is even higher considering that there are almost twice as many Bosniaks as Serbs in the sample.

4. The urbanity level in itself has no influence on cognitive or cognitive-behavioural radicalisation. Prejudice that is generally more common in rural areas does not follow this pattern against urban areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The existence of a statistically significant difference in the support for the political assassination of Stjepan Radić is probably a consequence of bias, since Serbs who expressed significant prejudice generally come from high urbanity areas.
5. Population structure of the places that the respondents come from by itself also has no influence on cognitive-behavioural or cognitive radicalisation. The support for the assassination of King Alexander is not related to the population structure of the area that the respondents come from, but to the expressed prejudice against Serbs by Croat respondents.

10.1. Research limitations and expectations

The limitations and expectations of the research we conducted are related to three important issues: the sample used in the empirical research, the area to which the research is directly related (Bosnia and Herzegovina), and applicability to forms of terrorism other than ethnic.

As mentioned above, the used sample does not represent overall population. These are young people striving for higher education. A stratified sample would probably show the existence of differences in analysed attitudes by age of the respondents, socio-economic status (including completed education, employment and income), mobility and similar socio-demographic data. However, to confirm the hypothesis, the differences between subgroups formed within the observed sample are far more significant than the fact that, for example, persons from older age groups show lower radicalisation levels than younger people. Also, one can reasonably assume that differences between people from, for example, older age groups classified by ethnicity, level of expressed bias, gender, etc., are consistent with differences established within the observed sample.

The research was conducted in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a rather unique social and political environment. Historical turbulence in ethnic relations and the current constitutional setup can have a direct impact on the overall structure of relations between members of different peoples, and thereby on internalisation and development of ethnic bias. Regardless of this, we consider the overall research findings to be applicable to other areas with similar ethnic and/or religious environment where there is competition for resources or conflict over the particular interests of different groups.

The research we conducted is related to the influence of ethnic prejudice on radicalisation that can lead to terrorism. In the theoretical definition of the research subject, we indicated terrorism heterogeneity, which implies that it is very difficult to present and prove the principal rules related to this phenomenon. The phenomenology of terrorism, which has several typologies and classifications, is divided according to different ideological orientations, among others. In that respect, the terrorism of non-governmental terrorist groups is generally divided to: social-revolutionary terrorism, nationalist-separatist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, and terrorism of religious extremists (Post, 2005b), i.e., ethnic terrorism, religious terrorism, far-left terrorism and far-right terrorism. Empirical research we conducted is focused on testing of the hypothesis about the influence of ethnic prejudice on radicalisation that can lead to terrorism. Therefore, by confirming the general hypothesis, it was undoubtedly found that in the radicalisation process of ethnic terrorism, a significant place is occupied by prior internalisation of prejudice against members of another people with which own people is in a conflict or competition over significant resources, positions of power and influence, etc. Considering that, apart from ethnic bias, the theory also knows religious and class bias, i.e., classism (Kite & Whitley, 2016), it is clear how

the findings of this research can be applied to religious terrorism and far-left terrorism. Far-right terrorism, or radicalism in general on the far-right political spectrum, has already been proven to be highly correlated with authoritarianism, a concept associated with bias. These hypothetical-theoretical assumptions require further empirical confirmation.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Terrorism is a complex, multivariate, heterogeneous and omnipresent phenomenon. These are some of the characteristics that make it difficult to define terrorism, for almost a century. Controversies surrounding the conceptual determination of what terrorism is were further fuelled by the politicisation of the phenomenon and observations from political-ideological perspectives. The famous maxim “one person’s freedom fighter is another person’s terrorist” is a classic example of trivialisation of consequences (human victims) from the perspective of objectives (of ideology we agree with or not).

Using the mathematical-statistical method, Alex Schmid helped the most in defining terrorism by analysing the frequency of occurrence of certain terms in the definition of terrorism. In accordance with his findings, the most frequently mentioned term “violence” is essentially a higher gender term (*genus proximum*) in the definition of terrorism. The specific differences (*diferentia specifica*) that distinguish this phenomenon from other forms of violence are: political background, fear-causing, influencing undecided mass, i.e., the public in terms of radicalisation and mobilisation, and extra-normality of methods and means for carrying out attacks. We should not go further than this when defining terrorism. Therefore, terrorism means perpetrated or threatened violence against persons or property, used in order to achieve certain political-ideological goals by inducing fear in society.

The heterogeneity of terrorism resulted in numerous classifications and typologies. For the research in question, the typology from the perspective of political ideology preached, followed and supported by members of certain terrorist organisations, is of the greatest importance. Jerold Post (2005b) tentatively divided terrorism of non-governmental terrorist groups to: social-revolutionary terrorism, nationalist-separatist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, terrorism of religious extremists, and single issue terrorism.

