Democracy and Security
in Southeastern Europe

NATO's New Strategic Concept

NATO 2020:
Assured Security;
Dynamic Engagement

Tena Broda
Novi NATO Strategski Koncept

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KOREMATSU WITH A HUMAN FACE
The Atlantic Initiative (AI) is a non-profit, non-governmental organization, established in Sarajevo in 2009 by a group of academics and journalists concerned about the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the slow pace of its accession to NATO and the European Union.

We believe that Bosnia’s integration into NATO and the EU is of crucial importance for the country, but are equally convinced that lively and informed public debate before and during this process is sine qua non for its successful completion. In that spirit, we wish to initiate, encourage and enable this debate through a wide range of activities on various platforms in order to reach and involve multiple audiences.

The journal "Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe" is only one of our projects under this stated aim, carried out in partnership with the governments of the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Norway. We are thankful for the encouragement from several non-governmental organizations in the region and particularly grateful for the support of the NATO HQ Sarajevo, the Bosnian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Bosnian Ministry of Defense and the George Marshall Alumni Association in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

For more information on the Atlantic Initiative, please visit our web page: http://www.atlantskainicijativa.org/
Dear readers,

Several important events which could impact the dynamics and substance of processes in the region have occurred between the last and this (double) issue of Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe.

At the end of April, at a meeting in Tallinn, foreign ministers of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries invited Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) on the condition that all immovable military property used for defense purposes is transferred to the state and registered as its property, i.e. as the property of the BiH Ministry of Defense. The North Atlantic Council has been authorized to accept the first Annual National Program from BiH, as stipulated by the MAP, only when this condition has been met. Given the post-Dayton construction of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the current ratio of political power in the country, meeting this condition represents a serious test. It is certain that the upcoming October elections will only make this test more challenging.

In mid-May, an expert group appointed by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen presented its recommendations for the creation of a new Strategic Concept for the North Atlantic Alliance. Through a public debate - the scope of which was unprecedented in the Alliance’s history, and which included representatives of the civil sector, strategic partners, and international organizations and institutions, and was presided over by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright - the expert group reached agreement on the most important recommendations for a “new NATO”. Their report noted, among other things, that NATO has a permanent obligation to guarantee security of its members, and that this goal can be reached only if the Alliance is engaged in a dynamic development of relations with states and organizations beyond its borders.

In addition, the report recommends developing partnerships with the European Union and Russia, and states that the creation of a secure environment will be supported by the continuation of NATO’s gradual enlargement policy. By inclusion of Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the expansion to Southeastern Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance has integrated almost the whole region, fully or significantly, with the exception of Serbia. The internal situation in Serbia, as well as NATO-Russia relations, are likely to determine whether, when, how, and to what extent Serbia will move closer to the Western military alliance.

“Together when we can, alone when we must” – this is how former U.S. President Bill Clinton summarized his administration’s attitude toward post-Cold War international crises and external challenges to U.S. national security in the mid-1990s. The succeeding George W. Bush administration believed that, following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, it was entitled to a unilateral approach to security threats, aided by (often unwilling!) alliances with
its closest partners. To paraphrase President Clinton’s adage, the Bush approach could be summarized loosely as “Alone we must go now, others can follow us.” At the end of May 2009, President Barack Obama’s administration presented its first comprehensive U.S. National Security Strategy, announcing a departure from the previous administration’s so-called preventive war concept and suggesting better cooperation with China and India. The strategy points to the destruction of Al-Qaeda as one of its key goals, but it also discusses the threat of domestic terrorism for the first time. “We have to face the world as it is in order to succeed,” the new Obama doctrine concludes. With the Kosovo chapter closed, American opportunities to confront Southeastern Europe “as it is” are in its engagement with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The form of that engagement will partially depend on the outcome of October elections in BiH, as well as on the administration’s ability to recognize and support solutions that will encourage and strengthen genuine democratic and reform processes.

At the end of June, a powerful improvised explosive device (IED) went off in front of the Bugojno police station, representing the first act of terrorism in BiH in the so-called ‘post 9/11 context,’ a phrase that has become a frequent and simplistic moniker for the global security environment after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The attack in Bugojno resulted in myriad reactions and raised numerous questions. The key, and still unanswered, question is whether it was an isolated attack by a religiously radicalized group of multiple repeat criminals or if the Bugojno explosion has made BiH a part of the ‘global Salafi insurgence,’ which is only bound to escalate. Equally important is the question of whether Bosnia and Herzegovina possesses the real internal capacities and political will to fight security threats such as terrorism, or if preserving a security illusion is the most that local political elites are able to accomplish given the way they see fit to rule the country.

At the end of July, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague delivered the discretionary but still important opinion that the Kosovo declaration of independence did not violate international law. Though the court’s opinion relates exclusively to the circumstances surrounding the Kosovo declaration of independence, there are overt secessionist ambitions in Europe — and in the region — which could, at least in short term, look to The Hague ruling for encouragement and as a basis for further activities.

In a country such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, continuation of the process of state delegitimization and flirtations with the idea to make one of its parts independent — even if only as part of the election campaign — could further encourage the internal erosion of state structures. The European Union has recognized this threat and, just a couple of days after the ICJ opinion on Kosovo became public, the British media revealed the details of EU High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton’s new plan for BiH. The plan anticipates the introduction of mechanisms that should prevent additional weakening of the state and remove obstacles to reform processes. It is difficult and unappreciative to predict at this moment how much and in which way these events may impact security and democratic processes in Southeastern Europe, but it is certain that some of them have decisively influenced our contributors, determining the content and scope of this issue of our journal.
The Lead Story

New NATO or Old Geopolitics?

Global Multilateralism versus American Unilateralism

By Danko Plevnik

Through engagement by Putin, Russia has signed military alliances with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela. In Cuba and Venezuela, it holds part of its naval fleet and a stealth bomber that could reach the United States.

I will begin an analysis of NATO’s perspective by following the train of thought of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who I appreciate for his balancing of ideal political philosophy and realpolitik, and whose works represent fundamental readings for anyone interested in issues of American security. I met him in 1999 when presenting him my new book, New NATO or Old Geopolitics? at the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall in Vienna.

In the book, I point to the difference between the euphemistic doctrine of “common values” that drove the expansion of NATO, and the tactical consequences of a military encirclement of Russia and approach toward the borders of China. The situation in the field has exposed that old geopolitics continue despite the new rhetoric of NATO that the U.S. has a surplus of weapons but lacks manpower, which is what it will require from new member states. The main idea of the book, which I wrote before the war in Kosovo (1999), was that NATO will be forced to transform from a defensive alliance into an offensive one. I asked a number of still-unanswered questions, such as: What does it mean to join NATO, if NATO itself does not know where it is going? Does NATO membership lead toward a definite eradication of war in the world or just toward control over one that occurs within the Northern hemisphere? Is NATO being developed as a global security system or as a white man’s military alliance? Or, is it being converted to an operational mixture of interventionist legitimism and penetrating transatlantic monetarism? Will NATO cease to be an exclusively European phenomenon any time soon? Does it intend to be the means of pressure in a possible geo-economic war with China? What is NATO’s macro-political perspective?

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Even laypeople understand that the United States is the heart of NATO. NATO is an instrument of U.S. geopolitics; after all, NATO is primarily a geopolitical — and only secondarily a military, political, and diplomatic — organization. De Gaulle once argued that American hegemony was hiding under the guise of NATO integration. The world of de Gaulle is past, and these days NATO has
Journal „DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE“ is available at Central and Eastern European Online Library (C.E.E.O.L.) (http://www.ceeol.com).