Prejudice is also an omni-present phenomenon that has its variations in phenomenology, but is quite simple conceptually. These are distorted, negative attitudes towards members of certain groups based solely on the fact of belonging to that group. Prejudice can be ethnic, religious, racial, class etc. The phenomenological compatibility of terrorism and prejudice points to potential etiologial connection, that is, causality between the two phenomena.

Identity has been observed multiple times in the context of influence on terrorism from the perspective of social identification, identity crisis, search for identity, subordination of individual identity to collective identity, depersonalisation, and identity as an ideology element. Social categorisation is an important phenomenon in identity construction. Social and cognitive categorisation are important constructs in the process of internalising bias. The theory of root causes of terrorism that lie in social, economic, political, cultural and historical factors, that is, historically conditioned inequalities in the distribution of power and wealth both globally and locally, is generally accepted. Equally, the conditions of inter-group contacts are important causes of bias. However, these two groups of terrorism theories failed to answer the question of why so many people who have a

collective identity developed and exist in the environment of socio-historical inequalities do not show any signs of radicalisation to terrorism. Furthermore, there are numerous overlapping etiological theories about terrorism and bias, among others the socialisation and social learning theories, the frustration-aggression hypothesis, the relative deprivation theory, and the actual deprivation (oppression) theory. All of the above points to the potential causality of these two phenomena.

The process of internalising prejudice is complex and influenced by many factors. In understanding the overall etiology of terrorism and particular involvement in terrorism, significant progress has been made by transforming the question of why one becomes a terrorist into the question of how one becomes a terrorist. The focus of recent research is on the process of radicalisation that precedes engagement in terrorist organisations. In this context, numerous theories about the radicalisation process have been developed and numerous radicalisation factors have been identified that contribute to the decision to get involved in terrorism. Radicalisation is essentially a process by which a person adopts a belief system that justifies the use of violence as a method of achieving social change as a goal.

Prejudice is primarily a social-psychological phenomenon. Terrorism is a phenomenon studied by several different sciences: criminal and international law, security studies, criminology, political science, sociology, criminal justice sciences, psychology and social psychology, etc. In understanding the aetiology of terrorism, social psychology offered multiple quality solutions shaped into different theories. Social psychology classifies the causes of both phenomena, terrorism and prejudice, to micro, mezzo and macro levels, i.e., the individual level, the level of dynamics within a group, and the level of interaction between groups. Radicalisation factors are also classified by these three levels. This additionally pointed to the causality of the prejudice and terrorism phenomenon through the concept of radicalisation.

Theoretical research has established that the causal link, i.e., the causality of the prejudice and terrorism phenomenon, has mostly been scientifically and professionally researched and observed in the direction in which terrorism, i.e. perpetrated terrorist attacks increase the level of prejudice in society, mostly using the mortality reminder mechanism. The terror management theory offered an understanding of how this mechanism works. A few theoreticians posited the possibility of existence of an opposite causal link in which prejudice is the driver on the terrorism path, but unfortunately uncorroborated by empirical data, which limits the overall reach of such research.

Accordingly, empirical research was conducted with the aim of establishing the existence of a direct link between previously adopted prejudice (independent variable) and radicalisation that can lead to terrorism (dependent variable). The research was conducted through an online survey of first-year students at three universities in Bosnia and Herzegovina through four sets of questions relating to socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, ethnic distance from other peoples, cognitive radicalisation in terms of supporting certain events with elements of terrorism, and cognitive-behavioural radicalisation in terms of willingness to engage in different non-violent and violent activities in situations of potential threat to the respondent's people. In order to examine potential influence of third factors as causes of both phenomena as part of sociodemographic characteristics, additional explanatory variables related to the prejudice and terrorism phenomenon were introduced: urbanity level and the population structure of places where the respondents come from. Also, the influence of the social identity theory and relative deprivation theory was tested, and the research hypothesis was not focused on questioning or overthrowing these theories, but rather upgrading them, and offering an answer to the above: why only a small number of people who have the same collective identity and experience relative deprivation actually become radicalised to terrorism.

After exhaustive and detailed analyses and processing of respondents' answers, confirming and rejecting specific hypotheses, the general hypothesis was confirmed. It has been irrefutably established that ethnic prejudice is a crucial driver on the path of radicalisation that can lead to terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, that there is a direct causality of independent and dependent variables. The analyses showed the existence of statistically significant differences in the majority of events involving elements of terrorism that examined cognitive radicalisation, even in cases of terrorist attacks with numerous casualties where direct ethnic identification of respondents with the perpetrator is lacking. The identity connection could exist on a very broad religious principle and in a negative sense, through support for the attacked targets (religious buildings). Also, statistically significant differences were found in terms of the cognitive-behavioural disposition of willingness to engage in a terrorist activity in situations of potential threat to own people. Persons with internalised prejudice are more willing to take action than those with moderate or no bias.

Social (ethnic) identity is an important factor in cognitive radicalisation, but mostly in terms of providing support to perpetrators in historical events involving elements of terrorism that heavily influenced general political movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region, and supporting recent events that occurred on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A similar finding follows the relative deprivation issues. Gender plays a role in cases of cognitive-behavioural radicalisation, as men are expectedly more willing to directly engage in terrorism than women. The urbanity level and population structure did not play a direct role in cognitive and cognitive-behavioural radicalisation.

Radicalisation obviously begins much earlier, in early childhood when the foundation for future adoption of radical ideologies is laid through socialisation and internalisation of bias. Regardless of the offered radicalisation model, the adoption prejudice can be seen as a preliminary stage of each of the possible models.

In accordance with the confirmed basic work hypothesis, we offer the PRaT model (prejudice-radicalisation-terrorism) as a special radicalisation model in which prejudice as a negative social phenomenon can lead to radicalisation, directly or indirectly (through polarisation, discrimination and similar effects), which results in non-violent political actions, violent extremism and different forms of political violence. In the chain of manifestations, violent action may grow into terrorism. The proposed model also suggests a shorter causality path that moves along the direct prejudice-radicalisation-terrorism line. Prejudice adopted under the influence of different factors in the specific social context leads to the radicalisation of individuals ready to engage in a conflict that manifests itself in terrorism as the chosen type of fight. The feedback loop of terrorism, violent extremism, but also non-violent radical political actions, leads to rising prejudice in the society, which has already been empirically proven many times.

Finally, research implications for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is definitely a potential for radicalisation to terrorism among young people with strong bias. In the observed sample, 27% of respondents expressed significant bias, and 40% moderate bias. Radicalisation potential does not mean involvement in terrorist activities, which takes place under the influence of many other factors, precipitants, trigger events, etc. Two and a half decades after the end of the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina's post-conflict society is extremely polarised by unresolved fundamental political issues and the day-to-day political instrumentalisation of those issues. The three main actors on the political scene (three peoples) radically differ by their visions of the country's future. One could say that the society is in a transition from post-conflict to pre-conflict, and terrorism has often been the chosen tactic for conducting conflicts through history.

Deradicalisation programmes and anti-prejudice intervention programmes are compatible in their key assumptions related to the analysis of the nature of the situation and social context (past, present and future)

of interaction between opposing sides. Terrorism as a security and political phenomenon is a product of place and time. Counter-radicalisation, which is aimed at the wider community in terms of influencing individuals in the earliest stages of radicalisation, is a concept that has proven to be highly complementary to efforts to deradicalize the already radicalised individuals, that is, to disengage individuals who are involved in terrorism. As we have proved the causality between prejudice and radicalisation that can lead to terrorism, in order to reduce radicalisation, counter-radicalisation intervention programmes should be designed aiming at general population, especially the strongly biased part of the population. Intervention programmes must therefore integrate measures aimed at the individual, group and intergroup levels. The already proved programmes to reduce prejudice in society, adapted to the nature of the situation and social context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should result in a decrease of radicalisation that can lead to terrorism. It is by no means an easy job. It is easier to split an atom than to crack prejudice.

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Damir Bevanda has a PhD in Security and Peace Studies from the Faculty of Political Sciences in Sarajevo. He completed his undergraduate and master's studies in criminology at Ministry of Interior - Police Academy in Zagreb. He published several security-related scientific and professional papers and presented his work at a number of international conferences. He is a lecturer in security and criminology courses. *Terrorism and Prejudice – Known and Unknown Causalities* is the first book he published as a single author. He has been an official of the security sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina for many years, and is currently Chief Inspector of the Intelligence and Security Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Damir Bevanda's study is an extensive theoretical and empirical research, unique in the academic community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also beyond. His theoretical approach to terrorism offers a relevant critical analysis of contemporary and internationally relevant studies, while the research and analysis of the results additionally legitimise him as an outstanding researcher in the empirical examination of how prejudice can impact radicalisation that can lead to terrorism. This study is recommended to a wider academic readership as a significant theoretical and empirical model for studying terrorism and its causes.

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This book presents a strong theoretical and empirical probing into ethnic prejudices the impact of which on the production of radicalism, violent extremism and political violence must not be underestimated. The author based his research on impressive literature, whose relevance, accompanied by skilful use of the research material, grant a par excellence scientific legitimacy this book.

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